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Abstract
Lower child mortality may imply a higher rate of return to
education, namely investments in human capital which is the
prime engine for the economic growth. As Noble-laureate
Amartya Sen convincingly argues that child mortality is an
important indicator of economic success since being alive
is already a necessary condition for our capabilities and it
is helpful in the formulation of the public policy decisions.
In other words, it is a good measure to understand how
governments are successful and effective in public resource
allocation(Sen98). Public spending on family-specific benefits
are one of the public social welfare programmes which are
implemented with distributional concerns. They are mainly
designed to support families for childbearing and childrear-
ing activities (e.g childcare, schooling). The two most impor-
tant public spending categories amongst family-specific poli-
cies are family allowances and the parental leave benefits. Fam-
ily allowances and the parental leave benefits are mainly de-
signed for the children’s well-being and the quality of life.
This dissertation touches on the links between family-specific
policies, the governance of public resource allocation and the
child health outcomes across OECD countries.
The dissertation is composed of three main chapters.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 sheds light on the relationship between pub-
lic spending on parental leave benefits and child health
outcomes-proxied with the infant and under-five mortality
rates- across OECD countries. Parental leave benefits are
xiii
government-funded entitlements which are paid at a rate
when parents are entitled to a leave period to care for their
newborn or young children. Parental leave benefits are often
a set proportion (wage replacement rates) of previous earn-
ings. Replacement rates vary across countries. Similar to some
prior literature which focuses on the association between pub-
lic spending and development outcomes, overall findings ex-
plain a surprising result that public spending often does not
yield the expected improvements in development outcomes.
The main finding of this chapter reveals that there is no ev-
idence for a significant relationship between parental leave
benefits and child health outcomes OECD countries.
Chapter 3
The preliminary result on the lack of a relationship between
public spending on parental leave benefits and child health
outcomes may questionize the efficacy of the public resource
allocation amongst social policy areas. Over the last three
decades in the OECD area, public spending on parental ben-
efits is one of the programmes with the low level GDP share.
The reason behind this lack of a relationship between parental
leave benefits and child health outcomes might be the in-
sufficient allocation due to the crowding out effect of tradi-
tional social polices (e.g pensions, old-age) on new policies
(e.g childcare). The population structure is a key driver of so-
cial welfare spending allocation across OECD countries where
the big part of the social spending goes to the elderly pop-
ulation. According to the latest statistics of the OECD “So-
cial Expenditures Database” (2009), overall total social wel-
fare spending is estimated as 22% of GDP where spending on
old age benefits and pensions are accounted for 11% of GDP.
Compared to the old-age benefits and pensions, OECD coun-
tries redistribute less amount of their GDP towards family-
xiv
specific benefits. The share of the parental leave benefits
was only 0.3% of GDP in 2009, while it was as high as
0.14% in 1980(OEC13f). This might be a rational response of
vote-seeking politicians, since the population of many OECD
countries are getting older, and voters over fifty are those
with the greatest propensity to vote. It is the case where
Down’s(1957) benchmark model of democracy applies. It is
characterised by complete policy commitment, policy choices
reflect the preferences of the median voter. However, in pol-
icy making electorally accountable governments often fail to
reflect the interests of the disadvantaged groups of race, gen-
der, class(Pan03). In contrast to Down’s Median Voter The-
orem, more recent “Citizen Candidate Models” assign a role
for the preferences of politicians. Following “Citizen Candi-
date Models”, there is a significant amount of research which
has emphasized that preferences of female politicians mat-
ter in family-specific policy making which directly reflects
women’s interests. It is often emphasized in the literature
that women are more likely than men to invest in children
and favour redistribution and they often give priority to pub-
lic policies related to their traditional roles as care givers in
the family.(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05).
In consideration of the persistent female under-representation
and unfavourable reseource allocation towards parental leave
benefits, Chapter3 has examined the link between female po-
litical representation, parental leave benefits and child health
outcomes. The main finding supports the fact that low level
of female political participation might be relevant for the in-
sufficient resource allocation towards parental leave benefits.
Chapter 4
The findings of the chapter3 can be interpreted in three
ways; a) Once female political representation reaches a cer-
xv
tain threshold in terms of bargaining power in policy-decision
making, the interaction of female political representation and
parental leave benefits would be significant on child health
outcomes. b) However, the irrelevance of the interaction be-
tween parental leave benefits and female political representa-
tion on child health might not only be driven from the female
under-representation in politics. b) Alternatively, the prefer-
ences of the woman who have been involved in policy deci-
sion could be closer to the preferences of their male collegues
or to the interests of parties that they belong into. Therefore,
female politicians who had been in the parliaments over forty
years, might not really represent the preferences of women’s
citizens. c) Moreover, they might have even no preferences on
a specific resource allocation. In other words, the relevance
of female politicians on the lack of a relationship between
parental leave benefits and child health outcomes would be
consistent with the Median Voter Theorem which assumes
that policy decisions only reflect the preferences of the median
voters, therefore the gender of the politician does mot matter
for policy decision making.
The third chapter, therefore, investigates whether female
politicians play a role in policy-making which reflects
women’s interests. To see the relationship between female
political representation and family-specific policies from a
broader view, I choose public spending on family allowances
as the main field of the interest. Public spending on fam-
ily allowances is one of the other family-specific social policy
which play an important role in helping families for the child-
care and child raising as well. Following the previous litera-
ture on critical mass, I identify four different thresholds which
are equal to 15, 20, 25 and 30 per cent of female seats over the
total parliamentary seats. Afterwards, I test for the existence
of a critical mass threshold across OECD countries in order to
examine whether the number of women at a certain threshold
xvi
translates into more public spending on family allowances.
Overall findings of the chapter3 may be driven by the fact that
the fraction of female parliamentarians in OECD countries
have not been sufficient for a possible gender effect in policy-
making on family allowances. In other words, women’s rep-
resentation needs to reach a certain critical level to make an
impact on the policy decision process. In fact, the fraction of
female politicians is above a certain threshold (30%) shows a
significantly different allocation of public spending on fam-
ily allowances. Even though the overall thesis does not aim
to support whether all those relationships are causally evi-
dent or not, the entire results are robust to using various dif-
ferent indicators for child mortality (neonatal, postneonatal
and under-five mortality), to the inclusion of additional co-
variates and to different econometric specifications.This result
suggests that the persistent under-representation of women
in OECD parliaments might still be an obstacle for their effi-
ciency in policy decision making on family-specific benefits.
The problem of equal opportunities in entering to politics can
be one of the reasons for the lowest rate of female participation
in politics. By 2013, gender inequality in political participa-
tion across OECD countries still exist that there is no country
which has reach to equal participation of women andmen into
politics. Sweden is the only country among OECD countries
where male and female parliamentarians have nearly equal
representation with 44.7% of female seats in the parliament.
Moreover, the percentage share of the female seats are still less
than one-third in 23 out of 34 countries across OECD.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of the studies in the field of economics focus on the child health
and mortality for two main reasons: a) First, child health has long-
term impacts on labor productivity b) Second, they are important in-
dicators of the success of the government policies and public spending
allocations(Sen98; CM99). Empirical evidence also previously empha-
size that public spending often does not yield the expected improve-
ment in child health outcomes and the efficacy of public spending is
largely explained by the quality of governance. One of the essential
prerequiste of the governance for the effective and fair redistribution
is the participation of the citizens from different groups to policy mak-
ing. Different voices in public policy making leads to a resource allo-
cation concerning the preferences of all citizens irrespective of gender,
class and race. Due to the persistent gap between women and men in
the political arena, particularly female political participation in policy-
making has emerged as a global issue all over the world. Preference dif-
ferences between men and women identified in numerous setting and
(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05) empirical evidence
also suggest that women are more likely than man to favour redistri-
bution and support policies such as spending on child care and other
child related expenses.Therefore, female political representation is con-
sidered as an important factor in the formulation of policies which rep-
1
resent women’s preferences. This dissertation studies the link between
public spending, governance, and child health outcomes where the main
outcome of interest is family-specific policies (parental leave policies and
public spending on family allowances) which mainly target women and
children.
Content of the dissertation
Public spending on parental benefits are the cash payments allocated to
families, especially for the mother’s use, during the pregnancy or imme-
diately after the birth of the child. Although public spending on parental
leave benefits across OECD countries are the policies exactly designed to
support families for pediatric health, chapter 2 reveals that there is no ev-
idence for a significant relationship between public spending on parental
benefits and child health outcomes. The interpretations on the main re-
sults can be done as following: a) First, child health might mostly depend
on the parental behaviors (e.g hygiene, nutrition) or unobserved geneti-
cal factors. b) Second, evidence might point out a economic failure which
is the insufficient resource allocation towards parental leave policy area.
Following the related literature(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04;
ALF05) which emphasize that the preferences of women are more likely
to be interested in investing in children, this economic failure might also
refer to a political failure where insufficient allocation can be explained
by the underrepresentation of women in public-policy making. The basic
premise of representative democracy indicates that irrespective of class,
gender or race, the equal representation of citizens in politics is essen-
tial for formulating the public spending allocation based on their inter-
ests because policies by electorally accountable governments often fail to
reflect the interests of different groups(Pan03). On the other hand, fol-
lowing “Representative Democracy Model (Citizen Candidate Model)”
of (BC97), there is sufficient amount of research has emphasized the im-
portance of female identity and own preferences of politicians in policy-
making which directly reflects women’s interests and preferences.
Correspondingly, chapter 3 focuses on the link between public spend-
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ing on parental benefits, female political representation and child health
outcomes. The empirical results presented in the third chapter supports
the notion that the interaction of female political representation and pub-
lic parental benefits over forty years across OECD countries, have not
played a significant role on child health outcomes. In other words, fe-
male political representation in OECD countries -proxied with the per-
centage share of female seats in national parliaments- has not been effi-
cient in the decision making of resource allocation towards parental leave
policies over the last forty years period. The result on this insignificant
relationship might be explained in three ways: a) Due to the persistent fe-
male under-representation (OECD-34 average is 19.9% and %26.8 in 2009
and 2012 respectively) over years, the bargaining power of female politi-
ciansmight have not been enough for being important in decisionmaking
on the public spending allocations to parental leave policies. b) Alterna-
tively, the preferences of the female politicians involved in policy-making
may be close to those of their male colleagues. c) Lastly, the gender of
the politician might not matter in the redistribution decisions of social
welfare spending across the OECD area. It is simply what Down(1957)’s
Median Voter’s Theorem suggest where politicians’ preferences and per-
sonal characteristics do not matter in public policy choices.
In consideration of the results in chapter 3, chapter 4, therefore, has
focused on the role of female politicians on policy-making which reflects
women’s interests. I choose public spending on family allowances as the
main field of investigation in order to see the relationship between female
political representation and family-specific policies from a broader view.
My preference in this subject has also been influenced by the availabil-
ity of the dataset on family allowances drawn many countries that have
recently joined the OECD to control cross-country heterogeneity. Pub-
lic spending on family allowances is one of the other family-specific so-
cial policy components which play an important role in helping families
for the childcare and child raising as well. The estimation results based
on different samples and various econometric frameworks show that the
number of female parliamentarians has not been significantly relevant on
the redistribution towards public family allowances over the forty years
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across OECD area. In particular, public spending on family allowances
which is associated to women’s preferences, such as childcare and child
raising, has not benefited from the representation of women in OECD
parliaments. Considering this finding, I have tested whether the reason
for this insignificance is the persistent under-representation of women in
politics. It is possible that when the percentages of elected female politi-
cians exceeds a remarkable value or a critical mass threshold, they would
be relevant in policy decision making. Following previous literature on
critical mass, I identify four different thresholds equal to 15, 20, 25 and 30
per cent of female seats over the total parliamentary seats. Afterwards I
test for the existence of a critical mass threshold across the central parlia-
ments of OECD countries for examining whether the number of women
at a certain threshold translates into more public spending on family al-
lowances.
Research questions
To summarize, this dissertation aims at dealing with the following re-
search questions:
1. Is there a relationship between public spending on parental leave
benefits and child health outcomes across OECD countries? (Chap-
ter 2)
2. Considering the economic failure in the insufficient allocation of
parental leave benefits, does the underrepresentation of women
drive this result as a political failure? (Chapter 3)
3. Does female political representation of womenmatter for the public
spending on family allowances? (Chapter 4)
Main results
The empirical evidence related to the previous set of research questions
of each chapter is summarized as follows.
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Chapter 2
The first results support the fact that public spending on parental ben-
efits has not been relevant for the decreasing trend of child mortality
rates across OECD countries over the forty years. This evidence is ro-
bust to performing different estimation techniques (including Arellano-
Bond GMM), using different indicators for child mortality rates (neonatal
mortality, postneonatal mortality, under-five mortality) and controlling
additional covariates. I have also performed a robustness check using
female education attainment as a proxy for the maternal education. To
begin with (Cal79), many authors have emphasized on the association be-
tween mother’s education and child health1. However, no cross-country
parental leave policy literature has dedicated consideration on this is-
sue due to the data unavailability so far. Using a new dataset (“Educa-
tional Attainment and ChildMortality Estimates by Country (1970-2009”)
which is launched in 2010 by IHME at University of Washington, I have
evaluated the contribution of female educational attainment to the ro-
bustness of the main findings. Main findings remain same but female ed-
ucation has showed positive significancy on child health outcomes with
some different estimation methods. The results on the significance of ma-
ternal education might indicate that more education helps women make
better choices in childbearing and childrearing approaches (e.g hygiene,
nutrition). Nevertheless, some caution is necessary in interpreting the re-
sults. First, once stationary of the variables are provided by first differen-
tiating the findings do not provide any significant evidence for a positive
relationship between maternal education and child health outcomes. On
the other hand another caution is necessary for a causal inefficiency of
parental leave benefits or causal efficiency of maternal education on child
health outcomes. Such an inefficiency might be present but should be
1(Sch84) posits five possible explanations in his general framework for the analysis of
mortality. First, education may increase the productivity of health inputs. Second, it may
reduce costs of information about the optimal use of health inputs where educated mothers
may be advantageous in searching out such information. Third, education may increase
family income. Fourth, education may increase the mother’s time costs which would serve
to decrease child health. Fifth, education may change preferences for family size and there-
fore child health.
5
supported with a strong instrumental variable estimation2.
Chapter 3
The last interpretation of the previous chapter raises one important ques-
tion: how efficient is representative democracy in social-policy making
across OECD countries? Looking at the trend of social welfare expendi-
tures over the last forty years across OECD countries, the highest share of
the old-age benefits compared to family-specific spending is not supris-
ing since the majority of the population are elderly and the population
structure is a key driver of social spending, much of it goes to the old-age
benefits and pensions. This might be a rational response by politicians
across OECD countries where voters over fifty are those with the great-
est propensity to vote. According to Down’s (1957) benchmark democ-
racy model (Median Voter Theorem), political decisions only reflect the
preferences of the median voters, since the majority of rule voting sys-
tem will determine the prefered outcome of the median voter. However
electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of
disadvantaged groups such as women, poor or ethnic minorities(Pan03).
On the other hand, following the “Representative Democracy Model” of
(Besley and Coate,1997), prior studies have pointed out on the role of
female identity of politicians which matters on family-specific policy out-
2For IV strategy, related literature on the efficiency of public policies on child health
outcomesmainly used ”legal origins” as an exogeneous instrument which shows the type of
legal system that countries belong into such as common law, German civil law, Scandinavian
civil law, French civil law etc. However my first-stage statistics of the 2SLS regressions
indicate that ”legal origins” is a weak instrument in this context. IV estimators are likely
to be biased once weak instruments are used. Secondly, legal origins themselves may affect
the related outcomes through channels other than parental leave benefits. (AJ05) also point
out few shortcomings in the use of this instrument in terms of framework which violates
exclusion restrictions. Considering the existing literature which suggests that Scandinavian
origin countries are sharply more interventionist similar to that socialist countries, they may
have a greater interest in state expansion with social welfare policies than common law
countries. On the other hand, it can be expected that civil law countries, in part because of
their commitment to equality, might redistribute more on health to reduce infant mortality
among poors(LPLdSSV99). Therefore, using legal origins as IV estimators can be severelly
biased and imprecise in this setting. Thus, this paper avoids making causal claims on the
efficiency of parental leave policies on child health outcomes.
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comes that directly target women and children3. It is often emphasized in
the literature that women are more likely than men invest in children and
they give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as care
givers to children(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05). On
the other hand parental leave policies are launched for supporting fami-
lies (especially mothers) in childcareing. In other words, the interaction
between parental leave benefits and women’s political underrepresenta-
tion4, over forty years across OECD countries would be the driving fac-
tor for the insignificant relationship between parental leave benefits and
child health outcomes. The secondary result of the thesis supports the
fact that the female political representation has been relevant for the lack
of a relationship between public spending on parental benefits and child
health outcomes.
Chapter 4
Considering the last finding in chapter 3, chapter 4 has examinedwhether
the persistent political under-representation over years has been the rea-
son for the irrelevance of female political representation on policymaking
in favor of family-specific policies. Using public spending on family al-
lowances as a main field of interest, it has showed that the interaction
of correspondent public spending and female political representation can
have a positive relationship with child health when female parliamentar-
ians reach a given critical mass threshold in terms of bargaining power
in policy-decision making and on the redistribution of resources among
social welfare policies.
Contribution to the literature
This last section of this introductory chapter aims at stressing the contri-
butions to the economic literature of the current dissertation chapter-by-
chapter.
3For the detailed information see:Chapter 4.
4At the end of the 2000s, the average percentage share of female seats across OECD par-
liaments has been only 19.9%
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Chapter 2
The economic empirical literature of the cross-country relationship be-
tween parental leave policies and child health outcomes has focused on
the efficacy of parental leave period (as the number of weeks that parents
are allowed to leave their job before or after the child birth.). However no
cross-country analysis has been performed on the relationship between
public spending on parental leave benefits and child health outcomes.
The second contribution of the chapter is the use of a recently published
data on female educational attainment. Although individual level studies
up to now have mostly emphasized on the role of maternal education in
reducing child mortality rates, the only dataset of (BL12) based on quin-
quennial observations has not been enough to control maternal education
in such a macro level study related to parental leave policies. This paper
controls for maternal education using the recent (2010) annual dataset on
female education gathered by IHME (Washington University Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation).
Chapter 3
Themain contribution of chapter 3 is to analyze the role of female political
representation on the link between public spending on parental benefits
and child health outcomes. In this aspect, there is no any previous study
which analyzes the role of any governance component on the relation-
ship between parental leave benefits and child health outcomes. Prior
cross-country research has focused on the health care or education ex-
penditures rather than parental leave policies and none of these studies
have considered female political representation as a link for the efficacy
of the public spending on development outcomes. The governance com-
ponents that havemostly received dedicated consideration are corruption
level and bureaucatic quality rather than participation (or representation).
This paper contributes to this strand of literature considering female po-
litical representation as a link between parental leave benefits and child
health outcomes.
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Chapter 4
The contribution to the economic literature of chapter 4 is to use the pub-
lic spending on family allowances as the main field of interest. Prior re-
search that seeks to understand the relationship between female political
representation and public spending has dedicated attention on the other
social welfare policy areas such as health and education. On the other
hand no comparative study has been tested the research question with
different subsamples to deal with the cross-country heterogeneity bias in
family allowances and female political representation. There are some
traditional OECD countries which are for long at the top of the list of an
established rank order of countries according to the fraction of female par-
liamentarians. Their high level women’s political representation role may
translate into more spending on female allowances considering women’s
preferences relative to countries that have recently joined the OECD. This
raises doubt about whether traditional OECD countries are driving the
positive relationship between women’s political representation and pub-
lic spending on family allowances. I therefore examine the relationship
between women’s political representation and public spending on fam-
ily allowances both excluding and including these new OECD countries
with different subsamples. On the other hand, to analyze the role of crit-
ical mass issue on the relationship between female political participation
and family allowances is the first attempt by this paper in the relevant
literature. As a common contribution of all chapters ; there has been no
study in the related cross country literature which checks the robustness
of the results using different econometric frameworks such as Arellano
Bond (GMM) or Prais-Winsten (AR(1)) estimation to deal with autocorre-
lation and contemporaneous correlation.
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Chapter 2
The Relationship Between
Public Spending on
Parental Leave Benefits and
Child Health Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
Child mortality rates are the best indicators of overall health status of
countries and as Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach strongly argues that
mortality is an indicator of economic success since being alive is a neces-
sary condition for our capabilities(Sen98). Considering it’s importance in
social and economic progress, prior studies have attempted to examine
the determinants of child health1. Cross-country studies of child health
especially focus on some determinants associatedwith the social modern-
1In this study, I use child health as a generic term to refer two different types of child
mortality rates which are infant mortality and under-5 mortality rates. Infant mortality rate
refers to total number of infant deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births. It has
two components as follows; a-neonatal mortality rate (total number of infant deaths under
twenty eight days of age per 1,000 live births) and b-postneonatal mortality rate (total num-
ber of infant deaths between twenty eight days and one year of age per 1,000 live births).
Under-five mortality rate refers to total number of child deaths under five years of age per
1,000 live births(Ruh00b).
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ization theory(Lip59), such as economic growth, education and fertility.
On the other hand, public health expenditure is another factor that prior
research often investigate its relationship with child health outcomes.2.
However, no previous cross-country evidence has up to this point ana-
lyzed the relationship between public spending on parental leave benefits
and child mortality rates across OECD countries. Parental leave policies
are one of the important economic policies that OECD countries use to
support families for their efforts to care for newborns or young children.
The components of parental leave policies is twofold; a) duration compo-
nent: job protected leave as the number of weeks after or before the child
birth b) spending component: financial support as cash benefits during
the parental leave period. Parental leave benefits are the public financial
supports for individuals who are pregnant, have recently given birth, or
are caring for a child. Considering this fact, parental leave benefits are
more specific in terms of targeting child health than public health expen-
ditures that are undertaken to achieve different health care goals within a
society.
The primary aim of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to this strand
of the literature by analyzing the relationship between public spending
on parental leave benefits and child health outcomes. Although there has
been no evidence so far for the spending component of parental leave
policies, the child health effect of parental leave duration (as the num-
ber of weeks) is analyzed by previous studies and related research have
2The motivation behind the number of former studies has been to understand whether
public health expenditure in OECD countries is effective on improved child health out-
comes. The cross-country empirical evidence on the link between public health expendi-
tures and child health outcomes is so far mixed with positive, negative or insignificant re-
sults. For instance, (Leu86) could not obtain any significant relationship between health
expenditures and child mortality rates after controlling for income.(HP92) have found a
weak relationship between health expenditures and infant mortality rates.Similarly(FP97)
have showed that public health expenditure account for less than 16 percent of all variation
in infant mortality, while income alone account for 84 percent of the entire variation. The
result on the inefficiency of public health expenditure on infant mortality has been repeated
by (DW99) as well. Based on a dataset for 117 countries,(KM92) have emphasized on a little
contribution of the health resources in health status compared to the other socioeconomic
factors.(CP95)’s finding indicates that income is a vital determinant for health outcomes but
public health expenditure does not show any significance on child health. In contrast to
those studies, (Hoj96), (BR97), (AR93) have reinforced the idea that public health expendi-
ture has a statistically significant effect on child health outcomes.
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obtained heterogeneous results3.
This paper has performed some analyses by expanding the cross-
country literature on parental leave policies and child health outcomes
in a way as following;
• The database is geographically widened to 22 OECD countries.The
period of time has been extended to 2010 to account for the recent
developments in parental leave policies which have occurred after
20004
• In contrast to prior research which focus on the parental leave du-
rations and child health outcomes, this paper examines the role of
parental leave benefits on child health outcomes.
3Based on a cross-country data for 17 OECD countries (WB95) have found a 2% -3% de-
cline in infant mortality rates once parental leave duration increases an extra week.(BHW05)
have found considerable associations between a mother’s early returns to work and reduc-
tions into breastfeeding and immunisations. Using data for 16 OECD countries, from 1969
to 1994,(Ruh00b) has empirically showed the positive effect of an increase in the lenght of
parental leave duration on child health outcomes. Similarly, extending (Ruh00b)’s dataset
from 1995 to 2000, (Tan05) has found a significant decreases in child mortality rates with in-
creasing weeks in parental leave duration. Overall their results support the fact that longer
periods of leave strength the child health outcomes. In contrast, (LS10) have examined the
impacts of an enhacement from 12 weeks to 15 weeks in Swedish Parental Leave Scheme
and found no impact on the child health outcomes.(Ros11) has analyzed the impacts of un-
paid maternity leave policy of the US 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) on child
health outcomes. She has found that the maternity leave duration has positive effects on
child health outcomes as long as the mother have a family support or a secondary income
during the leave duration. However she could not obtain any supportive evidence for the
children of low-educated, poor and single working mothers. Analyzing the maternity leave
entitlements in Canada,(BM10) has showed that maternity leave duration positively con-
tributes to child development only up to two years of age. In addition to child health out-
comes, prior research has focused on the effect of parental leave policies on the other child
well-being indicators (e.g educational outcomes) as well. For instance, (DS12) have evalu-
ated the impact of three major expansions (1979, 1986 and 1992) in parental leave scheme of
Germany on the long run labor and educational outcomes of children. Apart from the pos-
itive contribution of 1992’s maternity leave expansion on the high school attendance, they
found no evidence for a significant relationship between expansions and the labor market
or educational outcomes of children.
4Even though there has been no macro level evidence up to now for the spending com-
ponent of parental leave policies and child health outcomes, the child health effect of the
parental leave duration (as the number of weeks) is recently studied by (Tan05) which has
extended (Ruh00b)’s paper until 2000 for 18 OECD countries. This paper investigates the
relationship between parental leave benefits and child health outcomes across 22 OECD
countries from 1970 to 2010.
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• In addition to fixed effect methodology, which is the only technique
used by the relevant existing cross-country literature, three more
empirical strategies (including Arellano-Bond GMM estimator) are
used to examine the robustness of results.
• Maternal education has been often considered as one of the deter-
minants of child health in existing studies. Due to the unavailability
of an annual dataset before 2009, previous cross-country studies of
parental leave policies could not control for the maternal education.
For the selection of other control variables, I follow previous liter-
ature on parental leave policies and child health outcomes. In ad-
dition to previous literature, using a new dataset which is launched
in 2010, maternal education will be taken into account to investigate
the robustness of results.
This paper is organized as follows: Section (2.2) provides a brief
overview of the parental leave policies across OECD countries for which
the detailed information has been presented in Appendix-A. Section (2.3)
discusses the theoretical background of the relationship between parental
leave policies and child health outcomes. Section (2.4) presents the data
and variables. Section (2.5) specifies the empirical model and discusses
the methods of analyses. Section (2.6) provides the results of empirical
estimations and investigates their robustness.
2.2 Overview of Parental Leave Policies across
OECD Countries
Governments, to address the challenges faced by parents and their chil-
dren, often launch leave policies. Such policies are allocated for various
lengths of time and paid at different replacement rates across countries5.
Although these policies vary with respect to their concept and accord-
ingly are called with different names (e.g maternity leave, parental leave,
childcare leave), the common aim of the all leave policies are to enhance
5Replacement rate is defined as the ratio of parental leave benefits to the parents’ earn-
ings.
13
the child health. The most traditional leave policy is the maternity leave
entitlements which has been intended only for women, related to preg-
nancy, childbirth and the first months of mothership. Women receive
a propotion of their salary or an adequate allowance during the ma-
ternity leave period. The duration of leave, before and after the child
birth, is generally between 14 and 20 weeks across the OECD. Some
countries have considerably longer periods of leave such as Ireland (42
weeks), Greece (43 weeks) and the UK (52 weeks) where some weeks are
unpaid(Mos10; Ray08). Maternity leave entitlement has a long history in
the OECD area. The first maternity leave law was launched in Germany
in 1833 and currently most of the OECD countries have statutory mater-
nity leave policies except the United States. The United States is the only
country which makes no national provision for a paid leave at the time
of pregnancy and childbirth, though the possibility of unpaid leave con-
ditionally exists for mothers6. Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal and Sweden do not have a maternity leave scheme but provide
a paid leave for the woman under a common term of “parental leave en-
titlement”. Apart from those few exceptional countries, since the 1980s,
parental leave entitlements has been applied as an extended right taken
just after the end of the maternity leave period. Parental leave entitlement
is a type of employment guaranteed leave which is available for both fa-
thers and mothers. Childcare leave entitlement is another type of leave
given as a supplemantary leave immediately after the parental leave and
much less common than parental leave.(Mos10; Ray08; Tan05).
In consideration of their common aim at enhancing child health, they
may all play an important role for the child health outcomes. On the other
hand, the distinction between these entitlements is often not possible in
some countries where there is only one legislative framework for all types
of leave. Overall thesis, therefore, uses “parental leave benefits” as a generic
term which captures total public spending on all type of leave benefits
including maternity, parental and childcare leave.
6Only five states (California, Hawaii, New Jersey, NewYork, Rhode Island) provide some
payments to parents who are away from work at around the time of the child birth.
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2.3 Economic Theory and The Prior Research on
Parental Leave Policies and Child Health
In classical economic theory, households maximize utility over some con-
sumption goods which are purchased in the market subject to a budget
constraint. Becker (1965, 1994) developed this framework by assuming
that households combine time and market goods to consume some ba-
sic commodities that directly enter their utility functions. For example,
consuming a pizza is not valued only as the costs of buying it; one has
to add the value of the time spent while consuming the pizza with her
friends. Likewise, the utility of going to the cinema is not merely the
price of the cinema tickets, but also the time spent enjoying the movie.
Following (Bec65? ), (? ) developed the classical household production
model where work at home as time use that generates services which
have a close substitute in the market, while leisure has only poor market
substitutes. (? ) extended (? )’s model where they introduce so-called
joint production that they define as housework also partly being leisure.
(? ) continue with the development of a household production model
which explicitly deals with the problem of household activities which are
partly work, partly leisure activities. Similar with the household produc-
tion model on a certain consumption good, (RS82) has developed one of
the first efficient economic theories on child health production by using;
a) main perceptions from the model of “household production and con-
sumption” by (Bec65), b) models on “health production” by (BP67) and
(ALS69), and c) models of “demand for health care” by (Gro2b), (Gro82)
and (Act75). Model assumes that family does not maximize the child
health but the child health is one of the component of its utility and it is
assumed to be produced.
This paper uses (? )’s idea on partly leisure partly work activities to
include parental leave period and parental leave payments into (RS82)’s
child healthmodel. It is assumed that the production of the child health in
a family requires additional time to spend for childrearing or childbearing
activities like a usual work but at the same time it can be enjoyed by both
partners in the family while spending time with the child.
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The general framework for estimating the determinants of child health
starts up with a health utility function where representative family gets
satisfaction from the health status of childH as much as it gets from other
consumption goods X . On the other hand family drives utility from the
consumption of their own leisure L and from spending leisure time with
the child as well. Therefore, the utIlity function of the representative fam-
ily can be written as following;
U = U(X,H,L, h) (2.1)
Model assumes that family does not maximize the child health but
the child health is one of the component of family preferences while max-
imizing its utility. Child Health is assumed as produced by the family
and is a function of time spent in childrearing (h).Namely, parental leave
period might be considered as partly work and partly leisure. Therefore
it takes place both in the family utility function and child health produc-
tion function. On the other hand child health production is the function
of health-related goods and services (M ) which are bought by the family
or allocated to the family by government (e.g immunization, hospital fa-
cilities, medicine, medical insurance). It is important to note that, other
factors, which may not have direct but only indirect effects on the child
health are not included into child health function. For instance, family
income (including earnings, public social welfare allowances and bene-
fits), maternal education, mother’s employment can be effective on child
health only through parental behaviors. For instance, maternal education
may have effect on the child health if it is assumed that more education
makes women more aware on parental behaviors (e.g hygiene, nutrition)
or if it is presumed that more education may reduce the cost of an in-
formation about the optimal use of health inputs where educated moth-
ers may be advantageous. Similarly, mother’s employment that increase
the mother’s time at work would negatively reflect to the child health or
would have positive effect on the child health through the additional in-
come that women contributes to family budget. Similarly, family income
(including public social welfare cash allowances and benefits) directly in-
crease the amount of the money in the family budget but its effect on the
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child health depends whether or not the additional money is used for the
child health. Child health production function is described as follows;
H = F (M,µ, h, ξ) (2.2)
where Fm, Fµ, Fξ Fh ￿= 0.
Y = N + wR = PxX + PmM + s(wh) (2.3)
Y is the total income and Px; are the prices of consumption goods.
Pm are the prices of the goods and services related to child health, R is
the time spent at work, w is the wage rate and N represents non-earned
income. It is assumed that both partners participate in the labour force.
This assumption ensures that we have observation on total family income
and parental leave benefits which are allocated by the government during
the parental leave period for the family activities in child-rearing.
s is the wage replacement rate. At the same time it can be defined
as the the opportunity cost of working or the shadow price of receiving
the parental leave benefits7. Parents are entitled to receive parental leave
benefits at this rate of their earnings. For instance if a mother earns 1000
Euros per month (wh) and if the wage replacement rate is 0.8, the parental
leave benefits that mother is entitled to receive is 800 euros per month.
s = 0 refers to an unpaid leave. Namely s is equal to percentage share
of cash parental benefits in total earnings (The cash amount of parental
leave benefits ((s)wh) = Total earnings (wh) * Wage replacement rate(s).
(s) varies across countries and governments determine the level of wage
replacement rates by law. For instance, in the United States there is no
entitlement for a paid leave,namely s = 0 and therefore total parental
benefits ((s)wh) that parents are entitled to receive during the leave pe-
7Following (RS82)’s model,(Ruh00b) developed a simple model where a family maxi-
mizes the utility function subject to a budget and child health production function. The
utility funtion of the family is composed of the child health (H) and the other consump-
tion goods (X). He includes both public spending on parental leave benefits and parental
leave durations to this model considering their possible effect on the child health. He has
assumed that parental leave benefits might increase the budgetary amount of a family and
the parental leave duration makes parents away from work before or after the child birth
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riod is zero.
After the maximization of the family utility function with respect to
budget constraint, the first order maximization conditions are will be;
UL = λ (2.4)
UX = λPx (2.5)
Uh + UHFh = (1 + λ)sw (2.6)
UhFm = λPm (2.7)
The model yields four demand equations for the four different goods
in terms of prices and income;
X = Dx(Px, Pm, Y, µ, sw) (2.8)
M = Dm(Px, Pm, Y, µ, sw) (2.9)
h = Dl(Px, Pm, Y, µ, sw) (2.10)
The effects of price changes on the level of child health can be obtained
using the first differentiation of the child health production function;
dH = FmdM + Fµdµ+ Fhdh (2.11)
The effect of the prices on child health might be formulated with the
help of (2.11) whilst assuming that dµdPi = 0where i = x, y, z .
dH
dPx
= Fm
dM
dPx
+ Fh
dh
dPx
(2.12)
dH
dPm
= Fm
dM
dPm
+ Fh
dh
dPm
(2.13)
dH
dsw
= Fm
dM
dsw
+ Fh
dh
dsw
(2.14)
Equations suggest that wage replacement rate of the public spending on
parental benefits as a percentage of earnings can be relevant for the child
health. It is well-known that a rise in any price of a good will reduce
the consumption of this good. For instance, an increae in Px reduce the
purchasing amount of X . However some of the above equations can-
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not be predicted since the sign of fractions are not known such as dMdPx .
The model thus points out that we cannot do a priori prediction for the
relationship between the interactive governance term and child health
outcomes. Following section analyze the issues econometrically. As ex-
plained above, M may refer various factors related to child health that
may have direct effect on the child health such as immunization, hospi-
tal care used for the child, medical insurance, medical technology. They
might be bought by the family or allocated by the government. These
variables are controlled with total health expenditures, insurance cover-
age and medical technology in the econometric frameworks which take
place in the following section. On the other hand, following the previ-
ous parental leave-child health literature and considering the fact that
they may have effect on the child health through different channels, vari-
ables such as female employment and income are controlled as well even
though they do not appear in the child health function of the theoretical
model due to their indirect effect and for the simplicity in explanations.
Moreover country-variant and country-invariant specific characteristics
controlled with country fixed effects and country specific time trends for
the ommitted bias problem due to other unobservables. In addition to
ommited bias problem, the other source of the endogeneity might be re-
verse causation but it is important to note that this study does not aim to
answer whether there is a causal correlation rather than a simple relation-
ship.
Previous cross-country research has only focused on the effect of the
leave duration component of the parental leave policies. This study con-
tributes to this strand of the literature by analyzing the relationship be-
tween public spending on parental leave benefits and child health out-
comes. Even though (Ruh00b) has included parental leave benefits in his
model, he has not analyzed the relationship between parental leave ben-
efits and child health outcomes. He only has focused on the effect of the
parental leave duration (as number of weeks) on child health outcomes.
Similarly, the economic model of (SLDD92) has remarked the importance
of parental leave durations for the child health. This paper contributes to
this strand of literature analyzing the relationship between parental leave
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benefits and child health outcomes.
2.4 Data Description
The dataset8 covers 22 OECD countries between 1970 and 2010, and in-
cludes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, the United States. The measure of public spending on parental
leave benefits comes from (GB11), “Comparative Maternity, Parental, and
Childcare Leave and Benefits Database” (1960-2010) which has data avail-
ability for only above-mentioned countries. Parental leave benefits are the
cash payments which are paid during the parental leave duration. They
are paid at a replacement rate of earnings. Thus, the replacement rate is
equal to a ratio that is the percentage share of parental leave benefits in
total earnings. The overall analyses in chapter2 and chapter3 use “Com-
parativeMaternity, Parental, and Childcare Leave and Benefits Database”
(1960-2010) which define parental leave benefits as a percentage of earn-
ings, namely as replacement rates.
Following three measures are the main dependent variables of the in-
vestigation;
• The natural log of neonatal mortality rate : Total number of infant
deaths under twenty eight days of age per 1,000 live births
• The natural log of postneonatal mortality rate : Total number of
infant deaths between twenty eight days and one year of age per
1,000 live births
• The natural log of under-five mortality rate: Total number of child
deaths under five years of age per 1,000 live births
The data on child mortality rates come from (IHM10b),“Infant and
Child Mortality Estimates by Country (1970-2010)”. The neonatal and
8For more information see: Appendix-B.
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postneonatal mortality rates are the primary concerns of the paper due to
their occurance at the most important period of the parental leave. ILO
Convention (No. 183 and Recommendation No. 191 (2000)) on mater-
nity protection recommends that a woman should be entitled to a time
of maternity leave of at least 14 weeks. Almost all OECD countries have
ratified the minimum duration of 14 weeks (which is the period includes
both neonatal and postneonatal deaths) of paid leave as recommended by
the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Since it is not an obligatory
law and just a recommendation, the duration of the leave varies across
countries. On the one hand, there are country schemes where parents are
entitled to less than 14 weeks of leave. For instance, the United States
has no legislation for a national paid leave, but it can be received as a
unpaid leave for 12 weeks of duration. On the other hand, many coun-
tries grant leave entitlements that exceed this 14-weeks of period where
parents are entitled to a leave of one year or even longer. For instance
German families are allowed to receive 14 months of parental leave. In
addition to neonatal and postneonatal mortality rates, I therefore also
consider under-five mortality rates as the other main regressand, since
it captures child deaths over one year of age as well.
Control variables is selected following existing literature on the
parental leave policies and child health outcomes9. The first control
variable, total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, is obtained
from (OEC13c), “Health Data: Health Expenditure and Financing”. It
is assumed to be negatively related with child mortality rates, because
public or private investment on health care services might yield bet-
ter child health outcomes10. However, the prior literature for the ef-
ficiency of health expenditures on child health outcomes have conflict-
ing results(Hoj96; BR97; AR93; Leu86; HP92; FP97; CP95; DW99; KM92;
RS08).
Furthermore, the data on real GDP per capita at constant prices in
9I especially follow (Ruh00b)’s study who has done the first most detailed work on
parental leave policies and child health outcomes.
10Former research has preferred to control for only public health expenditures. This study
considers the possible impact of private health care expenditures as well and use total health
care expenditures as percentage of GDP.
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2005 USD are collected from (HSA12), Penn World Table 7.1. It is as-
sumed that a higher GDP might allow a country to allocate more money
to health care services to invest child health outcomes. Similar to health
expenditures, the results of prior research on the relationship between in-
come and the child health is heterogeneous for industrialized countries.
Some studies reveal a positive association (e.g.(Ett96)) while others ob-
tain no effect (e.g. (Dul95)). (Ruh00a) even shows that child health might
be negatively affected by short-lasting improvements in economic condi-
tions. The econometric model also includes fertility rates (children per
women aged 15 to 49 years old) by assuming that an increasing num-
ber of infant births might cause an increase in infant deaths by reducing
available time and energy to invest in each individual offspring and in-
creasing their likelihood of dying. (RW88) and (FSSJ92) suggest that fer-
tility rates and infant deaths are positively correlated. The data on fertil-
ity rates is collected from (OEC13b), “OECD Health Data: Demographic
References”. Furthermore health insurance coverage has been used as
an essential control variable which is assumed to be positively related
with the child health. Unfortunately, there is no enough available data
for the medical technology11 which starts from the early period (1970)
of analyses to use in such a cross-country setting. A number of other
proxies of medical technology that have been mostly considered in the
single-country literature are the surgical procedures and the number of
specific medical equipments(BW98; Wei95). However cross-country data
for those variables is incomplete for most of the countries. Although,
the most of the observations are missing, (Ruh00b) proxied medical tech-
nology with dialysis patients per 100,000 population using extrapolation
method. However this method should be preferred for the short-time
span missing data and it is questionable how much this variable grows
at a constant rate or it linearly changes. Some other papers have con-
trolled the change in medical technology by adding country specific time
trends(DM05), since medical technology is a time-variant variable. Prox-
11Medical technology is one of the important determinants which is assumed positively
contributes to infant and child health in the previous literature. Advances in medical tech-
nology might reduce dramatically the risk of the mortality of the ill newborns and it is
extolled for saving lives and improving health status of children.
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ying medical technology with country specific time trends is the strategy
that I have followed for the empirical estimations as well12.The data on
the share of the population with health insurance coverage is collected
from (OEC13e), “ Health Data: Social Protection”. Additionally, over-
all analyses include female employment to population ratio and the data
is collected from (OEC13a)“Employment and Labour Markets: Key Ta-
bles from OECD”. Previous studies which focus on the effect of female
employment on the child health have controversial results. One side of
the literature claims that child health is affected by the employment of
their mothers which might be positive due to additional earnings that the
mother contributes to household income. On the other hand, the effect
of female employment might be negative because of the time that she
spends in the labor market might be more than the time that she spends
at home for childbearing and childrearing13.
I have also performed a robustness check using female educational
attainment for 15-44 year old as an additional covariate. Beginning with
(Cal79), many authors have emphasized on the assosciation between ma-
ternal education and child health.(Sch84) posits five possible explanations
for the role of maternal education on the child health status. First, edu-
cation may increase the productivity of health inputs. Second, it may
reduce the cost of an information about the optimal use of health inputs
where educated mothers may be advantageous in searching out such in-
formation. Third, education may increase family income. Fourth, edu-
cation may increase the mother’s time at work which would reflect to
the child health negatively. Fifth, maternal education may change prefer-
12Following prior literature, all variables proxied for medical technology so far has highly
incomplete data for a cross-country study on parental policies.The only variable is the “life
expectancy” with complete data which (DR05) previously used as a proxy for medical tech-
nology. Once I replicated results using the life expectancy as the proxy for medical tech-
nology, overall results remain unchanged and the life expectancy shows highly negative
significant coefficient as expected. However it is questionable whether it is a good proxy
for medical technology in this setting. The life expectancy at birth might not reflect medical
technological progress in general, since it is the exact inverse of the mortality rate at birth.
The reason behind the negative significance of the variable might be the negative correla-
tion between mortality rates at birth and the deaths at birth but not the advances in medical
technology.
13For more information, see (BI03; Sta87; LEZ98; Eng93; BHW05; GWPB05).
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ences on the birth control for the family size and therefore child health.
Up to 2010, the only cross country dataset for female educational attain-
ment was “A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World,
19502010”(BL12).Considering the fact that this dataset consists of quin-
quennial observations rather than annual observations, it has not been
suitable for the parental leave literature due to the insufficient data of
other variables for an estimation using a quinquennial dataset. The ear-
liest data for parental leave policies start up in 1970 and most of the
control variables are complete only for few number of countries before
1975 and even before 1980s. In 2010 (IHM10a) has published an annual
dataset called as “Educational Attainment and Child Mortality Estimates
by Country (1970-2009)” which includes annual observations for female
educational attainment. This study, therefore, provides the most detailed
investigation in cross-country settings to date of the relationship between
parental leave policies and child health which includes maternal educa-
tion as a control variable for the robustness of results.
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Figure 1: Public Spending on Parental Leave Benefits (as a % of female wages
in manufacturing) across OECD Countries (1970-2010)
Panel (A1) in Table (1) compares a number of descriptive statistics of
a complete data set for the public spending on parental benefits and child
mortality outcomes from 1970 to 2010. The average public spending on
parental leave benefits (as a percentage of female wages in manufactur-
ing) is 0.79 with 0.498 standard deviation. Figure (1) shows the yearly
variations in parental leave benefits from 1970 to 2010 for each coun-
try. The changes for each country are not frequent and of small mag-
nitude in general, except Luxembourg and Belgium (Figure (1)). Aus-
tria and the United Kingdom are the countries which have followed a
decreasing trend since the middle of the 1970s. The Netherlands, Italy,
Greece and Portugal have almost have not undertaken any changes in
replacement rates over years. Parental leave benefits in Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark have been decreased starting with the mid-1990s. One
of the possible reasons of this decreasing trend might be the global re-
cession which largely had effect on the financial systems of Nordic coun-
tries at the beginning of 1990s. Following this global recession, Nordic
countries were forced into making deep budget cuts in social welfare
26
spending (e.g replacement rates were cut, services were cut and quali-
fying conditions for benefits were increased). The degree of the reduction
in social welfare spending were smaller in Norway(EA96) compared to
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. For instance, Sweden made major cut-
backs in family-specific benefits in general and in parental leave benefits
in particular. The benefit level was reduced from 90 percent to 75 percent
during this period(FD10; LTP12). Both the benefits and the length of the
parental leave were cut in Finland in the mid-1990s as well(LTP12). In the
early 90s, social welfare spending became very costly after a decrease in
GDP in Finland. In 1994, therefore, a number of reforms were introduced
for some reductions in social welfare spending(Par96). France and Ger-
many also have witnessed the decrease in parental leave benefits from
mid-1990s to the late 1990s. During the recession of the early 1990s, GDP
contracted for about two quarters in Germany and France as well(fEA09).
Especially compared to the other countries, the Belgian reaction to crisis
is defined as continuity and non-reaction. Indeed, the Belgian welfare ex-
penditures did not decrease very much during the first half of the 1990s
and parental leave benefits had even an increasing trend(SKvH11). The
recent spending allocations to parental leave policies (even after the eco-
nomic of 2007-2008) were comparatively much higher in countries since
the character of these two economic crises (early 1990s and 2007-2008)
have been different from each other. After the 2007-2008 crisis, up to now
there have not been cuts in family benefits with the idea of a social sup-
port for the future generations.
On the other hand, all countries across the OECD have followed a de-
creasing trend in child mortality outcomes (Figure 2-4) from 1970 to 2010.
In 2010, the minimum and the maximum values of under five mortal-
ity rate was 6.68 per 1,000 births in the United States and 2.68 per 1,000
births in Sweden where the United States is the only country which has
no paid parental leave scheme for long time and Sweden’s parental leave
benefits are currently the most generous in the world even after the re-
cession period in mid-1990s. Moreover, Figure (5) depicts an increase
in average parental leave benefits and a decrease in average child mor-
tality rates. However these explanations do not particularly enough to
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Figure 2: Neonatal Mortality Rates across OECD Countries (1970-2010)
Figure 3: Postneonatal Mortality Rates across OECD Countries (1970-2010)
make predictions for a positive relationship between parental leave ben-
efits and child health outcomes. Other country specific factors and the
28
Figure 4: Under-Five Mortality Rates across OECD Countries (1970-2010)
Figure 5: Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a % of female wages in
manufacturing) and Child Health Outcomes
determinants of child mortality rates should be controlled to examine the
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precise relationship. Seeing that descriptive statistics and diagrammatic
demonstrations lead to do mixed presumptions on the relationship be-
tween parental leave benefits and child health outcomes, the following
section, therefore, investigates issues econometrically.
2.5 Econometric Model and Methods of
Analyses
The panel data model has the following semilogarithmic framework to
analyze the relationship between parental leave benefits and child health
outcomes14;
lncit = αLit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (2.15)
where the dependent variable lncit denotes the natural log of child
mortality rates of country i in period t. The main independent variable of
interest Lit is the public spending on parental leave benefits as a percent-
age of female wages in manufacturing. Due to the data unavailability in
other units, in the econometric estimations parental leave benefits is used
as a percentage of female wages in manufacturing. All other potential
control variables are included in xit. Moreover, γi denotes a full set of
country dummies and µt denotes a full set of year dummies. υit is an
error term, capturing all other omitted factors, with E(υit) = 0 for all i
and t. Model is initially estimated using Pooled-OLS estimation method
which excludes country dummies, γi. As it is well-known, strict exo-
geneity assumption is one of the crucial necessity for the unbiased and
consistent estimates under OLS specification. Strict exogeneity assumes
that idiosyncratic error term (υit) is uncorrelated with the individual spe-
cific effects. Since the pooled regression model neglects the heterogeneity
14In the balanced panel data setting twenty-two countries are observed yearly over a
forty-year time period. This is the base sample which is used for the estimations that ex-
clude control variables (For the detailed information see: Table (1) - Panel (A1)). All econo-
metric estimations which include control variables have been done based on a sample that
covers fifteen countries from 1975 to 2010 due to the data unavailability of some controls for
some countries and years (For the detailed information see: Table (1) - Panel (A2)).
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across individuals and assumes that all individuals have a unique effect,
pooled-OLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent. But the fixed effect
estimator will be consistent since it allows for the heterogeneity among
individuals by assuming each one to have its own specific effect. As an
alternative to pooled-OLS framework, I therefore used the fixed effect es-
timation technique to control for the country specific time invariant char-
acteristics. Moreover, I also include country-specific time trends for the
country-specific time-variant omitted factors.
To further take into account mean reverting dynamics (e.g the ten-
dency of the mortality indicator to return to some equilibrium value for
the country), the lagged dependent variable, lnci,t−1, is also added on the
right hand side of the regression equation. Due to the unavailable data
of parental leave benefits for developing countries, estimation samples
mainly cover advanced economies where child mortality rates are really
low compare to developing countries. It is mainly because of the advan-
tage in medical technologies, facilities, high number of health personnel
and the improved living standards. Therefore to control mean revert-
ing dynamics which might occur as turning to some equilibrium value in
mortality rates, estimations include lagged dependent variables. On the
other hand the lagged value of the regressand is useful to further capture
the past occurances in child mortality as well. It is important to note that
the relationship between public spending on parental benefits and child
mortality in a populationmay not be static and depend in part on the past
level of child mortality.
lncit = δlncit−1 + αLit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (2.16)
However, In the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-
effect estimator might be biased in a panel with short time dimension
which is the often the case for macro-level studies (Nic81). On the other
hand, time-invariant fixed effects characteristics may be correlated with
the explanatory variables. To deal with these problems, instead of fixed
effect technique in dynamic panel data setting, I use the generalized
method of moments estimator (GMM) developed by Manuel Arellano
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and Stephen R. Bond (1991)(AB91). It estimates the parameters of the sys-
tem by specifying the model in first differences on both sides of the equa-
tion (2) which drops out the time invariant factors and country-specific
unobservables.
Time series-cross sectional data (TCSE) are special cases of “panel
data” where the number of units are less than number of time period in
the sample. In TCSE setting, therefore, It is unlikely that cross-sectional
panel errors will meet the assumption of sphericality. The estimations
will be wrong if the errors show any of panel heteroskedasticity, contem-
poraneous correlation and serially correlated errors. To control for them, I
additionally apply PCSE (panel corrected standard errors) technique fol-
lowing (BK95; BK96). However the PCSE method only corrects for the
problems of contemporaneous correlation and panel heteroskedasticity.
Following the convention in the literature, I focus on the autoregressive
processes of order 1 (AR(1)) which indicates the presence of serial cor-
relation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of se-
rial correlation. Furthermore, in order to test for stationarity of the time
series, I initially apply a battery of panel unit root tests on each econo-
metric model. As a general model residuals of the each econometric mo-
del give mixed results. Therefore I have after applied the same unit root
tests on each variable used in the respective models. Due to their statis-
tical power, the panel unit root tests are more advantageous than their
univariate counterparts even though the tests to a panel loose power in
small samples. As is common in the macro literature, however, I carefully
apply the battery of respective tests. First, I test whether the time series
are cross-section independent. I apply (Fre95), (Fri37) and (Pes04)’s test
statistics using STATA 12 (see (DHS06)). The test statistics show mixed
findings on whether cross-section dependence does exist or not. There-
fore, I apply both panel unit root tests that take into account cross-section
dependence and Pesaran’s. Moreover, I apply Pesarans second genera-
tion panel unit root test that does take into account cross-section depen-
dence. Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of panel unit root tests on
the relevant series of the natural log of neonatal mortality rate, the natu-
ral log of postneonatal mortality rate, the natural log of under-5 mortality
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rate, public spending on parental leave benefits, natural log of GPD per
capita, share of population with health insurance coverage, total health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, fertility rates, female employment
to population ratios and female educational attainment. I applied the
Levin, Lin and Chu(LLJC02), Im-Pesaran-Shin(IPS03) and Fisher tests re-
ferring to (MW99) and (Cho01) tests. Since the stationary of variables are
obtained after taking the first differences, all econometric specifications
are reestimated using the first differences of the variables. Next section
discusses the results in details.
Table 2: Results of the panel unit tests (H0: Unit root in first difference)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
Public Spending on Parental Leave Benefits
Stat Prob Obs.
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -5.5164 0.0000 858
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -5.6472 0.0000 858
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 308.2776 0.0000 858
PP-Fisher Chi-square 652.7650 0.0000 858
Pesaran -3.697 0.0000 858
The natural log of neonatal mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -8.5015 0.0000 858
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -8.6102 0.0000 858
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 175.3960 0.0000 858
PP-Fisher Chi-square 211.5277 0.0000 858
Pesaran -6.885 0.0000 858
The natural log of postneonatal mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -8.3744 0.0000 858
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -8.4093 0.0000 858
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 173.4732 0.0000 858
PP-Fisher Chi-square 214.4262 0.0000 858
Pesaran -6.869 0.0000 858
The natural log of under-five mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -8.6438 0.0000 858
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -8.7250 0.0000 858
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 178.2262 0.0000 858
PP-Fisher Chi-square 209.7569 0.0000 858
Pesaran -6.869 0.0000 858
Columns (1) of each sample show unit root test statistics with p-values represented in Columns (2). “Obs” stands for the number of observations
in the sample. The sample that is used to obtain the test results is a balanced yearly panel data for 22 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.) between 1970 and 2009. Levin, Lin and Chu t*, Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat, ADF-
Fisher Chi-square, PP-Fisher Chi-square stand for Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test, Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test, Fisher-type unit-root test based on
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, Fisher-type unit-root test based on Phillips-Perron tests. The results of the tests were obtained including one lag of
the variable and a deterministic trend. The inferences do not change at all when more lags are included.
Table 3: Results of the panel unit tests (H0: Unit root in first difference)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
Public Spending on Parental Leave Benefits
Stat Prob Obs.
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -12.5793 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -12.7024 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 183.7354 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 314.0271 0.0000 510
Pesaran -3.697 0.0000 510
The natural log of neonatal mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -7.2293 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -6.2492 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 105.0487 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 94.5432 0.0000 510
Pesaran -4.703 0.0000 510
The natural log of postneonatal mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -7.0611 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -6.1136 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 104.0328 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 93.9381 0.0000 510
Pesaran -4.831 0.0000 510
The natural log of under-five mortality rate
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -7.2745 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -6.2392 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 105.3462 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 93.6705 0.0000 510
Pesaran -4.714 0.0000 510
Total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -4.5784 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -7.2299 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 139.6671 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 169.1518 0.0000 510
Pesaran -6.880 0.0000 510
Log(GDP per capita)
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -3.0518 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -3.3624 0.0004 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 63.2640 0.0004 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 104.5326 0.0000 510
Pesaran -3.739 0.0000 510
The share of population with health insurance coverage
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -2.6096 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -2.9194 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 71.4241 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 174.8365 0.0000 510
Pesaran - 6.345 0.0000 510
The female employment (aged between 15-64)/population ratio
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -5.8277 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -5.9276 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 101.9198 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 185.1633 0.0000 510
Pesaran -4.090 0.0000 510
The fertility rate (children per women aged 15 to 49 years old)
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -6.1590 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -9.0830 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 168.0014 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 480.4985 0.0000 510
Pesaran -8.067 0.0000 510
Female educational attainment aged between 15-44 years old
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -8.6717 0.0000 510
Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat -10.2613 0.0000 510
ADF-Fisher Chi-square 191.4414 0.0000 510
PP-Fisher Chi-square 437.0476 0.0000 510
Pesaran -7.487 0.0000 510
Columns (1) of each sample show unit root test statistics with p-values represented in Columns (2). “Obs” stands for the number of observations
in the sample. The sample that is used to obtain the test results is a balanced yearly panel data for 15 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom) through the
period from 1975 to 2009. Levin, Lin and Chu t*, Im-Pesaran-Shin W-stat, ADF-Fisher Chi-square, PP-Fisher Chi-square stand for Levin-Lin-Chu
unit-root test, Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test, Fisher-type unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, Fisher-type unit-root test based
on Phillips-Perron tests. The results of the tests were obtained including one lag of the variable and a deterministic trend. The inferences do not
change at all when more lags are included.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Preliminary Results: Relationship Between Public
Spending on Parental Benefits and Child Mortality
Rates
Figure 6: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a %
of female wages in manufacturing) and Neonatal Mortality Rates
Figures (6-8) graphically show the simple scatter plots between public
spending on parental leave benefits (% of female wages in the manufac-
turing sector) and the log of child mortality outcomes in a sample of 22
OECD countries from 1970 to 2010. The vertical axis of each figure rep-
resents the natural log of mortality rates for neonatal, postneonatal and
under-five deaths respectively. Public spending on parental leave bene-
fits (as a % of female wages in the manufacturing sector) is shown along
the horizontal axis. The figures reveal an ambigious negative association
between public spending on parental leave benefits and child mortality
rates.Alternatively, Figures (9-11) demonstrate the relevant assocation in
average terms. Values for variables are averaged by country from 1970
to 2010. Evidence in the figures shows almost a lack of relationship since
semilogarithmic regression lines are nearly flat.
I further investigate these benchmark results econometrically. Table
4 presents the relevant estimates for the all child mortality outcomes.
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Figure 7: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a %
of female wages in manufacturing) and Postneonatal Mortality Rates
Figure 8: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a %
of female wages in manufacturing) and Under-Five Mortality Rates
The estimation results on the relationship between public spending on
parental leave benefits (PLB) and neonatal mortality rates are shown in
Panel(A) without including any control variable. The econometric frame-
works at Panel(B) and Panel(C) replicate the same estimations to investi-
gate the relevant relationship for postneonatal mortality rates. Columns
(1) of each panel show the pooled OLS estimation results. The coeffi-
cient estimates of public spending on PLB is negatively significant for all
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Figure 9: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a %
of female wages in manufacturing) and Neonatal Mortality Rates
Figure 10: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a
% of female wages in manufacturing) and Postneonatal Mortality Rates
mortality rates. However, the pooled-OLS estimation technique looks at
the cross-sectional association rather than at the within variation. Hence,
country specific omitted factors and potential long-run determinants can
be reasons of making incorrect inferences. Thus, to control for coun-
try specific characteristics and potential long-run determinants of both
parental leave benefits and childmortality rates, the following columns of
37
Figure 11: Relationship Between Public Spending on Parental Benefits (as a
% of female wages in manufacturing) and Under-Five Mortality Rates
each panel add country fixed effects. Namely, Columns (2) simply repli-
cate the pooled OLS estimations in Columns(1) by additionally including
only country fixed effects. The negative cross-sectional relationship be-
tween public spending on PLB and mortality rates disappeares when the
country fixed effects are included. Columns (2) of each panel include
also country specific times trends to capture the impact of time-variant
characteristics (e.g medical technology). The first econometric model it-
self, which is represented with equation (1), is static and does not include
lagged dependent variable. Using the second specification which in-
cludes the lagged dependent variable Arellano Bond GMMmethod used
as an additional framework to Pooled-OLS and FE estimations. Relevant
results are represented in Columns(3) and the estimation results are ro-
bust to FE estimates15.
15In accordance with the large sample properties of the Arellano-Bond GMM method,
GMM estimator might be severely biased and imprecise in panel data with a small num-
ber of cross-sectional units. I therefore replicate the results with Brunos (2005a, 2005b) bias
corrected least squares dummy variable estimator as well. Using (AH82), (BB00) or (AB91)
as the initial estimators, the results remain unchanged. Bootstrapping standard errors are
common practices in the application of bias corrected least squares dummy variable estima-
tor.Following (BCMM07), I initially undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap
the estimated standard errors. The coefficient estimate of public spending on parental ben-
efits is always insignificant even with more repetitions such as 100, 200 or 500.
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The specifications in Panel (E-F) in Table 4 analyze the relationship be-
tween public spending on parental benefits and child mortality rates with
including additional sets of controls such as the natural log of GPD per
capita, share of population with health insurance coverage, total health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, fertility rates and female employ-
ment to population ratios.16.The first columns of Panel E-F are the fixed
effect estimations with set of controls. Columns 3 show coefficient esti-
mates of GMM framework. Furthermore, to control for contemporaneous
correlation and panel heteroskedasticity, I estimate Panel-corrected stan-
dard errors (PCSE) in Columns (4). I focus on autoregressive processes of
order 1 (AR(1)) indicating on the existence of a serial correlation and al-
lowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation17.
It is important to note that all standard errors are fully robust against ar-
bitrary heteroskedasticity as well. The inclusion of the basic control vari-
ables has a noticeable effect on the size of the parental leave coefficient es-
timates but none of the coefficients is still significant at any conventional
level. Namely, previous results are robust to using additional covariates
as well.
The absence of a significant relationship between public spending on
parental leave benefits and child mortality indicators is also not driven by
large standard errors. This basic finding is also robust to using the first
differences of the variables for the stationary concern. Table(5) represent
the results using the first differences of the variables which are simply
the replication of same estimation techniques in Table (4). Results remain
unchanged.
16However, both fertility rate and female employment rate may be endogenous. Reverse
causality might occure since parental leave benefits, not only for the child health but also are
often providedwith the goal of improving the labor market opportunities of women as well.
Similarly higher infant mortality rates imply, ceteris paribus, that more births are needed to
achieve a target family size with increasing fertility rate (Ruh00b). Reflecting these concerns,
I have replicated results without controlling for those two covariates as well. Although the
relevant estimates were not represented here, excluding these variables does not change the
main results.
17The Wooldridge test I applied implies the existence of arbitrary serial correlation, null
hyphothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected (Woo02). As an alternative to Prais-
Winsten regression estimation, clustering standard errors at the country level fot the serial
correlation problem does not change the results.
40
Turning to control variables, female employment ratio is positively
significant in all regressions irrespective of which econometric framework
is used andwhichmortality indicator is themain outcome of interest. The
positive coefficient of female employment rate may indicate that work-
ing mothers have less time to invest in childrearing and childbearing ac-
tivities. The coefficient estimates of fertility rates and log of per capita
GDP have expected signs and significant with the use of GMM technique
(Columns (2) of Panels(D-F) in Table 4).
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The preliminary finding of the paper on no evidence for a significant
relationship between public spending on parental leave benefits and child
mortality rates has not changed with the analysis which take into account
the first differences of the variables18. Overall, my results in Table 5 sup-
port two basic hypotheses: (1) GDP per capita is positively related with
the low level of child mortality; and (2) the relationship between fertility
rate and child mortality is positive. Moreover, overall results poses two
important questions:
(1) Is there a long-run causal relationship between public spending
on parental leave benefits and child mortality rates? It is important to
emphasize that this paper does not directly address the causation. A
complication might arise in assessing the direction of the causality. The
measurement for parental leave benefits may be endogenous and the
causality might run from existing child mortality rates to the generos-
ity of the welfare state in parental leave benefits. That is, the welfare
state may expand parental policies to compensate for an increase in child
mortality rates and provide more services within families. To allow for
a causal interpretation of the estimation results, an instrumental vari-
able (IV) strategy should be identified. For an IV strategy, the related
literature on the efficiency of public policies on development outcomes
mainly used ”legal origins” as an exogeneous instrument which refers
to the legal system that countries belong into such as common law, Ger-
man civil law, Scandinavian civil law, French civil law etc. However, le-
gal origins themselves may affect the related outcomes through channels
other than parental leave benefits.(AJ05) also point out few shortcomings
in the use of this instruments which violates exclusion restrictions. Con-
sidering the existing literature which suggests that Scandinavian origin
18In addition to the investigation of parental leave benefits and child health outcomes, I
examine this relationship between maternity leave benefits and child outcomes as well. As
it is explained in the section (2.2), “parental leave benefits” is a generic term which cap-
tures the total amount of payments that are provided from all types of leave schemes which
parents are entitled to receive. These are maternity leave entitlements, parental leave enti-
tlements and child care leave entitlements. Among those entitlements, the most traditional
one is the maternity leave entitlements which provide benefits only to mothers. To examine
whether maternity leave benefits alone are relevant for the child health outcomes, I have
solely analyzed the relationship between maternity leave benefits and child mortality rates
as well.The relevant results are represented in Appendix-C.
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countries are sharply more interventionist similar to that socialist coun-
tries, they may have a greater interest in state expansion with social wel-
fare policies than common law countries. On the other hand, it can be
expected that civil law countries, in part because of their commitment
to equality, might redistribute more on health to reduce infant mortality
among poors(LPLdSSV99).(Sen98) also strongly argues that infant mor-
tality statistics are important indicators in the formulation of economic
policy decisions over a large field covering distributional concerns over
the class, gender and race. Therefore, using legal origins as IV estimators
can be severelly biased and imprecise in this setting. Thus, this paper
avoids making causal claims on the efficiency of parental leave policies
on child health outcomes. The next section further interprets the relevant
results. (2) What would be the other omitted factors influencing child
health outcomes? To test the validity of my results, I subject each of these
key regressions to one robustness test and the results are reported in Table
6. Female educational attainment aged between 15-44, which is the proxy
for the maternal education, is considered as an additional covariate for
the robustness check.
2.6.2 Robustness Check: Female Educational Attainment
According to the World Economic Forum’s “The Global Gender Gap Re-
port”(2012), the lower but persistent gender gap in educational attain-
ment exists for most of the countries in the world. However, OECD
countries have almost a gender equal pattern in educational attainment.
The ratio of female to male educational attainment increased from around
57.7% in 1950 to 80.3% in 1990 and to 85.9% in 2010. Previous studies sug-
gest that promoting female attainment to education positively contributes
to children’s physical and developmental well-being. Recent studies have
emphasized that higher educated women tend to have smaller families,
because of the increased employment opportunities and better knowl-
edge about contraception. Namely, less children in a family improves
the chances of child survival. More education also might help women
to make better decisions about several health factors such as basic hy-
44
giene, nutrition and immunization. One of the important theories that lies
behind these conclusions is the “Social Modernization Theory” (Lip59)
which has emphasized that maternal education may reduce child mortal-
ity rates. The relationship between maternal education and child mortal-
ity has been previously confirmed in many single-country studies. How-
ever, due to the unavailability of yearly data, cross-country research on
parental leave policies(Ruh00b; Tan05) have thus far not considered it, as
an important determinant of child health. Using a new dataset (“Educa-
tional Attainment and ChildMortality Estimates by Country (1970-2009”)
which is published in 2010 by the Institute for Health Metrics and Eval-
uation (IHME) of Washington University, this will be the first study that
investigates the role of maternal education in the cross-country parental
leave and child health literature. Maternal education is proxied with fe-
male educational attainment aged between 15-44.
Table 6 represent the results of robustness check estimations with fe-
male educational attainment. Relevant results for neonatal, postneonatal
and under-five mortality rates are shown in Panel A-C respectively using
the original variables. Panel D-F represent the robustness check results
using the first differentiation of the variables.
Table 6: Robustness Check: Relationship Between Parental Leave Benefits
and Child Health Outcomes
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C
FE AB PCSE FE AB PCSE FE AB PCSE
Public Spending on PLB 0.0456 0.0159 0.0036 0.0431 0.0128 0.0040 0.0451 0.0154 0.0040
(0.0299) (0.0144) (0.0100) (0.0269) (0.0132) (0.0088) (0.0286) (0.0138) (0.0094)
Female Education -0.0097* -0.0023** -0.0018 -0.0104* -0.0018** -0.0018 -0.0098* -0.0020** -0.0017
(0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0056) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0054) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Lag(Log Neonatal M.) 0.8301*** 0.7672***
(0.0171) (0.0364)
Lag(Log Postneonatal M.) 0.8330*** 0.7523***
(0.0168) (0.0361)
Lag(Log Under-Five M.) 0.8321*** 0.7627***
(0.0169) (0.0361)
Health Care Coverage -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Total health expenditures -0.0219 -0.0039 -0.0043 -0.0200 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0211 -0.0042 -0.0043
(0.0145) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0143) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0143) (0.0038) (0.0039)
Log(GDP) -0.0860 -0.0759** -0.0149 -0.0162 -0.0621* -0.0182 -0.0651 -0.0692** -0.0157
(0.2163) (0.0321) (0.0511) (0.1994) (0.0357) (0.0488) (0.2061) (0.0319) (0.0494)
Female Employment Rate 1.1661* 0.1880** 0.2514*** 1.0063* 0.1660* 0.2253** 1.1012* 0.1832** 0.2388***
(0.5739) (0.0925) (0.0964) (0.5094) (0.0862) (0.0890) (0.5408) (0.0880) (0.0924)
Fertility Rate 0.0065 0.0591*** 0.0171 0.0146 0.0456** 0.0067 0.0101 0.0541*** 0.0130
(0.0442) (0.0200) (0.0181) (0.0442) (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0435) (0.0191) (0.0176)
R-Square 0.9820 0.9943 0.9837 0.9943 0.9825 0.9951
Number of Cases 525 480 525 525 480 525 525 480 525
PANEL D PANEL E PANEL F
FE AB PCSE FE AB PCSE FE AB PCSE
∆Public Spending on PLB 0.0158 -0.0001 0.0048 0.0138 0.0028 0.0058 0.0151 0.0013 0.0051
(0.0118) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0063) (0.0098) (0.0110) (0.0072) (0.0103)
∆Female Education -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0015)
∆Lag(Log Neonatal M.) 0.4831*** 0.3498***
(0.0537) (0.0544)
∆Lag(Log Postneonatal M.) 0.4478*** 0.2910***
(0.0630) (0.0557)
∆Lag(Log Under-Five M.) 0.4765*** 0.3329***
(0.0581) (0.0541)
∆Health Care Coverage -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
∆Total health expenditures 0.0028 0.0024 0.0028 0.0031 0.0027 0.0035 0.0028 0.0022 0.0029
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0050)
∆Log(GDP) -0.2240** -0.2269*** -0.2010** -0.2276** -0.2239*** -0.1987** -0.2251** -0.2267*** -0.2014***
(0.0822) (0.0606) (0.0785) (0.0861) (0.0568) (0.0788) (0.0834) (0.0561) (0.0772)
∆Female Employment Rate 0.2075 0.0926 0.1173 0.1807 0.0804 0.1230 0.1954 0.0800 0.1133
(0.1485) (0.0975) (0.1224) (0.1387) (0.0981) (0.1216) (0.1399) (0.0901) (0.1198)
∆Fertility Rate 0.0829** 0.0603** 0.0670*** 0.0907** 0.0678*** 0.0773*** 0.0846** 0.0617** 0.0697***
(0.0315) (0.0262) (0.0216) (0.0319) (0.0260) (0.0203) (0.0316) (0.0263) (0.0207)
R-Square 0.3495 0.4601 0.3652 0.4682 0.3588 0.4623
Number of Cases 510 465 510 510 465 510 510 465 510
This table replicates the same estimation techniques of Table 4 by first differentiating all variables against non-stationary. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C represent results
on the relationship between public spending on parental benefits and child mortality rates without controlling any covariates. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the
logarithm of neonatal mortality rate. Panel B and Panel C use the logarithm of postneonatal and under-five mortality rates as dependent variables. Pooled cross-sectional
OLS estimation results are represented in columns 1 of each panel. Fixed effects OLS estimates are shown in columns 2 with country dummies. Columns 3 uses GMM of
Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) which is instrumented for the log of child mortality rates using a double lag. Estimations are done based on a sample which
is a yearly balanced panel which covers 22 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States) from 1970 to 2009 where public spending on parental
leave as a percent of female wages in manufacturing is the main regressor. Panel D, Panel E and Panel F investigate the relationship between public spending on parental
benefits and child mortality rates with additional covariates such as natural log of GPD per capita, share of population with health insurance coverage, total health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, fertility rates and female employment to population ratios. The first columns of each panel replicate fixed effect estimations with
additional control variables. Columns 2 show Arellano-Bond GMM estimation results. To control for contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are
reported in columns 3 which includes autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression
for the correction of serial correlation. Estimations which include control variables use a sample covers 15 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland,Germany, Ireland, Japan,Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) through the period from 1975 to 2009. All regressions at all
panels include year dummies. Except Pooled OLS specifications, they all include country dummies and country specific time trends as well. All standard errors are robust
for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity and represented in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. PLB is the abbreviation
for Parental Leave Benefits.
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The econometric frameworks in Panels A-C of Tables 6 control female
educational attainment with other controls to investigate the relationship
between public spending on PLB and child health outcomes. The main
dependent variable of interest in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C are the nat-
ural log of neonatal mortality, postneonatal mortality and under-fivemor-
tality rates respectively. Panel D-F replicate same estimations using the
first differences of all variables to take into account the stationary issue.
Columns (1) of each panel show the fixed effect estimation results. The co-
efficient of parental leave benefits is insignificant with fixed effect estima-
tion technique. Arellano Bond estimates in columns (2) also support the
insignificance of the parental leave benefits in decreasing the child mor-
tality rates. The last column of each panel represents the Prais-Winsten
regression estimates. Results remain unchanged on the insignificancy of
parental leave benefits. On the contrary, the coefficient of female educa-
tional attainment itself is expectedly negative with FE and GMM specifi-
cations for all mortality rates. However, it has turned to be insignificant
with PCSE (AR(1)) estimation which controls potential serial and contem-
poraneous correlation. Moreover estimations using the first differences
of the variables do not support this previous finding as well. Positive co-
efficients of fertility rates and negative coefficients of GDP per capita is
robust to estimations with different techniques similarly to the previous
findings shown in Table 5. To sum up, using female educational attain-
ment, which is the proxy for maternal education, the robustness check es-
timations show that female educational attainment also do not affect the
lack of a relationship between public spending on parental leave benefits
and child health outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Female Political
Representation, Political
Responsiveness and Child
Health Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, (RS82) established a theoretical mo-
del which shows that some economic factors such as health related goods
and services play an important role for the determination of the child
health. There is sufficient amount of research on the economic deter-
minants of child health and most of them mainly focused on the role of
public health expenditures. The contradicting findings among alternate
studies have endorsed the fact that public health expenditures often does
not produce expected improvements in child health outcomes. There-
fore Chapter 2 has provided an evidence for this strand of literature that
likewise the public expenditures on health, public spending on parental
benefits may also be irrelevant on the child health outcomes1.
1Public spending on parental leave benefits are social welfare payments for the use of
parents during the pregnancy period. Although, both public health expenditures and the
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The previous literature explains the reasons why public health expen-
ditures are not always efficient in reducing child mortality in the follow-
ing two ways:
• a) The crowding out effect of private sector allocation.
• b) The inefficiency of governance in public reseource allocation (e.g
corruption)
The nature of public health expenditures allows both for the crowding
out effect of private sector allocation and the inefficiency of governance
(or political institutions) in health-service delivery. In contrast to public
health expenditures, public spending on parental leave benefits are dis-
tributed solely by the government. There is, therefore, no channel for
the private provision of parental leave benefits. Namely, the presence
of the private sector’s crowding out effect on parental leave benefits is
an impossible case for explaining the insignificant relationship between
public spending on parental leave benefits and child health outcomes.
The existing studies on the relationship between the inefficiency of gov-
ernance in resource allocation and child health outcomes has mainly fo-
cused on the bribes that corrupt politicians might levy on the high tech-
nology medical equipment, or advanced hospital facilities since they are
produced by a limited number of suppliers.(Mau98) argues that large
bribes will be available on items on which the degree of competition is
low. On the contrary, he has emphasized that welfare transfers (e.g old-
age pensions, parental leave benefits, individual transfers such as the
salaries of doctors) are policies where corrupt politicians may find lim-
ited or almost no room. On the other hand, most of the OECD coun-
tries, especially advanced economies, already have well-functioning anti-
corruption measures and transparent legal frameworks to ensure bureau-
cratic quality. Thus, it is difficult to explain the insignificant relationship
between parental leave benefits and child health outcomes through cor-
ruption, bribes etc.
spending on parental benefits are the policies which implemented in part for the well-being
of children, they are different category of social welfare policies. Public health expenditures
cover all governmental spending related to any kind of health facilities and do not capture
parental leave benefits
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What would be the reason for the insignificant relationship between
parental leave benefits on child health outcomes over 40 years across
OECD countries? Although, the private sector crowding out effect does
not explain the insignificance of parental leave benefits on child health
outcomes, the reason behind it might be an insufficient allocation due
to the crowding out effect of traditional social polices (e.g old-age bene-
fits) on new policies such as parental benefits. Most of the social spend-
ing goes to the elderly population over forty years across countries. Al-
though the recent economic crisis (2007/08) has made an increase on
family-specific spending (includes parental leave benefits) with an idea
to support future generations, social spending on the elderly amounted
to 11% of GDP which is exactly half of the overall social welfare spend-
ing (22% of GDP) in 2009. 7% of the total is the share of public health
expenditures and the remaining 4% of total social spending is shared by
unemployment, housing, spending on active labor market programmes
and spending on families.
Even though the inefficiency of governance in resorce allocation
through corruption is almost impossible for the case of parental leave
benefits, the inefficacy of governance should not be examined only from
an economic perspective. The inefficiency in resource allocation through
corruption is mostly related to uselessness of financial resources in a good
way . Inefficacy in political institutions or governance might be analyzed
from a political perspective as well. As (Ace06) argues since “democracy
is a regime more beneficial to the majority of the populace, it will result
in policies that are relatively more favorable to the majority”. However
he also mentions that democracy does not always correspond to some
ideal of political equality. At this point, we can look at the role of the rep-
resentative democracy for the possible political equality in governance
of public resources. A body of theoretical literature argue that different
groups by gender, race and ethnicity should be represented by members
of those groups for better political institutions(Gui94; Lij12). In other
words, public policy making should have more voices in itself because
policies which made byeven electorally accountable governments often fail
to reflect the interests of some groups(Pan03). For instance, over the last
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Figure 12: Relationship between public spending on parental benefits (as a
% of female wages in manufacturing) and infant mortality outcomes
ten years, scholars have engaged in theoretical and empirical discussions
on female representation in politics and ask whether there is a link be-
tween an increasing number of female politicians and allocation of public
reseources to women’s policy preferences which especially concern child-
care and child raising(Phi95; You02). Public spending on parental leave
benefits are allocated to support families, especially to mothers, for their
efforts to care for newborns or young children. Moreover, considering
their role on female labour market outcomes, parental leave policies are
the preliminary social welfare policies which certainly reflects women’s
interests.
On the other hand Citizen Candidate Model of Besley and Coate
(1997) assumes that identity or preferences of politician may matter for
different policy outcomes. Following Citizen Candidate Models, there
is sufficient amount of research which has emphasized the effect of fe-
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male politicians on family-focused policy outcomes which directly target
women and children2. To sum up, the role of women’s representation
in a representative body and the individual preferences of female politi-
cians are both emphasized as important factors in policy-decision making
which might reflect women’s preferences and interests (e.g child health,
maternal health).3.
Public expenditures on parental leave benefits in OECD countries di-
rectly target young women and children. Parental leave benefits are allo-
cated to support families (especially mothers before and after the child-
birth) for their efforts to care for infants or young children. Moreover, if
we also consider their role on female labour market outcomes, parental
leave policies are the preliminary social welfare policies which certainly
reflects women’s interests.
Despite constituting half of the world’s population, in most coun-
tries the number of women are proportionally less in positions of power
and decision-making and they are still underrepresented in the repre-
sentative bodies (e.g national parliaments) of even most advanced na-
tions. By 2013, gender inequality in political participation across OECD
countries is still persisted and there is currently no country which has
reached the ideal of equal participation amongst women and men in
politics. Sweden is the only country among OECD countries where
male and female parliamentarians have nearly equal representation with
44.7% female seats in the parliament and the average percentage share
of female seats across OECD parliaments is still less than one-third
in many OECD countries. According to latest statistics of IPU (2012)
“Women in National Parliaments Database”4, there are only 9 coun-
tries over 34 countries where the percentage share of female seats are
more than one-third of the entire seats in OECD. In the rest, the num-
ber of women account for less than one quarter or even one-fifth of the
2For the related literature, see: Chapter4.
3The empirical studies also often emphasize on the preference differences between sexes.
Their common argument has been that women are more likely than man invest in children
and favour redistribution, they give priority to public policies related to their traditional
roles as care givers in the family and society(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04? )
4http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm
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entire parliament. For instance, by 2013, the percentage share of fe-
male parliamentarians in some of the advanced nations across OECD
are as follows; the United states (17.8%), the United Kingdom (22.5%),
Japan(8.1%), Canada(24.7%), Greece(21%), France(26.9%), Italy(31.4%),
Germany (32.9%). Only 10 years ago, by 2003, these numbers were much
more lower as; for the United states (14.3%), the United Kingdom (17.9%),
Japan(7.1%), Canada(20.6%), Greece(8.7%), France(12.2%), Italy(11.5%),
Germany (32.2%).
Correspondingly, chapter3 investigates the link between parental
leave benefits, female political representation and child health outcomes.
More specifically, I seek to assess whether the persistent underrepresen-
tation of women in parliaments has played a role for the inefficacy of
parental leave benefits on child health outcomes over the forty years
across OECD countries. The paper organized as follows: Section (3.2)
discusses the small theoretical contribution where I aim to modify the
model of(RS82) with the interactive governance term -measured as the
interaction of female political representation and parental leave benefits-
Section (3.3) presents the data and specifies the empirical model. Section
(3.4) provides the results of empirical estimations and investigates their
robustness.
3.2 Prior Research and Theory
3.2.1 Previous Literature
A number of past studies have examined the relationship between
public spending and child development outcomes (e.g public health
expenditures-child mortality rates, public education spending-child edu-
cational attainment). Even though some studies have pointed out statisti-
cally significant positive relationship between public spending and child
development outcomes5, there are also diverging findings which empha-
size on the inefficacy of political institutions or governance in policy-
making that cause an insignificant relationship between public spending
5For the related literature see: Chapter 3.
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and development outcomes.
The inadequacy of the governance6 in policy making and reseource
allocation is studied in two dimensions: political and economic. For in-
stance corruption within government, where high government officials
are likely to demand illegal payments (e.g bribes), is more accounted for
the economic dimension of governance7.On the other hand, participation
6In UNDP Governance for Sustainable Human Development Report, 1997, the core char-
acteristics of Good Governance are described as follows;
• “Participation: Irrespective of class, race and gender,all citizens should have a voice
in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions
that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of associ-
ation and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.
• Transparency: Transperancy is built on the free flow of information. Processes, in-
stitutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and
enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.
• Accountability:Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society
organizations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders.
This accountability differs depending on the organization and whether the decision
is internal or external to an organization.
• Equity: All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-
being.
• Effectivenes&Efficiency : Process and institutions produce results that meet needs
while making the best use of public reseources.
• Responsiveness: Institutions and process try to serve all stakeholders.
• Strategic Vision: Leaders and public have a broad a long-term perspective on good
governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such
development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is
also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that
perspective is grounded.
• Rule of Law: Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly
the laws on human rights.”
(UNDP, 1997).
7(Han86) is one of the first economists who emphasize on the inefficiency of educational
expenditures in the US context, showing it empirically that greater expenditures per student
do not result in parallel gains in educational achievement.(FHP98) have focused on theweak
links between public health spending and the health status. They have mentioned that the
institutional capacity is an indispensable component for the efficiacy of public health ser-
vices in improving health status of people. (GVT02) have indicated that countries have high
level of corruption, have higher infant mortality rates. Moreover (KKZL00) and (KKM04)
show that government ineffectiveness have a strong direct negative impact on infant mor-
tality. Similarly,(RS08), using the corruption index as an indicator of the governance, has
found that public health and educational spending often does not yield the expected im-
provements in development outcomes such as child mortality and educational attainment.
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in politics or the political representation of disadvantaged groups consti-
tutes of the political dimension of governance.There are several studies
which have been focused on the role of female political representation on
public social expenditures8. However studies on the link between female
political representation, public spending and child development out-
comes are limited with single-country studies. Using quasi-experimental
election outcomes (CF11) have found that higher female political repre-
sentation leads higher primary educational attainment in India.(BCF11)
have indicated that one standard deviation increase in women’s politi-
cal representation results in a 1.5 percentage point reduction in neonatal
mortality.
This study contributes to this strand of literature by examining the
link between female political representation, public spending on parental
benefits and child health outcomes.
3.2.2 Theory
The represented model in the previous chapter has showed that child
health function may change with the amount of parental leave benefits
which is determined with s wage replacement rates. In Chapter 1, Equa-
tion(3.1) has obtained after a family utility maximization (3.2) subject to
budget constraint (3.4) and with a given child health production func-
tion(3.3).
dH
dsw
= Fm
dM
dsw
+ Fh
dh
dsw
(3.1)
U = U(X,H,L, h) (3.2)
H = F (M,µ, h, ξ) (3.3)
8For the related literature see: Chapter 4.
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where Fm, Fµ, Fξ Fh ￿= 0.
Y = N + wR = PxX + PmM + s(wh) (3.4)
(s) varies across countries and governments determine the level of
wage replacement rates by law. For instance, in the United States there is
no entitlement for a paid leave,namely s = 0 and total parental benefits
((s)wh) that parents are entitled to receive during the leave period is zero.
It is possible that if the parental leave is unpaid or paid at a low replace-
ment rate parents would prefer to work instead of receiving the leave
(Ros11). Following (SLDD92), (Lei05) has emphasized on the woman’s
time allocation between labor market and home for the maximization of
family’s utility. Considering the limited resources and therefore the op-
portunity cost occured between time spent in one activity and the other,
she indicates that women maximize the utility of the family by weighing
the costs and benefits of being at work and not. Both(Ruh00b) and (Lei05)
have showed the positive impact of parent’s time away from work on
the child health outcomes unless the benefits paid during the leave pe-
riod has an increasing impact on household income.(Tan05) has also ob-
tained similar cross-country findings which show that weeks of unpaid
parental leave do not have a significant effect on child health since the
leave has been provided without any payment. As children of poor, sin-
gle and low-educated working mothers are a key vulnerable population
that was not reached by the US parental scheme. These mothers are often
forced to work immediately after childbirth, and their newborn children
are then placed in low-quality childcare. Even in the OECD area, there
have been large disparities between different social welfare areas with re-
spect to amount of social welfare spending allocation. Most of the social
welfare spending goes to the elderly population over forty years due to
the fact that population across the OECD is getting older. Although the
recent economic crisis (2007/08) has made an increase on family-specific
spending (includes parental leave benefits) with an idea to support fu-
ture generations, social spending on the elderly amounted to 11% of GDP
which is exactly half of the overall social welfare spending (22% of GDP)
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in 2009. 7% is the share of public health expenditures in overall social
spending and the remaining 4% of GDP share is divided among seven dif-
ferent categories which includes unemployment, housing, spending on
active labor market programmes and spending on families. In 2009, the
public spending on parental leave benefits was only 0.3%. As previously
explained, one of the prerequisites of an effective and fair public resource
allocation is the well-functioning representative democracy or having an
equal voice in policy making, since even electorally accountable govern-
ments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged groups such as
women, poor or ethnic minorities(Pan03).
Parental leave benefits are the policies which target especially mothers
for their efforts to care newborns and they are important policies for the
female labour market outcomes as well. Considering this fact, parental
leave policies are the preliminary social welfare policies which certainly
reflects women’s interests. Therefore one can assume that the under-
representation of women in politics would be a factor for this inefffec-
tive redistribution over forty years and the reason for the insignificant re-
lationship between parental leave payments and child health outcomes.
Following the previous literature which often claim that female politi-
cal representation is positively significant in policy decision making that
reflects women’s interests, the female political representation as a gov-
ernance indicator may have role in determining the amount of parental
leave benefits or level of the wage replacement rates that are allocated or
determined by governments. Thus, budget constraint of the family (3.4)
can be rewritten as following;
Y = N + wR = PxX + PmM + αs(wh) (3.5)
It is assumed that both partners participate in the labour force. This
assumption ensures that woman contributes to household income aswell.
The interactive term αs represents the interaction of female political
representation and parental leave benefits as percent of parents’ earnings.
As explained in preceding lines, it is, at the same time, the shadow price
of receiving the leave or opportunity cost of working.
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The first order maximization conditions of the model in the previous
chapter can be rewritten as following;
UL = λ (3.6)
UX = λPx (3.7)
Uh + UHFh = (1 + λ)αsw (3.8)
UhFm = λPm (3.9)
The model yields four demand equations for the four different goods
in terms of prices and income;
X = Dx(Px, Pm, Y, µ,αsw) (3.10)
M = Dm(Px, Pm, Y, µ,αsw) (3.11)
h = Dl(Px, Pm, Y, µ,αsw) (3.12)
The effects of price changes on the level of child health can be obtained
using the first differentiation of the child health production function;
dH = FmdM + Fµdµ+ Fhdh (3.13)
The effect of the prices on child health might be formulated with the
help of (2.11) whilst assuming that dµdPi = 0where i = x, y, z .
dH
dPx
= Fm
dM
dPx
+ Fh
dh
dPx
(3.14)
dH
dPm
= Fm
dM
dPm
+ Fh
dh
dPm
(3.15)
dH
dαsw
= Fm
dM
dαsw
+ Fh
dh
dαsw
(3.16)
Equations suggest that the interaction of governance and public spending
on parental benefits as a percentage of earnings can be relevant for the
child health.
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3.3 Data and Empirical Specification
Table-7 provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables of inter-
est. To examine the link between public spending on female political rep-
resentation, public spending on parental benefits and child health out-
comes, overall analyses have been done based on two different sam-
ples.The first sample shown in Panel A is used to analyze the role of
the female political representation for the efficacy of parental benefits on
child health outcomes without including any control variables. It cov-
ers 21 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States) from 1974 to 2010. Using the same econo-
metric frameworks, the estimations which include control variables are
done based on a sample that is shown in Panel B. It is a yearly bal-
anced panel dataset which covers 14 countries (Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal , Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom) from 1975 to 2010.
The model has the following framework to analyze the link between
public spending on parental benefits, female political representation and
child health outcomes.
lncit = αgit + σwit + ϕLit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (3.17)
lncit = δlncit−1 + αgit + σwit + ϕLit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (3.18)
where the dependent variable lncit denote the natural log of child
mortality rates. The data on mortality rates is from(IHM10b),“Infant and
Child Mortality Estimates by Country (1970-2010)” which covers neona-
tal, postneonatal and under-5 mortality estimates.
Lit is the public spending on parental leave benefits as a percentage of
female wages in manufacturing. wit represents the female political repre-
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sentation variable which is measured with the percentage share of female
parliamentarians in national parliaments across OECD. The main inde-
pendent variable of interest is the interactive governance variable git. It is
the interaction of public spending on parental leave benefits (Lit) and the
female political representation (wit). In order to capture the direct and the
indirect effects of the female political representation on child health out-
comes, the variablewit enters into themodel both as an independent vari-
able and interacted with the spending on parental benefits (git=wit*Lit).
The data on the percentage share of female parliamentarians in na-
tional parliaments across the OECD is mainly from(IPU95), “Women in
Parliaments: 1945-1995” and the series after 1995 is collected from the
website of IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union). All potential control vari-
ables are included in xit. Moreover, γi denote a full set of country dum-
mies and µt denote a full set of year dummies. υit is an error term, cap-
turing all other omitted factors, with E(υit) = 0 for all i and t.
Similar to the previous chapter, the data for public spending on
parental leave benefits as a percentage of female wages in manufacturing
sector comes from (GB11),“Comparative Maternity, Parental, and Child-
care Leave and Benefits Database” (1960-2010). The data on total health
expenditures as a percentage of GDP is directly obtained from (OEC13c),
“Health Data: Health Expenditure and Financing”. It is assumed to be
positively related with child health outcomes because government allo-
cation or private investment on medical and health care facilities might
be related to improved child health outcomes. Furthermore, the data on
real GDP per capita at constant prices in 2005 USD are collected from
(HSA12), Penn World Table 7.1. The inclusion of income is a neces-
sary control for its possible effects on health which works through a
variety of indirect channels (e.g., better nutrition, better housing, bet-
ter sanitation). The transformation of the income variable to log is use-
ful to capture the non-linearity. The data on fertility rates come from
(OEC13b), “OECD Health Data: Demographic references”. Furthermore
the health insurance coverage has been used as an essential control vari-
ables which are assumed to be positively relatedwith the child health.The
data on the share of population with health insurance coverage are col-
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lected from (OEC13e), “ Health Data: Social Protection” and data for
life expactancy is from (OEC13d), “Health Data: Health Status”. Finally,
the data on female employment to population ratio are collected from
(OEC13a)“Employment and Labour Markets: Key Tables from OECD”.9
3.4 Results
Before presenting the econometric evidence, it is instructive to consider
some simple scatter plots of the data that contain the interaction variable
of parental leave benefits and the female political representation (inter-
active governance term) across OECD countries. Figure 13-15 plot the
interaction of public spending on parental leave benefits and the female
political representation versus childmortality outcomes. The scatter plots
are drawn based on a sample which covers 21 OECD countries for the pe-
riod from 1974 to 2010. All figures reveal a negative association between
the interactive governance term and child mortality rates.
Figure 13: The Relationship Between the Interactive Governance Term and
Neonatal Mortality Rates
To examine the relationship in a more robust fashion, I proceed is-
sues econometrically. In the first chapter, I have examined the relation-
9For the detailed information on the literature which is followed for the selection of vari-
ables: see Chapter 2
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Figure 14: The Relationship Between the Interactive Governance Term and
Postneonatal Mortality Rates
Figure 15: The Relationship Between the Interactive Governance Term and
Under-Five Mortality Rates
ship between public spending on parental benefits itself and child health
outcomes. Based on the evidence that there is no empirical relationship
between public spending on parental leave benefits and child health out-
comes, in line with equation (1) and equation (2), I test this relationship
between the interactive governance term (the interaction of parental leave
benefits and the female political representation) and child health out-
comes.
Equation (3.17) is a standard fixed-effects panel data model. Coun-
tries are indexed by i, time is defined in terms of annual periods, by t.
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γi denote time-invariant country-specific effects. First of all, I run re-
gressions using the method of Pooled-OLS without controlling country
dummies (γi) which allow the persistence of country-specific effects over
time. Columns (1) in Panels A of Table(8-10) represent the Pooled-OLS
estimates where the main regressands are neonatal, postneonatal and
under-five mortality rates respectively. Pooled-OLS results indicate that
the interaction variable of the female political representation and public
spending on parental benefits has an highly high significant coefficient
of 0.32217, 0.67713 and 0.45208 and public spending on parental bene-
fits itself is insignificant. Columns (2) of Panel A, alternatively control
for the time-invariant omitted factors. However, once country-specific
time trends and country fixed-effects are included to the model interac-
tive governance term turns to be insignificant and this result is robust
to using any other estimation techniques. Alternatively, using equation
(3.18), Columns (3) of Panel A represent the GMM framework estimates
where the coefficient of the interactive governance term remain insignif-
icant. The Wooldridge test has strongly rejected the null hyphothesis of
no serial correlation. Following the existing cross-country parental leave
and child health literature(Ruh00b; Tan05) remaining columns of Table
(8-10) add the natural log of GPD per capita, the share of the population
with health insurance coverage, total health expenditures as a percentage
of GDP, fertility rates and the female employment to population ratios
as additional controls. In addition to fixed effect estimates in columns(4)
of Panel B, columns (5) uses GMM and columns (6) report PCSE-AR(1)
estimates where Prais-Winsten regression controls for the serial correla-
tion.The evidence on the lack of a relationship between the interactive
governance term and the child health outcomes is robust using additional
controls as well.
Turning to control variables, health insurance coverage have nega-
tively significant coefficient estimates under the fixed effect estimations
(Columns 4) of Panel B in Table 8-10. The female employment ratio, GDP
per capita and fertility rate have also significant coefficient estimates in
some econometric frameworks but all methods are not support this result.
Similar to results in the previous chapter, total public health expenditures
64
(as a percent of GDP) are not significant irrespective of any econometric
framework.
The econometric methods in Panel C and D of each table uses first
difference of the variables as their non-stationary represented in the sec-
ond chapter with panel unitroot tests. The first difference of Log(GDP)
per capita and fertility rates are significant in all estimations. Overall re-
sults that the female political representation has been relevant for the lack
of a relationship between public spending on parental benefits and child
health outcomes over the thirty years in OECD area.
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Table 8: Political Responsiveness: Female Political Participation, Parental
Leave Benefits and Neonatal Mortality Outcomes
PANEL A PANEL B
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
FPR*Public Spending on PLB -0.32217** 0.22008 -0.00116 0.12661 0.02278 0.03898
(0.12964) (0.23187) (0.05611) (0.27604) (0.11664) (0.07951)
FPR -0.41087*** -0.03385 0.03808 -0.00492 0.00475 -0.00876
(0.15403) (0.35108) (0.07320) (0.07119) (0.03711) (0.02269)
Public Spending on PLB 0.01972 -0.05295 0.00582 -0.07048 0.06664 -0.04143
(0.03205) (0.06979) (0.01862) (0.37527) (0.13412) (0.09230)
Lag(Log Neonatal M.) 0.84559*** 0.84072*** 0.75276***
(0.01323) (0.01744) (0.03736)
Health Care Coverage -0.00146* -0.00067* -0.00069
(0.00076) (0.00041) (0.00048)
Total Health Exp.(%GDP) -0.01959 -0.00317 -0.00324
(0.01262) (0.00370) (0.00392)
Log(GDP) -0.00481 -0.08345* -0.03540
(0.22238) (0.05058) (0.05113)
Female Employment Ratio 0.90349 0.12461 0.20433**
(0.53021) (0.11934) (0.09901)
Fertility Rate 0.00891 0.06227** 0.01420
(0.03133) (0.02472) (0.01840)
R-Square 0.81483 0.98332 0.98304 0.99446
Number of Cases 777 777 714 503 462 503
PANEL C PANEL D
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
∆FPR*Public Spending on PLB 0.05312 0.13780** 0.07018 0.14869 0.08968 0.08493
(0.06557) (0.05480) (0.05828) (0.10295) (0.08868) (0.08941)
∆FPR -0.01118 -0.03090** -0.02286 -0.31820*** -0.20711* -0.22513**
(0.01689) (0.01424) (0.01675) (0.10325) (0.10689) (0.10227)
∆Public Spending on PLB -0.10020 -0.19149*** -0.11206 -0.02348 -0.02356 -0.01882
(0.08580) (0.06596) (0.08713) (0.02047) (0.02574) (0.02437)
∆Lag(Log Neonatal M.) 0.42020*** 0.46790*** 0.34843***
(0.05760) (0.05557) (0.05519)
∆Health Care Coverage -0.00023 0.00034 0.00024
(0.00056) (0.00031) (0.00060)
∆Total Health Exp.(%GDP) 0.00271 0.00453 0.00456
(0.00552) (0.00558) (0.00503)
∆Log(GDP) -0.22373*** -0.22516*** -0.21257***
(0.06212) (0.05475) (0.07684)
∆Female Employment Ratio 0.23208 0.11000 0.13467
(0.15691) (0.10610) (0.12095)
∆Fertility Rate 0.08501** 0.05266* 0.06458***
(0.03252) (0.02715) (0.02246)
R-Square 0.20460 0.25172 0.36461 0.47284
Number of Cases 756 756 693 489 448 489
Panel A-B represent some results on the link between parental leave benefits, female political representation and neonatal mortality rates
without differentiating any variable to take into account stationary. The econometric frameworks in Panel A do not include any control
variable. The dependent variable of interest is the logarithm of neonatal mortality rate which refers to the total number of infant deaths
under twenty-eight days of age per 1,000 live births. The interaction between the percentage share of female parliamentarians and the
public spending on parental leave benefits (as a percent of female wages in manufacturing) is the main regressor of interest. Pooled-OLS
estimation result is presented in Column (1) of Panel A. Column (2) of Panel A show the fixed effect estimates with country dummies. The
GMM estimate of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) is represented in column(3) of Panel A and is instrumented for log(under-
five mortality) by using a double lag. Econometric specifications in Panel B investigate the relavant relationship including additional
controls such as the natural log of GPD per capita, share of population with health insurance coverage, total health expenditures as a
percentage of GDP, fertility rates and female employment to population ratios. Column (1) of Panel B is the fixed effect estimation with
country dummies. Column (2) shows the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation result which is instrumented for log(under-five mortality) by
using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported in column (3) which include
the autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for
the correction of serial correlation. Panel C-D replicate same estimations on the link between parental leave benefits, female political
representation and neonatal mortality rates with differentiating variables to take into account stationary. Except Pooled-OLS estimation
in columns 1 all estimation techniques of Panel A-D include country specific time trends as well. All regressions include year dummies.
All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity and represented in parentheses. Estimations without controls are
done based on a sample which is a yearly balanced panel covers 21 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States) from 1974 to 2010. Estimations with controls are done based on a sample which is a yearly balanced panel
covers 14 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal , Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom) from 1975 to 2010.One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. PLB
and FPR are the abbrevations for Female Political Representation and Parental Leave Benefits respectively.
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Table 9: Political Responsiveness: Female Political Participation, Parental
Leave Benefits and Postneonatal Mortality Outcomes
PANEL A PANEL B
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
FPR*Public Spending on PLB -0.67713*** 0.23071 0.01347 0.09486 0.04282 0.03356
(0.17854) (0.24069) (0.05523) (0.26288) (0.10932) (0.07395)
FPR -0.55051*** -0.06432 0.02068 -0.00113 -0.00416 -0.00738
(0.20294) (0.35775) (0.06931) (0.06949) (0.03573) (0.02160)
Public Spending on PLB 0.03247 -0.05907 0.00069 -0.00774 0.02349 -0.03659
(0.03727) (0.07194) (0.01682) (0.35585) (0.12049) (0.08802)
Lag(Log Postneonatal M.) 0.85353*** 0.84812*** 0.73288***
(0.01012) (0.01713) (0.03737)
Health Care Coverage -0.00175** -0.00061 -0.00074
(0.00073) (0.00046) (0.00053)
Total Health Exp.(%GDP) -0.01750 -0.00353 -0.00314
(0.01221) (0.00346) (0.00387)
Log(GDP) -0.09178 -0.05957 -0.04120
(0.19775) (0.04777) (0.04799)
Female Employment Ratio 0.69663 0.11557 0.17745*
(0.44101) (0.10278) (0.09123)
Fertility Rate 0.00096 0.04937** 0.00312
(0.02979) (0.02015) (0.01793)
R-Square 0.75686 0.98434 0.98474 0.99448
Number of Cases 777 777 714 503 462 503
PANEL C PANEL D
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
∆FPR*Public Spending on PLB 0.04961 0.13405** 0.05466 0.14185 0.09702 0.08330
(0.06584) (0.04945) (0.05774) (0.09588) (0.07873) (0.08313)
∆FPR -0.01223 -0.03209** -0.01985 -0.30061*** -0.21577** -0.22686**
(0.01757) (0.01354) (0.01648) (0.09738) (0.09957) (0.09627)
∆Public Spending on PLB -0.08600 -0.17419** -0.08254 -0.02364 -0.02385 -0.01711
(0.08267) (0.06595) (0.08777) (0.01949) (0.02276) (0.02324)
∆Lag(Log Postneonatal M.) 0.38660*** 0.43099*** 0.28516***
(0.06435) (0.06529) (0.05599)
∆Health Care Coverage -0.00038 0.00025 0.00013
(0.00049) (0.00037) (0.00066)
∆Total Health Exp.(%GDP) 0.00291 0.00484 0.00490
(0.00508) (0.00509) (0.00508)
∆Log(GDP) -0.22361*** -0.22555*** -0.20717***
(0.06790) (0.04879) (0.07637)
∆Female Employment Ratio 0.19800 0.10170 0.13375
(0.14758) (0.10940) (0.11947)
∆Fertility Rate 0.09310** 0.06371** 0.07625***
(0.03336) (0.02694) (0.02122)
R-Square 0.19077 0.24784 0.38057 0.48197
Number of Cases 756 756 693 489 448 489
Panel A-B represent some results on the link between parental leave benefits, female political representation and postneonatal mortality
rates without differentiating any variable to take into account stationary. The econometric frameworks in Panel A do not include any
control variable. The dependent variable of interest is the logarithm of postneonatal mortality rate which refers to the total number
of infant deaths between twenty-eight days and one year of age per 1,000 live births. The interaction between the percentage share of
female parliamentarians and the public spending on parental leave benefits (as a percent of female wages in manufacturing) is the main
regressor of interest. Pooled-OLS estimation result is presented in Column (1) of Panel A. Column (2) of Panel A show the fixed effect
estimates with country dummies. The GMM estimate of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) is represented in column(3) of
Panel A and is instrumented for log(under-five mortality) by using a double lag. Econometric specifications in Panel B investigate the
relavant relationship including additional controls such as the natural log of GPD per capita, share of population with health insurance
coverage, total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, fertility rates and female employment to population ratios. Column (1) of
Panel B is the fixed effect estimation with country dummies. Column (2) shows the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation result which is
instrumented for log(under-five mortality) by using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard
errors are reported in column (3) which include the autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of serial
correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Panel C-D replicate same estimations on the link
between parental leave benefits, female political representation and postneonatal mortality rates with differentiating variables to take
into account stationary. Except Pooled-OLS estimation in columns 1 all estimation techniques of Panel A-D include country specific time
trends as well. All regressions include year dummies. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity and represented
in parentheses. Estimations without controls are done based on a sample which is a yearly balanced panel covers 21 countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) from 1974 to 2010. Estimations with controls are done based on
a sample which is a yearly balanced panel covers 14 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal , Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) from 1975 to 2010.One, two and three * indicate significance
at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. PLB and FPR are the abbrevations for Female Political Representation and Parental Leave Benefits
respectively.
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Table 10: Political Responsiveness: Female Political Participation, Parental
Leave Benefits and Under-Five Mortality Outcomes
PANEL A PANEL B
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
FPR*Public Spending on PLB -0.45208*** 0.22394 0.00826 0.11921 0.03700 0.03974
(0.12972) (0.23224) (0.05577) (0.26792) (0.11611) (0.07653)
FPR -0.45642*** -0.04108 0.02965 -0.00414 -0.00029 -0.00855
(0.15144) (0.34939) (0.07196) (0.06954) (0.03755) (0.02203)
Public Spending on PLB 0.02699 -0.05515 0.00314 -0.04807 0.04612 -0.04198
(0.02964) (0.06966) (0.01816) (0.36624) (0.12926) (0.08975)
Lag(Log Under-Five M.) 0.85071*** 0.84419*** 0.74659***
(0.01149) (0.01716) (0.03702)
Health Care Coverage -0.00155* -0.00066 -0.00069
(0.00074) (0.00043) (0.00050)
Total Health Exp.(%GDP) -0.01889 -0.00324 -0.00316
(0.01230) (0.00344) (0.00385)
Log(GDP) -0.03071 -0.07307 -0.03822
(0.20998) (0.04855) (0.04909)
Female Employment Ratio 0.82516 0.12631 0.19129**
(0.49017) (0.11358) (0.09453)
Fertility Rate 0.00484 0.05775** 0.01024
(0.03029) (0.02285) (0.01782)
R-Square 0.83305 0.98363 0.98357 0.99520
Number of Cases 777 777 714 503 462 503
PANEL C PANEL D
Pooled-OLS FE AB FE AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
∆FPR*Public Spending on PLB 0.05852 0.14219** 0.07155 0.15231 0.09939 0.09159
(0.06339) (0.05176) (0.05934) (0.09953) (0.08798) (0.08505)
∆FPR -0.01343 -0.03290** -0.02375 -0.31380*** -0.21064* -0.22677**
(0.01651) (0.01380) (0.01708) (0.10219) (0.10791) (0.09816)
∆Public Spending on PLB -0.10078 -0.18992*** -0.10754 -0.02503 -0.02415 -0.02003
(0.08203) (0.06486) (0.08908) (0.02034) (0.02517) (0.02338)
∆Lag(Log Under-Five M.) 0.41538*** 0.46021*** 0.33002***
(0.06090) (0.06067) (0.05485)
∆Health Care Coverage -0.00028 0.00030 0.00021
(0.00052) (0.00033) (0.00061)
∆Total Health Exp.(%GDP) 0.00252 0.00408 0.00438
(0.00521) (0.00542) (0.00495)
∆Log(GDP) -0.22201*** -0.21860*** -0.21004***
(0.06387) (0.05074) (0.07523)
∆Female Employment Ratio 0.21997 0.10215 0.13120
(0.14915) (0.09904) (0.11815)
∆Fertility Rate 0.08632** 0.05401** 0.06672***
(0.03247) (0.02673) (0.02155)
R-Square 0.20368 0.25312 0.37410 0.47476
Number of Cases 756 756 693 489 448 489
Panel A-B represent some results on the link between parental leave benefits, female political representation and under-five mortality
rates without differentiating any variable to take into account stationary. The econometric frameworks in Panel A do not include any
control variable. The dependent variable of interest is the logarithm of under-five mortality rate which refers to the total number of
infant deaths between twenty-eight days and one year of age per 1,000 live births. The interaction between the percentage share of
female parliamentarians and the public spending on parental leave benefits (as a percent of female wages in manufacturing) is the main
regressor of interest. Pooled-OLS estimation result is presented in Column (1) of Panel A. Column (2) of Panel A show the fixed effect
estimates with country dummies. The GMM estimate of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) is represented in column(3) of
Panel A and is instrumented for log(under-five mortality) by using a double lag. Econometric specifications in Panel B investigate the
relavant relationship including additional controls such as the natural log of GPD per capita, share of population with health insurance
coverage, total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, fertility rates and female employment to population ratios. Column (1) of
Panel B is the fixed effect estimation with country dummies. Column (2) shows the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation result which is
instrumented for log(under-five mortality) by using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard
errors are reported in column (3) which include the autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of serial
correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Panel C-D replicate same estimations on the
link between parental leave benefits, female political representation and under-five mortality rates with differentiating variables to take
into account stationary. Except Pooled-OLS estimation in columns 1 all estimation techniques of Panel A-D include country specific time
trends as well. All regressions include year dummies. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity and represented
in parentheses. Estimations without controls are done based on a sample which is a yearly balanced panel covers 21 countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) from 1974 to 2010. Estimations with controls are done based on
a sample which is a yearly balanced panel covers 14 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal , Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) from 1975 to 2010.One, two and three * indicate significance
at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. PLB and FPR are the abbrevations for Female Political Representation and Parental Leave Benefits
respectively.
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Chapter 4
Does Gender Matter?
Public Spending on Family
Allowances and Female
Political Representation
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the under-representation of women
in politics over the forty years across OECD countries might be a reason
for the insufficient resource allocation towards family-specific social pol-
icy areas.Considering parental leave benefits as one of the important fam-
ily specific social policy areas, Chapter 3 indicates that the interaction of
public spending on parental leave benefits and female political represen-
tation over the forty years across OECD countries has empirically been
irrelevant on child health outcomes. Is allocation of total public spending
really affected by“gender bias” in politics? Namely, could different pro-
portions of women and men in political institutions result in unsimilar
spending allocation decisions?
Contrary to unitary models, non-unitary models in family
economics(MB80; MH81; LP93) suppose that differences in prefer-
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ences of men and women influence familys’ choices and women often
have stronger preferences on childcare and child raising related to health.
The empirical studies also often emphasize on the preference differences
between sexes. Their common argument is that women are more likely
than man invest in children and favour redistribution, they give priority
to public policies related to their traditional roles as care givers in the
family and society (Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05).
Such sex differences are now leading to promotion of gender equality
as a potent means of human development (Duf12; UN13). In particular,
empowering women is believed to increase investments in children
(Ban01). For instance, conditional cash transfers (CCT), which have
recently been launched in many countries, target regular enrollment of
the children into schools and getting regular health controls at the health
centers (e.g receiving vaccinations). Considering the fact that women
have higher tendency to spend for children in families, CCT qualify
only mothers. A similar line of research has been done by (Duf00) who
has analyzed the old age pension transfers in South Africa. She has
shown that households do not function in a unique mechanism and
the efficiency of the government transfers depends on the gender of the
recipients. According to her findings, Old Age Pension program in South
Africa has caused an improvement in child development (especially
for girls) and this effect is entirely because of the pensions that women
receive in order to use only for the child needs.
These gender differences in preferences in the society and within the
family may also be brought into political institutions, influencing the vot-
ing behaviour of politicians and, therefore, the allocation of resources
across spending categories. When investigating the role of female politi-
cians in policy making, scholars have empirically analyzed the relation-
ship between the fraction of female politicians in politics and various
public spending categories. Considering existing studies in economics
literature, the empirical evidence on the existence of gender specific de-
cisions on different public spending categories is mixed so far. On one
hand, it has been argued that female politicians contribute to an increase
in public spending which concerns women’s preferences. On the other
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hand, there is empirical literature which finds no evidence that such poli-
cies are significantly affected by the gender of politicians. Theoretical lit-
erature also has diverging arguments on the importance of the identity
of the politician, gender included, in shaping the allocation of resources
across spending categories. In contrast to Down’s(1957) Median Voter
Theorem, Citizen Candidate Models of Besley and Coate (1997) and Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996) support the fact that the identity and prefer-
ences of a politicianmatters for the implementation of a policy. According
to the Median Voter Theorem(Dow57), if the politicians only care about
winning the elections and commit to implementing specific policies once
elected, majority rule applies and policy decisions should only reflect the
preferences of the median voter rather than the preferences of the politi-
cian. However, if the candidates could not commit to specific policies, the
identity of the politician matters for policy implementation(OS96; BC97).
Based on the theory of Citizen Candidate Models which support the
fact that the identity of a politician matters for the policy determination,
this chapter firstly has aimed to contribute to the strand of empirical lit-
erature by studying the relationship between female political representa-
tion and public spending on famliy allowances across OECD Countries.
Public spending on family allowances is one of the family-specific poli-
cies that plays an important role in helping families for the childcare and
child raising which the literature suggests is one of the woman’s primary
concerns. The preliminary result of this chapter is the lack of a relation-
ship between the female political participation and public spending on
family allowances can be interpreted in three ways. 1-The result might
be consistent with the Median voter theorem, rather than Citizen Can-
didate Models, suggesting that politicians’ preferences and identities do
not matter in public policy making. 2- Preferences and the gender iden-
tity of the politicians might still matter for the policy determination but
the preferences of the women who involved in political activities might
be close to those of their male colleagues. 3- Gender identity of the politi-
cian might matter but the insignificance of the female political participa-
tion in policy-decision making may depend on the under-representation
of women in political institutions.Namely, the role of female politicians
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may start to be relevant in terms of bargaining power over policy making
and the governmental resource allocation when the percentage share of
the female politicians reach a given threshold. As discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, the under-representation of women in politics over the forty
years across OECD countries might be a reason for the insufficient re-
source allocation towards family-specific social policy areas. Therefore, I
further aimed to analyze whether this lack of a relationship may turn to
be a significant relationship after the number of female politicians reach
a critical mass threshold in terms of bargaining power in policy making.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the theoreti-
cal background 4.3 presents recent empirical studies on the relationship
between female political participation and public policies. Section 4.4
presents the data, specifies the empirical model and provides the first re-
sults. Section 4.5 investigates the robustness of the releavant results.
4.2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical background for this study is based on Citizen Models of
Political Economy that the identity of a politician matters for the pol-
icy determination(BC97; OS96). Politicians if they can not commit on
moderate policies before being elected, the identity and the individual
preferences of the politician matters for policy determination rather than
the preferences of median voter. Since existing political institutions can-
not enforce full policy commitment such models of policy-making pre-
dict that increases in political representation afforded to a disadvantaged
group will enhance its influence on policy. It is commonly argued that
the representation of disadvantaged groups such as women, poor or eth-
nic minorities can translate into public policy outcomes which reflects the
preferences of such groups. For instance (Pan03) has pointed out that
policies chosen by minority politicians might reflect the policy prefer-
ences of minorities. Her empirical results show that increasing propor-
tions of minority representation increase the level of transfers going to
this group. Similarly, the representation of women can translate into pub-
lic policy which reflects women’s preferences.
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Following the theory of separate spheres bargaining model of (LP93),
I propose a framework of distribution related with the political participa-
tion of women and men.
Here I characterize the sources of potential gains of political participa-
tion of the man and women who have “collaborative” form of utility. It is
assumed that they have different public policy preferences with respect
to their gender identities but there is a simple Cournot equilibrium in
the provision of public goods by women and men to household, assum-
ing that socially prescribed gender roles assign primary responsibility for
certain activities in households. The general utility function Ui is defined
over a vector of public consumption goods (q1, q2), private consumption
goods (xi) and leisure (Li) where i = m, f . m represents the man and f
represents the woman. The preferences of the woman and men are repre-
sented by the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions as following;
Specifically, the individual’s utility function is assumed to be strictly
quasiconcave and monotone increasing in all its arguments and to pos-
sess continuous second partial derivatives.
Um(xm, q1, q2, Lm) (4.1)
Uf (xf , q1, q2, Lf ) (4.2)
where xm and xf are private consumption goods, Lm and Lf is leisure
time for the man and women respectively. q1 and q2 are public goods
that are consumed jointly. Thus, it is assumed that the interdependence
between individuals operates only through consumption of the public
goods. For the simplicity, it is assumed that there are four types of goods
including leisure. With Nash bargaining, the equilibrium values of xm,
xf , q1 and q2 are those that maximize the product of gains to coopera-
tion between man and woman. The form of utility function is assumed as
“collaborative” where the man’s utility depends on women’s utility or vice
versa. These gains are defined in terms of a threat point utility which rep-
resents a equilibrium utility point. Namely, Nash Social Welfare function
is a symmetric Cobb-Douglas function as following;
N = (Um − Tm)(Uf − Tf ) (4.3)
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The utility that men receive in the Nash bargaining solution is an in-
creasing function of the utility that women receive at the threat point.
For instance, an increase in the threat point utility of men and a decrease
in that of women will cause an increase in the Nash bargaining solution
utility of men and a decrease in that of women.
The individuals face a time constraint as following;
ti = li + Li + ki (4.4)
where i = m, f . More explicitly time constraint functions for each indi-
vidual can be written as following;
tm = lm + Lm + km tf = lf + Lf + kf (4.5)
ti is the total time available to individual i and li is time devoted to mar-
ket work by i. ki is the time which is spent in form of a political activity
which affects the public good allocation. Following Citizen Candidates
Model, It is assumed that increases in political participation of the indi-
vidual will enhance its influence on public good allocation. Therefore the
time that individuals spend for the political activities is the shadow price
for having prefered public good as well.
Individual i faces a budget constraint as well.
pixi + wiLi + p1q1 + p2q2 = Yi (4.6)
where p1 = km and p2 = kf are equal since ki is the opportunity cost of
obtaining the public good.
To derive the demand functions for the goods, the Nash Social Welfare
Function will be maximized as following;
N = [Uf (xf , Lf , q1, q2)− Tf (kf , km, wf , pf )]
[Um(xm, Lm, q1, q2)− Tm(km, kf , wm, pm)] (4.7)
subject to total budget and time constraints;
s.t pmxm + pfxf + wmLm + wfLf + kmq1 + kfq2 = Ym + Yf (4.8)
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s.t tf + tm = lf + Lf + kf + lm + Lm + km (4.9)
This yields the demand functions;
xm = xm(km, kf , pm, pf , wm, wf , Ym, Yf ) (4.10)
xf = xf (kf , km, pf , pm, wf , wm, Yf , Ym) (4.11)
q1 = q1(km, kf , pm, pf , wm, wf , Ym, Yf ) (4.12)
q2 = q2(km, kf , pm, pf , wm, wf , Ym, Yf ) (4.13)
However, up to this point it is assumed that the form of the utility
function is “collaborative”. I have started with a simple Cournot equi-
librium in the provision of public goods by women and men, assum-
ing that socially prescribed gender roles assign primary responsibility
for certain activities in households. However in the absence of a co-
operative agreement, each individual decides unilaterally on the level
of her/his preferred public good (q1 or q1 ) consumed by the house-
holds. The above-obtained results change once the form of the util-
ity function is assumed as “egoistic” or once they have different pref-
erences on the public good allocation inside the household. The com-
mon argument of the previous empirical studies in political economy is
that women are more likely give priority to public family policies (e.g
family allowances, child cash benefits) with respect to their traditional
roles as care givers in the family and society related to child health and
education(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05). For example,
child care subsidies and child allowances are often regarded as women’s
issues. This linking of women’s and children’s welfare with child-based
subsidies is rooted in the gender assignment of child care: mothers expect
and are expected to assume primary responsibility for their children1.
1“As Crawford and Pollak (1989) point out, it is often asserted that mothers are primarily
responsible for child care in three senses: first, it is mothers who find a child care provider
andmake the arrangements; second, it is mothers who take time off fromwork when a child
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In a noncooperative enviornment the utility function of the man and
women will be as following;
Um(xm, q1, Lmq¯2) (4.14)
Uf (xf , q2, Lf q¯1) (4.15)
Women choose xf and q2 to maximize her utility Uf (xf , q2, Lf q¯1) sub-
ject to pfxf + p2q2 + wmLm = Yf where q1 is the level of public good
preferred by the man. The decision leads to a set of reaction functions;
xf = xf (p2, pf , wf , q¯1) (4.16)
q2 = q2(p2, pf , wf q¯1) (4.17)
Lf = Lf (p2, pf , wf q¯1) (4.18)
It is previously assumed that kf is the price of having prefered public
goods through the time spent for the political activity participation. The
price of possessing the preffered public good kf equals to p2. Participa-
tion to the political activities might be in the form of direct participation
through having a role in policy-making in political institutions. It might
be through working in political organizations and unions. Even though
it is an indirect participation, in order to choose proper representatives,
participation to elections are the activities require time allocation. Using
this equality function kf = p2, the demand functions of women can be
rewritten as following;
xf = xf (kf , pf , wf , q¯1) (4.19)
q2 = q2(kf , pf , wf q¯1) (4.20)
Lf = Lf (kf , pf , wf q¯1) (4.21)
The female demand will be the function of both political participation
kf and the government allocation to the other public goods such as q¯1.
is sick or when child care arrangements collapse; and third, it is mothers who ”pay” child
care expenses from their discretionary incomes”(LP93).
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Similarly the man’s demand functions for (xm, q2, Lm) will depend
on his political participation and the government allocation to the other
public goods such as women’s most prefered policies q¯2.
xm = xm(km, pm, wm, q¯2) (4.22)
q1 = q1(km, pm, wmq¯2) (4.23)
Lm = Lm(km, pm, wmq¯2) (4.24)
Next section discusses the existing empirical research on the female
political participation and public spending on policies which take into
account women’s interest.
4.3 Prior Research
Existing single-country studies on the relationship between female polit-
ical participation and policies that concern women’s interests have het-
erogeneous results.(Tho91), using data gathered from a 1988 survey of
members of the lower houses of the state legislatures of 12 US states, re-
veals that women in states with the highest percentages of female rep-
resentatives introduce more priority bills dealing with issues of women
and children than men in their states. Correspondingly, employing data
on bill introduction in Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the U.S House
of Representatives,(Jon97) has pointed out that the gender of legislators
matter in investing on the areas concern women rights, families and chil-
dren. Moreover, (Wa¨n09), using parliamentary survey studies carried
out in the Swedish Parliament, has emphasized on the necessity of fe-
male representation to take into account the women’s interests in policy-
making. Her findings show that women members of the parliament ad-
dress issues of social welfare policies such as famliy or health care more
than their male colleagues. A more recent work on Swedish municipal-
ities by (Sva09) has found a positive causal impact of female represen-
tation on public spending allocation on education and childcare. Simi-
larly (LN03), using the 2001 British Representation Study survey of 1,000
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national politicians, have emphasized on sex differences of legislators in
policy making related to womens issues. One of the other applications to
this line of models has been done by (CD04) who carried on a survey for
all investments in local public goods in sample villages of two districts in
India. They have found that, female members of reserved village councils
make more investment in drinking water than male members in where
women complain more often then men about drinking water. (Reh07),
similarly with (DC91) has found a dramatic movement of women into
US State Legislators over the past quarter century for a robustly signifi-
cant 15% share of the rise in state health spending. In contrast to these
single-country findings on the positive efficiency of female political rep-
resentation for the policies related to women and children issues, a recent
working paper by (AGH12) on Flemish Municipalities has found con-
tradictory results claiming that higher female representation in the local
parliaments is not associated with higher spending. Furthermore, an em-
pirical study from Italianmunicipalitiesł by (RT11) has found no evidence
on a significant relationship between female politicians and social expen-
ditures until the number of women politicians reach a certain threshold
supporting the fact that, even though Italy is one of the most developed
countries, has still very few numbers of female politicians in parliaments
similar to many other countries.
Although existing single-country studies have ambigious results, em-
pirical macro level studies have so far agreed on the positive effectiveness
of female politicians on various policy outcomes such as social welfare
spending, health spending, spending on maternity and parental benefits,
education expenditures. (BB07) investigates the influence of womens rep-
resentation on social welfare spending in national legislatures within 12
capitalist democracies during the period from 1980 through 1999 and they
have found a strong support for the hypothesis that womens political rep-
resentation increases social welfare spending. In a study of the impact of
womens representation in legislative power on policy outcomes includ-
ing health, education, social welfare spending, (Che10) finds a positive
effect of female legislators on government expenditures of social welfare.
(BR10) find a strong impact of womens presence in parliament on total
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public family expenditures using fixed effects model (Kit08), with sys-
tematic analyses of 19 OECD countries between 1970 to 2000, has showed
that women’s parliamentary presence significantly influences the mater-
nal and parental leave policies.
This paper contributes to this strand of cross-country literature by
studying public spending on famliy allowances as the main field of in-
terest.
Previous studies on the women’s representation in parliaments and
various public spending outcomes often have causal claims. However, an
accurate and reliable estimation on the causality is challenging and bur-
densome for many reasons such as the endogeneity problem. Prior cross-
country literature examining the impact of womens political representa-
tion in a range of public policy contexts have often neglected the problem
of reverse causality which makes the results of those studies question-
able. Reverse causality might occur due to the women empowerment
role of public social welfare spending. Social welfare policies (e.g educa-
tion, health, maternity policies) empower women in socio-economic life.
Therefore social welfare spending can also cause an increase in the female
political participation. For instance there is no maternity leave policy or
childcare support for the female members of the UK House of Commons
and the members of Canadian Parliament. This would undoubtedly be
a reason for women to delay seeking electoral office. (Che10) is the only
cross-country study so far considers the reverse causality problem by in-
strumenting the percentage of female parliamentarians with gender quo-
tas. However results are again questionable given that gender quotas
in itself might be the consequences of the insufficient representation of
women in policy decisionmaking. Possible reverse causality problem can
lead to biased coefficient estimates and wrong conclusions about theoret-
ical propositions but most dangerously if weak and wrong instruments
are used then the sampling distributions of instrumental variable statis-
tics are in general nonnormal, and standard instrumental variable point
estimates, hypothesis tests, and confidence intervals become unreliable.
The negligence of omitted variable bias is also one of the other fac-
tors make prior cross-country studies questionable. Some of them have
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neglected using country fixed effects (e.g (BB07)), lagged dependent vari-
ables for the historical perspective of phenomenon2(Che10; Kit08). More-
over, prior cross-country applications are based on panel data framework
with small numbers of time span (Che10; BR10; Kit08). The usual fixed
effect estimator is inconsistent when the time span is small(Nic81). In
addition to existing studies, I apply the generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bond. Furthermore, contemporaneous
and serial correlation across the countries are the important problems that
previous studies have ignored as well. To control for contemporaneous
correlation across countries, I apply panel corrected standard errors fol-
lowing (BK96; BK95). I also focus on the autoregressive processes of order
1 (AR(1)) which indicates the presence of serial correlation and allowing
Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation.
To sum up, this overview reveals several gaps in the cross-country
prior research on the role of female political representation and policy
outcomes in OECD setting. First of all there is no comparative study ex-
amining the relationship between female representation in parliaments
and public spending on family allowances. It is important to emphasize
that public spending on family allowances is one of the important pub-
lic policies supporting families for the cost of raising children related to
schooling and health which are the main concerns of women as litera-
ture suggests. Additionally, this study tests the research question with
different subsamples to deal with the cross-country heterogeneity bias.
There are some traditional OECD countries which are for long, at the top
of the list of an established rank order of countries according to the frac-
tion of female parliamentarians. Their high level women’s political rep-
resentation role may translate into more policies considering women’s
preferences relative to countries that have recently joined the OECD. This
raises doubt about whether traditional OECD countries are driving the
positive relationship between women’s political representation and pub-
lic spending on family allowances. I therefore examine the relationship
between women’s political representation and public spending on fam-
2The relationship between female political participation and public social spending is
not static and depends in part on the existing level of public social expenditure.
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ily allowances both excluding and including these new OECD countries
with different subsamples. Moreover, no comparative study up to now
tests the research question with different econometric specifications to
deal with the problems such as autocorrelation and contemporaneous
correlation. Furthermore, this study contibutes to this strand of literature
by studying the relationship between women’s parliamentary represen-
tation and public spending on family allowances both in absolute terms
(as a percentage of GDP) and relative terms(as a percentage of total gov-
ernment spending. Lastly, considering the relevant literature, this study
is the first attempt which analyze the role of critical mass issue on the re-
lationship between female political participation and family allowances.
This study has filled these gaps extending also the time period to 2008
and enlarging the geographical coverage to 27 OECD countries. The over-
all results support two basic hyphothesis; a) there is no robust evidence
for a positive significant relationship between the fraction of female par-
liamentarians and public spending on family allowances in the OECD
setting. b) Policy changes in terms of public spending choices on family
allowances can be driven by the female politicians only when the percent-
ages of women in the parliaments exceed a remarkable value. Related
empirical studies on the critical mass concept and public spending are
mainly single-country works3 and this paper will be the first attempt to
analyze the threshold effect in cross-country settings where main field of
interest is the public spending on family allowances.
The research on the influence of the critical mass of women relies
primarily on (Kan77)’s foundational study. She has hypothesized that
women would not be able show their influence in a male-dominated cor-
porate enviornment, wheremen (dominants) constitute more than 85 per-
cent and women (tokens) constitute less than 15 percent of total, since
they are subject to performance pressures, role entrapment and bound-
ary heightining. Although her work is the earliest source often cited on
3The most influential work on the critical mass is (Tho94), who focuses on the effects
of different proportions of women on public policy in 12 state legislatures in the United
States. She finds some impact of more women on policy outcomes, especially sponsoring
and passing bills concerning women and children issues. However, she also suggests that a
critical mass exists in the 1520 per cent range of women legislators.
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the topic and did not deduce a critical mass’ threshold for a political env-
iornment, some political scientists have attempted to determine a critical
mass threshold at which elected female politicians can start to have in-
fluence on public spending decisions. However, the determination of a
critical mass threshold is still problematic and undertheorized in polit-
ical science literature. Related literature can not answer whether there
is a single threshold which would be universially applied. In the liter-
ature, threshold has been variously identified at different levels such as
15, 20, 25 or 30 percent(BCM07; SM02). Drawing on previous studies,
I identify four different thresholds equal to 15, 20, 25 and 30 per cent
of women over total parliamentary seats. Afterwards I test them to ex-
amine whether there exists a unique threshold at which the number of
women translates into more public spending on family allowances. Each
threshold is represented with a dummy variable as a proxy of gender bar-
gaining power, which takes value equal to 1 when the share of women’s
seats exceeds the threshold itself. Overall findings show that a positive
relationship between the fraction of female parliamentarians and public
spending on family allowances exists only when the highest threshold is
passed (30%). However, it is important to note that this paper does not
claim on the existence of a causal connection between these two variables.
4.4 Data Description, Econometric Model and
Empirical Results
Before empirically addressing the role of critical mass in public spend-
ing decisions, I firstly look at whether there is a relationship between
the fraction of female parliamentarians and public spending on family
allowances. In fact, if there is a relationship, there is no reason to assume
that female parliamentary representation is currently irrelevant but could
be relevant in affecting the allocation of public spending after reaching a
certain critical mass threshold.
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4.4.1 The Relationship Between Female Parliamentary
Representation and Public Spending on Family Al-
lowances
Table 11 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest.
Overall analysis are based on three different samples. The first sample at
Panel A is called as base sample which covers 19 countries4 from 1980 to
20085. It is the full sample and includes countries which has the complete
data on family allowances (as a percentage of GDP) from the initial year
of OECD Social Expenditure Database (1980). The second sample at Panel
B covers 27 countries6 also including countries having joined the OECD
recently. There are some traditional OECD countries which are for long,
at the top of the list of an established rank order of countries according
to the level of female parliamentary representation, and their high level
representation may translate into larger amount of spending compare to
countries having joined the OECD recently. Therefore, the second sample
also includes countries such as Korea, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Re-
public where the number of female politicians in parliaments is arguably
lower compared to others. The second sample at Panel B is restricted in
terms of time span, from 1995 to 2008, due to the incomplete data for those
countries before 1995. In contrast to first two samples, the third sample
at Panel C uses public spending on family allowances as a percentage of
total government spending to analyze the relationship in relative terms
(as a percentage of tal government spending) rather than absolute terms
(as a percentage of GDP). The third sample covers the same countries and
the same period of second sample7.
4Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, NewZealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States
5Year 2009 is excluded due to the missing observations on family allowances for Switzer-
land in this year
6Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States
7It excludes only Japan due to the absence of relevant data on family allowances as a
percentage of total government spending.
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Table 11: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
SAMPLES
PANEL A: Base Sample
Mean Std. Dev. N
Public Spending on Family Allowances as a percentage of GDP 0.866 0.553 551
The fraction of Female Parliamentarians 17.392 11.322 551
(Lag) Public Spending on Family Allowances as a percentage of GDP 0.867 0.552 550
Population rate of the citizens below 15 years old 0.193 0.03 551
Population rate of the citizens above 65 years old 0.141 0.023 551
Log(GDP per capita) 10.185 0.308 551
Female Labor Force Participation Rate 60.035 11.492 551
Female Educational Attainment (aged between 15-44) 11.022 1.705 551
Public and Mandatory Private Spending on Old-Age Benefits 6.774 2.417 551
Unemployment Rate 7.433 4.052 551
Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index) 2.413 1.523 550
Voter Turnout in Election 75.119 14.221 551
Electoral Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 73.794 8.858 551
Legislative Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 67.642 11.581 551
Augmented Index of Constitutional Structures 1.904 2.059 551
PANEL B: Base Sample with Neo-OECD Countries
(Regressand:Public Spending on Family Allowances as a percentage of GDP
Mean Std. Dev. N
Public Spending on Family Allowances (%GDP) 0.872 0.556 378
The Fraction of Female Parliamentarians 21.916 10.734 378
(Lag) Public Spending on Family Allowances (%GDP) 0.874 0.555 377
Population rate of the citizens below 15 years old 0.468 1.221 378
Population rate of the citizens above 65 years old 0.145 0.027 378
Log(GDP per capita) 10.25 0.365 378
Female Labor Force Participation Rate 63.324 8.412 378
Female Educational Attainment (aged between 15-44) 11.968 1.211 378
Public and Mandatory Private Spending Old-Age Benefits 7.485 2.4 378
Unemployment Rate 7.267 3.822 378
Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index) 2.57 1.506 349
Voter Turnout in Election 72.486 14.165 350
Electoral Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 75.852 7.893 350
Legislative Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 70.11 10.102 350
PANEL C:Base Sample with Neo-OECD Countries
(Regressand:Public Spending on Family Allowances (%Total Government Spending)
Mean Std. Dev. N
Public Spending on Family Allowances (% Total Gov.Spending) 2.033 1.335 364
The Fraction of Female Parliamentarians 22.499 10.503 364
(Lag) Public Spending on Family Allowances (% Total Gov.Spending) 2.038 1.334 363
Population rate of the citizens below 15 years old 0.481 1.243 364
Population rate of the citizens above 65 years old 0.143 0.026 364
Log(GDP per capita) 10.246 0.372 364
Female Labor Force Participation Rate 63.448 8.545 364
Female Educational Attainment (aged between 15-44) 11.931 1.217 364
Public and Mandatory Private Spending Old-Age Benefits 7.476 2.43 364
Unemployment Rate 7.381 3.847 364
Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index) 2.63 1.507 335
Voter Turnout in Election 72.887 14.299 336
Electoral Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 75.967 7.98 336
Legislative Fractionalization of the party-system (Rae-Index) 70.376 10.152 336
Columns (1) of each sample show themean values of observations with standard deviations represented in Columns (2). “N” stands for the number
of observations used in samples. The first sample in Panel A, is a balanced panel data at one-year intervals for 19 countries between 1980 and 2008:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The second sample in Panel B adds eight more countries (Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) which have
recently joined to OECD and could not be included to first sample due to the data incompleteness for previous years from 1995. The third sample
covers same units (except Japan due to the data unavailability) and time span (1995-2008). In contrast to first two samples, the third sample takes
into account public spending on family allowances as a percentage of total government spending (in relative terms) rather than public spending
on family allowances as a percentage of GDP (in absolute terms).
For all samples there is a substantial variation in public spending on
family allowances: for the first sample shown in Panel A, the mean value
of public spending on family allowances (% of GDP) is 0.886%, the stan-
dard deviation is 0.553%. For the larger second sample, mean value of
public spending on family allowances (% of GDP) is 0.872% , and the
standard deviation is 0.556%. For the third sample, the mean value of
public spending on family allowances as a percentage of total govern-
ment spending is %0.886, and the standard deviation is 0.553%.
The main independent variable is the fraction of female parliamentar-
ians in lower chambers8. The mean score of the fraction of female parlia-
mentarians is 17.392 %, with Sweden (47.3%) being the highest and Korea
(2%) is the lowest.
The panel data model has the following framework which will be the
basis of my paper to analyze the relationship between female parliamen-
tary representation and the public spending on family allowances;
yit = αwit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (4.25)
where yit denotes public spending on family allowances as a percent-
age of GDP of country i in period t for the first two samples. For the third
sample, it represents public spending on family allowances as a percent-
age of total government spending of country i in period t. The main
independent variable is wit and represents the fraction of female par-
liamentarians (the percentage of female seats) in lower chambers across
OECD. Data on family allowances comes from (OEC13f), Social Expendi-
ture Statistics. The share of female seats in lower chambers is mainly from
the (IPU95),Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995 and the series after 1995 is
collected from the website of IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union). All other
potential control variables are included in xit. Moreover, γi denote a full
set of country dummies and µt denote a full set of year dummies. υit is
an error term, capturing all other omitted factors, with E(υit) = 0 for all i
8I employ the data of female parliamentarians in the lower chamber because the election
results do not appear in the upper chamber for some countries with a bicameral system,
such as in Canada.
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and t. Model is initially estimated using Pooled-OLS estimation method
which excludes country dummies, γi. As it is well-known, strict exo-
geneity assumption is one of the crucial necessity for the unbiased and
consistent estimates under OLS specification. Strict exogeneity assumes
that idiosyncratic error term (υit) is uncorrelated with the individual spe-
cific effects. Since the pooled regression model neglects the heterogeneity
across individuals and assumes that all individuals have a unique effect,
pooled-OLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent. But the fixed effect
estimator will be consistent since it allows for the heterogeneity among
individuals by assuming each one to have its own specific effect. As an
alternative to pooled-OLS framework, I therefore used the fixed effect es-
timation technique to control for the country specific time invariant char-
acteristics. Moreover, I also include country-specific time trends for the
country-specific time-variant omitted factors.
Furthermore, I follow the related literature for selecting control vari-
ables such as the real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population
rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old to take into
account general economic, labor market situation and demographic de-
velopment. I have also added female labor force participation rate and
female educational attainment for 15-44 year old women to take into ac-
count general social development as well. The data on real GDP per
capita at constant prices in 2005 USD are collected from (HSA12), Penn
World Table 7.19 and the data on female educational attainment (for 15-
44 years old women) comes from (IHM10a),Educational Attainment and
Child Mortality Estimates by Country (1970-2009)10. Furthermore, the
data on female labor force participation rate is obtained from(ILO12), On-
line Key Indicators of the Labour Market database. In addition, the data
on unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force comes
from (OEC10a), ”Labour Force Statistics: Summary tables”, OECD Em-
ployment and Labour Market Statistics. The data on population rates
is from (UN12), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Population
9Definition: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices.
10Female educational attainment is represented with mean years of education of women
aged between 15-44.
86
Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section). Finally, the ad-
ditional covariates to check the robustness of main regressions” results
are from (AWE+12) Comparative Political Data Set I 1960-2010. To test
the validity of conclusions, I subject five different robustness tests to re-
gressions which analyze the relationship between the fraction of female
parliamentarians and family allowances11.
To further take into account past occurrences, the lagged dependent
variable, lnyi,t−1, is also added on the right hand side of the regression
equation.
yit = δyit−1 + αwit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (4.26)
Before discussing the benchmark results, it is useful to look at the sim-
ple bivariate relationships between the fraction of female parliamentari-
ans and public spending on family allowances. Figure (16)12 is the scat-
ter plot, which shows an ambiguously positive relationship, and corre-
sponds to the cross-sectional relationship between the precentage share
of female parliamentarians and public spending on family allowances.
I further investigate these issues econometrically. Table 12 shows the
estimation results on the relationship between the percentage share of
female parliamentarians and the public spending on family allowances
based on three different samples. The estimation frameworks in Panel
A and Panel D use the base sample which is a panel data at one-year
intervals for 19 countries between 1980 and 2008. It is the full sample
and includes countries which have the complete data on public family
allowances (as a percentage of GDP) from the initial year of OECD So-
cial Expenditure Database (1980). Panel B and Panel E show estimates
based on the second sample where the main regressand is public family
allowances (as a percentage of GDP) as in the first sample but this ad-
ditionally includes countries that have recently joined to OECD. Panel
11For the detailed information on the variables used for robustness tests see: Section 4.5
12Notes: Values are averaged by country from 1980 to 2008. Country Abbreviations stand
for : Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France
(FR), Greece(GR), Ireland(IE), Italy(IT), Japan(JP), Luxembourg(LU), Netherlands(NL),
New Zealand(NZ), Portugal(PT), Spain(ES), Sweden(SE), Switzerland(CH), United King-
dom(UK) and United States(US).
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Figure 16: Percentage Share of Female Parliamentarians and Public Spend-
ing on Family Allowances (% of GDP)
C and Panel F use a sample which covers the same countries with the
second sample where the main regressand of interest is public family al-
lowances as a percentage of total public spending. Panel A, Panel B and
Panel C represent results on the relationship between family allowances
and the fraction of female parliamentarians without any control variables.
Panel C, Panel D and Panel E add other covariates following the sugges-
tions of previous literature. Considering the econometric specifications
without control variables, the coefficient for the fraction of female par-
liamentarians is significant in pooled-OLS estimations for each sample
which do not take into account country-specific dummies. Only the entire
estimations using the first sample gives significant coefficient estimates
but the results are not robust to estimates of same frameworks using other
samples. It is an interesting finding that the positive association between
the female political participation and family allowances is supportedwith
some estimation frameworks which have used the first sample that cov-
ers traditional OECD countries. Traditional OECD countries are for long,
at the top of the list of an established rank order of countries according
to the level of female parliamentary representation, and their high level
female parliamentary representation may translate into larger amount of
spending compare to countries having joined the OECD recently. This
finding raises a doubt on the fact that the contribution of female politi-
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cians to an increase of policy responsiveness to womens preferences may
occur only when the percentage share of elected female politicians exceed
a remarkable value or a critical mass threshold. Next section empirically
discusses on the critical mass threshold argument.
4.4.2 The Relationship Between Female Critical Mass in
Parliaments and Public Spending on Family Al-
lowances
In this section, I investigate whether the relationship between the percent-
age share of female parliamentarians and political choices is not linear. In
fact, it is possible that the roles of women start to be relevant in terms of
bargaining power only when the percentage share of female parliamen-
tarians reach a given threshold.
The threshold values where women’s representation starts to be rele-
vant for the major changes in public policy priorities have been variously
identified as 15, 20, 25 or 30 percent (BCM07; SM02). Following previ-
ous research, I identify four different thresholds equal to 15, 20, 25 and 30
which represent the percentage of female seats over total parliamentary
seats. Each threshold is represented as a dummy variable, which takes
value equal to 1 when the share of female seats exceeds the threshold it-
self. Overall findings show that a positive relationship between female
parliamentary representation and public spending on family allowances
exists only when the highest threshold is reached and this result is highly
robust to different econometric techniques, to estimation in various dif-
ferent samples and to the inclusion of different sets of covariates.
The time series-cross section data model has the following framework
to analyze the role of female critical mass in parliamentary representation
on public family allowances;
yit = αthit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (4.27)
As in the previous model, yit denotes public spending on family al-
lowances as a percentage of GDP for the first two samples. For the third
sample it represents public spending on family allowances as a percent-
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age of total government spending of country i in period t. The main inde-
pendent variables of interest is thit here represent four different dummy
variables which take value equal to 1 when the share of female seats ex-
ceeds 15, 20, 25 and 30 per cent critical mass thresholds respectively. The
rest of the model specifications including control variables is identitical
with the equation (4.25) and the equation (4.26). After the estimations
of Pooled-OLS (excluding country dummies and country specific trends)
and the fixed effect models using the equation 4.27, further the lagged
value,yi,t−1 of the regressand is included on the right-hand side to cap-
ture persistence and also potentially mean-reverting dynamics in public
spending on family allowances and make analysis in a dynamic panel
data setting.
yit = δyit−1 + αthit + xitβ + γi + µt + υit (4.28)
Table 13, columns (1) show the pooled OLS estimations on the rela-
tionship between the 30% critical mass threshold and public spending
on family allowances based on three different samples which are shown
at Panel A, Panel B and Panel C. The pooled OLS is identical to equa-
tion (4.27) except inclusion of the fixed effects, γi’s. In my framework,
these country dummies capture any time-invariant country characteris-
tics that affect the public spending on family allowances. As it is well
known, when the true model is given by (4.27) and the γi’s are corre-
lated with covariates, then pooled OLS estimates are biased and incon-
sistent. More specifically, let xjit denote jth component of the vector xit
and let Cov denote population covariances. Cov(yit−1, γi + υit) ￿= 0 or
Cov(xjit, γi + υit) ￿= 0 for some j, the OLS estimator will be inconsistent.
In contrast even these covariances are nonzero, the fixed effects estimator
will be consistent ifCov(yit−1, υit) = Cov(xjit, υit = 0 for all j (as T →∞).
This structure of correlation is particularly relevant in the context of the
relationship between the fraction of female parliamentarians and public
spending on family allowances because of the possibility of underlying
political and social forces shaping both equilibrium of the female empow-
erment and the governmental resource allocation.
90
Once fixed effects are introduced to capture any time-invariant coun-
try characteristics, the positive relationship between the female political
representation over the 30% critical mass threshold and the public spend-
ing on family allowances remained unchanged. The estimates of α are
0.2324, 0.16 and 0.3236 with standard errors 0.066, 0.0255, 0.0831 for the
first, second and third samples respectively. They are significant at the
one percent level where all the standard errors are robust to arbitrary
heteroscedasticity. Moreover, the result with the fixed effect estimation
technique on positive significant relationship is robust to the inclusion of
other additional covariates as seen in columns (5) and (6) in Table-13. Fol-
lowing the main literature on the determinants of family-friendly public
spending, these additional covariates such as real GDP per capita, un-
employment rate, population rate of the citizens above 65 years old (and
below 15 years old) to take into account general economic, labor market
situation and demographic development do not change the general find-
ing on the the positive relationship between female political representa-
tion over the 30% critical mass threshold and the public spending on fam-
ily allowances. As an extension to these control variables in columns(5)
used by previous literature, columns (6) include two more control vari-
ables which are the female labor force participation rate and the female
educational attainment. These variables are included to analysis to con-
trol general social development. The fixed effect estimates of αs remain
significantly positive in this case as well.
On the other hand, in simple dynamic panel models as equation(4.28)
where the lagged dependent variable is one of the regressors, it is well
known that the usual fixed effects estimator is inconsistent when the time
span is small (Nickell, 1981). Because the regressor yit−1 is mechanically
correlated with υis for s < t ,the standard fixed-effect estimation is not
consistent in panels with a short time dimension. To deal with this prob-
lem the generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) developed by
(AB91) is used in columns (3), (7) and (8) of Table 13. Findings on the pos-
itive significance of the 30% critical mass threshold is still robust to any
sample and the controls that are used under GMM estimation framework
as well.
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Furthermore, when the true model is given by (4.28), both OLS and
fixed effect standard errors might be wrong and the coefficients might be
inefficient if the errors show panel heteroskedasticity and they are con-
temporaneously or serially correlated. Serial correlation, which refers to
the linear dynamics of a random variable and biases standard errors caus-
ing less efficient results in time-series cross sectional data models. The
economic variables tend to evolve parsimoniously over time and that cre-
ates temporal dependence. This dependence can be a violation of one of
the classical assumptions of the Gauss-markov theorem. The Wooldridge
test I applied implies the existence of an arbitrary serial correlation and
the null hyphothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected (Woo02).
To control for contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard er-
rors are reported in columns (4) and columns (9) of Table 13which include
autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of se-
rial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction
of serial correlation. Irrespective of the sample type at Panel A, B or C, re-
sults on the positive relationship between the 30% critical mass threshold
and the public spending on family allowances are strongly valid under
these estimation technique as well. On the other hand, all standard errors
are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
All regressions except Pooled-OLS also use country specific time
trends to capture the effects of omitted factors that vary over time within
countries. The country-specific linear time trend helps capture the impact
of slow-moving changes (including unobserved policy changes) occuring
in a specific country throughout the period of analysis. Columns from
(5) to (9) of Table 13 investigate the influence of various covariates on the
relationship between the 30% critical mass threshold and public spend-
ing on family allowances. In each case, I present both fixed effects, GMM
and panel corrected standard error estimates. The results show that these
covariates do not affect the positive relationship between female political
representation over the 30% critical mass threshold and the public spend-
ing on family allowances. Estimations based on the first sample and the
third sample, represented at Panel A and Panel C, show that public and
mandatory private spending on old-age benefits is significant in the spec-
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ifications of both GMM and PCSE but it is insignificant for all models ex-
cept PCSE when estimations are done based on the second sample (Panel
B, Columns (9)).
As expected, lagged values of the family allowances are positively and
strongly related to the public spending on family allowances. Estima-
tions based on the first and the second sample give mixed results for the
log value of GDP per capita but it is positively significant in all regres-
sion estimations of the third sample (Panel C) where the main outcome
of interest is public spending on family allowances as a percentage of to-
tal government spending. For these sample estimates, the significance
is valid irrespective of using any different econometric specification and
additional control variables. The positive significance might support the
Wagners Law which claims that an increase in the average income would
raise the share of government spending in GDP. Similarly, female labor
market participation has a negative relationship with public spending on
family allowances as a percentage of total government expenditures once
women’s earnings are considered as an additional income which families
rely on. Increasing number of women in labor market increase the in-
come level of households which causes a decrease in family allowances
allocated to households with respect to their new income level. Some
unemployment rate coefficients also give expectedly positive signs with
GMM estimations in the third sample at Panel C of Table 13. One possible
interpretation for this result is that family allowances is a good practice
in anti-poverty family policies which are designed to support families for
the costs of raising children.
Overall results support Dahlerup (1988)’ argument on critical mass
which states that “The idea of a critical mass is most often applied to sit-
uations when women constitute less than 30 percent, in this way explaining
why the entrance of women into politics has not made more difference yet!”.
The positive cross-sectional relationship between the fraction of female
parliamentarians and family allowances exists when a certain threshold
(30%) is passed. This result is highly robust to different econometric tech-
niques from fixed effects to Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, to estima-
tions in various different samples and to the inclusion of different sets of
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covariates. On the contrary, I have not found any significant effect for the
other dummy variables associated to the lower thresholds as 15%, 20%,
25% (Tables 14-16). Correspondingly, UN CEDAW’s (The Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) General Recommen-
dation on Article 7 of the Convention also agreed on 30 percent as the
figure for female political representation to have a real impact on politi-
cal style and the content of policy decisions (CEDAW 1997, para.16). All
the critical mass thresholds which are determined under the 30% criti-
cal mass threshold show a significant coefficient estimates using pooled
OLS estimation technique (Columns (1) of Tables (14-16)). The positive
relationship between the threshold levels under the 30% and the public
spending on family allowances disappears once the country fixed effects
are included except the third sample of Table 16 which is not robust to
inclusion of other covariates, to different samples and superior models.
Table 14 represents estimates, using three different samples, where the
common interest is to analyze the relationship between the 15% critical
mass threshold and the public spending on family allowances. The co-
efficient of the 15% threshold is significant only under pooled OLS esti-
mations (columns(1)). Once county dummies are included to get rid of
omitted variable bias which is caused by the time-invariant country spe-
cific characteristics, the significance disappears. Table 15 (Table 16) repre-
sents results from regression estimations on the relationship between the
20% (the 25%) critical mass threshold and public spending on family al-
lowances respectively. In line with the previous results of the 15% critical
mass threshold, the fraction of female parliamentarians over the 20% or
the 25% critical mass thresholds are also positively significant in the the
Pooled-OLS estimation framework. Once country fixed effects and addi-
tional covariates are included, positive significance of both critical mass
thresholds disappear. There is no robust relationship between any critical
mass threshold level under the 30% female political representation and
the public spending on family allowances with the inclusion of the fixed
effects.
Therefore, it might be a possible answer for the absence of a cor-
relation between the fraction of female parliamentarians and family al-
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lowances, since the average percentage of female seats in OECD parlia-
ments has not peaked at the 30% critical mass threshold level over the
last fourty years. In other words, the higher percentages of women across
OECD countries might be required in order to be effective in the policy-
making at some social policy areas which represent women’s interests.
The small raises in the number of elected female politicians over years
might not be enough to observe policy changes, which probably require
stronger changes in female political participation. Although there is an
increasing trend in the number of female politicians across OECD coun-
tries, the average women share in parliaments of OECD-34 is still less
than one-third by 2012.
Figure 17: The Fraction of Female Parliamentarians across OECD between
1980-2008
Figure 17 represents the average fraction of female parliamentarians
in every ten years from 1980 to 2008. Although those countries have
showed up with significant increases since 1980, the average percentage
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share of the female seats still under the 30% of overall seats in OECD.
Figure 18: Public Spending on Family Allowances as a % of GDP across
OECD between 1980-2008
On the other hand, despite to an increasing trend in the fraction of fe-
male parliamentarians, public spending on family allowances (% of GDP)
does not have a continuous increasing trend in most of the OECD coun-
tries (Figure 18). As emphasized before in previous chapters, the highest
propotion of the total social expenditures belongs to old age benefits and
health expenditures in overall social welfare expenditures across OECD
countries.
4.5 Empirical Robustness
Based on the first sample, Table 17 investigates the robustness of the main
results on the positive significance of the 30% critical mass threshold on
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family allowances. Table 18 and Table 19 replicate the same estimations
using other two samples. Each panel of the Table 17 investigates the in-
fluence of different covariates on the relationship between the 30% critical
mass threshold and the public spending on family allowances. Panel A to
Panel E in Table 17 add voter turnout in election, cabinet composition13,
electoral fractionalization of the party-system14, legislative fractionaliza-
tion of the party-system15 and constitutional structures as additional co-
variates respectively. Panel A to Panel D at Table 18 and Table 19 check
robustness using the voter turnout in election, cabinet composition, elec-
toral fractionalization and legislative fractionalization respectively. Due
to the unavailability of data on constitutional structures for the countries
which have recently joined to OECD, robustness checks using the sec-
ond and the third sample do not include these variables. It is important
to note that some of those control variables may be potentially endoge-
neous.However, estimations which are done excluding those variables
has not created any change for the positive relationship between the 30%
threshold level on the family allowances.
4.5.1 Does voter turnout matter?
Scholars have formarly stressed on the public policy impacts of voter
turnout. They have mostly pointed out its positive impact on public so-
13Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index): takes value 1 if hegemony of right-wing (and
centre) parties (social-democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts
is 0), takes value 2 if dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties (social-democratic and
other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts¡33.3%), takes value 3 if balance of power
between left and right (social-democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabi-
net posts is between 33.3% and 66.6%), takes value 4 if dominance of social-democratic
and other left parties (social-democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet
posts¿66.6%), takes value 5 if hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties (social-
democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts is 100%).
14Index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula (1 −
mP
i=1
(vi)2 where vi is the share of votes for party i andm is the number of parties) proposed
by (Rae68).
15Index of legislative fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula (1 −
mP
i=1
(si)2 where si is the share of seats for party i andm is the number of parties) proposed
by (Rae68).
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cial welfare spending, because it is possible that the entrance of the new
and lower status voters into politics create a pressure on governments
to spend more on social welfare sectors. For instance, (Dye79), (HS92),
(Lin96) claim on an increasing effectiveness of voter turnout on welfare
spending. However the disparity in turnout between low and high-
income voters are important for the shape of governmental spending. If
huge disparities exist in countries across income levels or the number of
lower income voters are less than high or middle income voters in elec-
toral participation, less governmental spending on welfare services can
be expected. For instance (TV10) have emphasized that the middle class
prefers low taxes by a center-right party for fear that a left-wing party
would use high taxes to redistribute to the poor. Therefore it is expected
to have low taxes and less targeted transfers to narrow groups when the
number of low income class fewer than middle or high income class. For
instance (WRRS80) have claimed that the reason behind the poor gov-
ernmental spending in America is essentially voter turnout, since lower
income earners in America are less likely to vote than people with high
level incomes.
Panels A of Table 17-19 represent estimates controlling voter turnout
variable. Column(1-2) of Panels A show the fixed effect and GMM es-
timation results where the only control variable is voter turnout itself.
Columns(3) and Columns(4) of Panel A in Table 17-19 add other control
variables such as real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, the popula-
tion rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old, the
female labor force participation rate and the female educational attain-
ment for 15-44 year old women to take into account the economic, labor
market and demographic situation and as well as the social development.
Columns (4) show Prais-Winsten (AR(1)) regression estimates. Through-
out, country specific time trends, country and year fixed effects are con-
trolled in all regressions and all standard errors are robust for the arbi-
trary heteroscedasticity. The estimations based on three different samples
reveal that voter turnout does not change the positive significance of the
female political participation over the 30% critical mass threshold on fam-
ily allowances.The coefficient of the female political participation over the
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30% critical mass threshold is still highly significant. The voter turnout
variable itself is insignificant when the first sample is used for the analy-
sis. However it gives some negative significant results when the second
and the third samples are considered. Family allowances are the kind
of policies target mainly poor households. The countries with available
data on family allowances are mainly developed countries of OECD area.
Therefore, it is not surprising to obtain negative coefficient estimates for
the voter turnout variable, since the number of high income voters are
more than the number of less income voters. In other words, there can be
a crowding out effect of the other public policies which are prefered by
middle and high income groups.
4.5.2 Does cabinet composition matters?
The effect of the ideological cabinet composition on social welfare expen-
ditures has been largely analyzed in the prior literature. The findings of
the prior research on the relationship between ideological composition
and public social spending have so far been elusive. For instance, (Sol83),
(Ive01), (KO03) have found no evidence or at least weak association be-
tween the ideological composition and social welfare spending. On the
contrary, (HS92) has indicated that the leftist governments allocate more
on the welfare policies than the right wing governments. (Cus97) simi-
larly have emphasized on the role of leftist governments in high amounts
of welfare spending.(HRS93) also has mentioned on the role of ideology
in social welfare spending by showing the differences between christian
democrat and social democrat governments in public transfers. Despite
these diverging results, since ideology and the public policy correlation
has been largely taken into consideration by former research, I apply a
robustness check by adding an index for government party composition
to the equation (2).
Panels B at Tables 17-19 represent estimates using government party
composition as an additional covariate. Using different econometric spec-
ifications from fixed effects to Arellano-Bond GMM estimations in differ-
ent samples, the positive significance of the 30% critical mass threshold on
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family allowances has remained unchanged. Cabinet composition itself
is significant only in the PCSE specification of the second sample which
include additional covariates (Column (4) at Panel B of Table 18).
4.5.3 Does electoral fractionalization matter?
Electoral fractionalization shows the degree to which political parties in a
parliament share the votes in a more equitable way. In most of the coun-
tries in the world, two big main parties usually share the votes after an
election. (Lip77) and (MM86) pointed out that the larger number of po-
litical parties in a parliament might decrease efficiency of public spend-
ing since multiparty parliaments might make more promises to different
interest groups which can be resulted with less effective reallocation of
public expenditures. Econometric specifications at Panels C of Table 17-
19 control for the electoral fractionalization to check the robustness of the
positive relationship between the 30% critical mass threshold and public
spending on family allowances. All results support the positive signifi-
cance of the 30% critical mass threshold after controlling for the electoral
fractionalization as well. Electoral fractionalization itself has a negative
sign only in the PCSE estimations which are done based on the second
and the third samples (Table 17, Panel C, Column (1)). The same econo-
metric specification gives positive coefficient estimates using the second
and the third samples(Table 18 and Table 19, Panels A, Columns (4)).
However both results are not robust to using GMM and FE techniques.
Therefore it is difficult to make an interpretation on the relationship be-
tween the electoral fractionalization and public spending on family al-
lowances.
4.5.4 Does legislative fractionalization matter?
Legislative fractionalization is defined as ”the probability that any two
members of the parliament picked at random from the legislature will be
from different parties. This is a measure of the division within parlia-
ment which has substantial influence over the budget”. A higher legisla-
tive fractionalization indicates a larger number of small parties occupy-
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ing legislative seats. The public finance literature has recently discussed
that legislative fractionalization might affect the level of public spending.
(PT04) indicate that since majoritarian parliamentary systems are more
likely to produce single party majority governments, whereas coalition
and minority governments become more likely under proportional elec-
tions, majoritarian elections lead to smaller welfare programs than pro-
portional elections. Similarly (RS89) explain the higher amount of pub-
lic spending with high level of legislative fractionalization and show the
presence of many political parties in a ruling coalition as the reason of
larger budget deficits. On the other hand, (BR06) find no effect of a greater
number of parties in the legislature on public spending. In line, (VDH01)
and (PK02) find some effects that are only marginally significant or not
robust to different estimation frameworks.
In my regression estimates, legislative fractionalization itself does not
show any significant relevance on public family allowances (Table 17-
19). On the other hand, controlling legislative fractionalization does not
change the positive significance of the 30% critical mass threshold on fam-
ily allowances. Similar to the previous robustness checks using the elec-
toral fractionalization, voter turnout and cabinet composition, legislative
fractionalization also does not invalidate the main result.
4.5.5 Do constitutional structures matter?
The constitutional structure index is established by (AWE+12), based on
a paper written by (HRS93) . The index is augumented and includes
five different indicators as Federalism (absence federalism, weak federal-
ism, strong federalism), Government Form (presidential,parliamentary or
other), Electoral syestems (proportional, modified proportional representa-
tion, majoritarian), Bicameralism (no second chamber, weak bicameralism,
strong bicameralism) and Frequent Referenda.
Prior empirical research mostly pointed out the fact that federal coun-
tries spend less on social sectors compare to unitary countries(Cam78;
Swa02; Cas99; HRS93). Furthermore the effect of government form (par-
liamentary, presidential or other) on public expenditures also has been in-
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vestigated by existing research. (PT99) has emphasized that public good
supply of parliamentary regimes are smaller than the presidental regimes
since politicians are instigated to assign benefits for a larger number of
voters. Moreover, electoral systems have also been examined as one of
the determinants of government spending so far. (PRT07) have presented
a theoretical model where electoral rules form the equilibrium number of
parties and thus have an indirect effect on the government expenditure
allocation. The empirical predictions of their model have indicated that
proportional elections are associated with the higher government spend-
ing than majoritarian elections.
The prior literature have also mentioned on the role of bicameralism
and the frequent referanda in budgetary outcomes16. Bicameral legisla-
tures17 are those whose considerations and debates involve two distinct
assemblies. Depending on the relative balance of power between two
assemblies, preferences and interests expressed in two legislative bodies
might differ and a conflict over the legislative outcome which might arise
between the two assemblies. If both of them have common interests, bi-
cameralism produces a legislative outcome that makes both assemblies
better off. On the contrary, legislative outcomes closer to the interest of
one assembly make the other worse off(TM97). Consequently, there has
been a huge debate on the effect of bicameralism on public policy out-
comes and the empirical studies which examine the impact of bicamer-
alism have so far indicated diverging results. (Tul59) has pointed out a
problem which can occur in fiscal policies since the chambers have differ-
ent electoral bases. Chambers can blockthe each other’s decisions while
both of them trying to reach a different agreement on budgetary alloca-
tions that might lead to less amount of public spending. Similarly, (BC01)
have emphasized on the asymmetric bargaining powers of the cham-
bers in which the chamber has weaker power might have smaller impact
on policy outcomes than the other chamber has relatively strong power.
16For the relavant literature on referendums and government expenditures see: (Meg83;
Far90; FM03)
17Bicameral legislatures roughly got their popularity in 18th and 19th centuries although
the 14th century of English parliament was one of the first examples of bicameral legisla-
tures.
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Therefore, the effect of an additional legislator on public expenditures
would be smaller in bicameral structure than in unicameral structure. In
contraast, (Hel97) has claimed that the new individuals participating to
the second chamber reflect different number of interests which therefore
leads to higher governmental spending.
To control for constitutional structure does not change the positive re-
lationship between the female political representation over the 30% crit-
ical mass threshold and the public spending on family allowances. Due
to the data unavailability of this index for some countries which have re-
cently joined to OECD,the robustness checks with this variable could not
be analyzed using the the second and the third samples.
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Table 13: Female Political Representation over the 30% Female Critical Mass
Threshold and Public Spending on Family Allowances
Pooled-OLS FE AB PCSE FE FE AB AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PANEL A
Threshold-30 0.0905** 0.2324*** 0.0938** 0.1557*** 0.2342*** 0.2202*** 0.0914*** 0.0878*** 0.1466***
(0.0433) (0.0666) (0.0369) (0.0344) (0.0639) (0.0649) (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0326)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.6951*** 0.3042*** 0.6597*** 0.6570*** 0.2735***
(0.0483) (0.0416) (0.0451) (0.0416) (0.0394)
Population rate (above 65) -2.9085 -3.3633 -2.3954 -2.3147 -2.4424
(3.5364) (3.2378) (1.9522) (1.8273) (1.8396)
Population rate (under 15) 0.7809 0.6214 -0.5627 -0.5740 0.9065
(2.3761) (2.5208) (1.1386) (1.1467) (0.9941)
Total Old-Age Benefits (%GDP) -0.0324 -0.0308 -0.0351*** -0.0346** -0.0285**
(0.0256) (0.0276) (0.0123) (0.0138) (0.0128)
Unemployment Rate 0.0086 0.0077 -0.0024 -0.0030 0.0041
(0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0040)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.5268 -0.5689 -0.1239 -0.1321 -0.3079*
(0.3774) (0.4006) (0.2028) (0.1876) (0.1728)
FLFP 0.0035 0.0014 0.0043
(0.0096) (0.0042) (0.0046)
Female education 0.1881 0.1277 0.1345
(0.2494) (0.1449) (0.1042)
R-Square 0.0144 0.7778 0.9452 0.7999 0.8010 0.9471
Number of Cases 551 551 494 550 551 551 494 494 550
PANEL B
Threshold-30 0.1714*** 0.1600*** 0.1660*** 0.1298*** 0.1594*** 0.1589*** 0.1401*** 0.1399*** 0.1223**
(0.0529) (0.0255) (0.0358) (0.0446) (0.0361) (0.0310) (0.0396) (0.0401) (0.0504)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4018*** 0.1495*** 0.4153*** 0.3919*** 0.1510***
(0.0257) (0.0527) (0.0230) (0.0309) (0.0506)
Population rate (above 65) 0.1974 -0.7751 -5.1652 -4.7919 -1.4248
(5.2623) (4.7253) (3.9390) (3.4854) (2.4118)
Population rate (under 15) 0.1091 0.4422 0.8149 0.9142 0.1274
(0.5228) (0.5897) (1.1499) (1.1054) (0.4370)
Total Old-Age Benefits (%GDP) -0.0217 -0.0154 -0.0277 -0.0221 -0.0181*
(0.0205) (0.0190) (0.0188) (0.0199) (0.0095)
Unemployment Rate -0.0051 -0.0000 0.0103 0.0132** 0.0014
(0.0125) (0.0107) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0051)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.1656 0.0898 0.9990*** 1.0698*** 0.2562
(0.2518) (0.2744) (0.3625) (0.3488) (0.3064)
FLFP -0.0273* -0.0163 -0.0216***
(0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0062)
Female education -0.1419 -0.0217 -0.1278
(0.1411) (0.1670) (0.1790)
R-Square 0.0220 0.6189 0.9688 0.6224 0.6357 0.9702
Number of Cases 378 378 297 377 378 378 297 297 377
PANEL C
Threshold-30 -0.0434 0.3236*** 0.2741** 0.2407** 0.3498*** 0.3453*** 0.3126* 0.3190* 0.2459**
(0.1258) (0.0831) (0.1345) (0.0956) (0.1220) (0.1100) (0.1613) (0.1635) (0.1100)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4742*** 0.0985** 0.4523*** 0.4321*** 0.1158***
(0.0542) (0.0462) (0.0440) (0.0385) (0.0435)
Population rate (above 65) -1.8965 -4.3171 -12.0685 -10.9883 -5.9324
(12.2389) (12.1523) (8.1553) (7.4311) (5.3226)
Population rate (under 15) 0.6006 1.4352 4.0887 4.2439 0.6932
(1.1791) (1.4231) (2.7923) (2.6876) (1.0663)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0643 -0.0483 -0.0805*** -0.0726** -0.0497**
(0.0425) (0.0388) (0.0306) (0.0321) (0.0242)
Unemployment Rate -0.0052 0.0079 0.0177** 0.0239** 0.0134
(0.0256) (0.0219) (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0142)
Log(GDP per capita) 1.8844** 2.5017*** 4.2015*** 4.4777*** 2.7556***
(0.7206) (0.8376) (0.8918) (0.9131) (0.8818)
FLFP -0.0703* -0.0405* -0.0579***
(0.0376) (0.0211) (0.0135)
Female education -0.4974 0.1634 -0.4291
(0.4388) (0.4250) (0.4168)
R-Square 0.0011 0.5594 0.9611 0.5709 0.5885 0.9652
Number of Cases 364 364 286 363 364 364 286 286 363
The pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates are shown in columns 1 of each panel. The fixed effects estimation results are shown in columns 2, 5, 6. Columns 3,7 and 8 use the
GMM of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) which instrument for the 30% female parliamentary representation using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous
correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported in columns (4) and columns (9) which include autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of
serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Following related literature Columns 5 and 7 add additional covariates such as
real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old to take into account general economic development, labor
market situation and demographic development. In addition to these covariates, columns 6, 8 and 9 add also female labor force participation rate and female educational
attainment for 15-44 year old women to take into account social development. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Except the pooled cross-sectional OLS regression,
all estimations include country dummies and country specific time trends. The main independent variable (Threshold-30) is a dummy variable which is the proxy for gender
bargaining power. It takes a value equal to 1 when the share of female seats in national parliaments across OECD exceed 30%. Panel A uses a yearly balanced panel data from
19802008 where the public spending on family allowances as a percentage of GDP is the main regressand. Panel B uses the same annual data from 1995 to 2008 including
other countries for which the necesssary data is not available for the previous years. Panel C uses the same sample in Panel B where the public spending on family allowances
as a percentage of total govenment spending is the main regressand. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. Total Old-Age Benefits
(%GDP) refers to public and mandatory private spending on old-age benefits as a percentage of GDP. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity. FLFP
stands for Female Labor Force Participation Rate.
Table 14: Female Political Representation over the 15% Female Critical Mass
Threshold and Public Spending on Family Allowances
Pooled-OLS FE AB PCSE FE FE AB AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PANEL A
Threshold-15 0.2093*** 0.0592 0.0128 0.0346 0.0218 0.0295 -0.0009 -0.0015 0.0209
(0.0457) (0.0563) (0.0289) (0.0220) (0.0624) (0.0620) (0.0272) (0.0280) (0.0235)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.7209*** 0.3294*** 0.6902*** 0.6843*** 0.3041***
(0.0491) (0.0409) (0.0474) (0.0431) (0.0390)
Population rate (above 65) -3.6130 -5.1599 -3.0490* -3.1061* -3.3516*
(3.8626) (3.1571) (1.8422) (1.7185) (1.8296)
Population rate (under 15) 1.5831 0.8035 -0.4062 -0.5375 1.1020
(2.9625) (3.1294) (1.1619) (1.1972) (1.0098)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0339 -0.0349 -0.0356*** -0.0362*** -0.0310**
(0.0262) (0.0283) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0127)
Unemployment rate 0.0029 0.0025 -0.0046 -0.0051 0.0010
(0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0041)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.6272 -0.7334 -0.1451 -0.1724 -0.3726**
(0.4289) (0.4419) (0.1979) (0.1810) (0.1727)
FLFP 0.0122 0.0035 0.0094**
(0.0108) (0.0043) (0.0047)
Female education 0.2942 0.1431 0.1885*
(0.2627) (0.1388) (0.1050)
R-Square 0.0384 0.7591 0.9432 0.7803 0.7854 0.9467
Number of Cases 551 551 494 550 551 551 494 494 550
PANEL B
Threshold-15 0.3306*** 0.0284 -0.0678 -0.0115 0.0263 0.0268 -0.0243 -0.0163 -0.0105
(0.0576) (0.0509) (0.1102) (0.0213) (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0973) (0.0998) (0.0228)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4416*** 0.1576*** 0.4502*** 0.4277*** 0.1616***
(0.0385) (0.0531) (0.0411) (0.0481) (0.0509)
Population rate (above 65) -3.9712 -4.8906 -8.5034* -8.1130* -4.1440*
(5.5927) (5.2166) (5.0563) (4.4256) (2.2365)
Population rate (under 15) -0.3897 -0.0593 -0.3043 -0.2226 -0.2487
(0.5373) (0.6071) (1.1743) (1.1209) (0.4088)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0204 -0.0141 -0.0302 -0.0247 -0.0186*
(0.0207) (0.0192) (0.0227) (0.0242) (0.0099)
Unemployment Rate -0.0030 0.0021 0.0105 0.0135** 0.0024
(0.0126) (0.0109) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0052)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.1738 0.0788 0.8863** 0.9648*** 0.2269
(0.2815) (0.3300) (0.3689) (0.3570) (0.3184)
FLFP -0.0271* -0.0156 -0.0210***
(0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0064)
Female education -0.1636 -0.0285 -0.1525
(0.1411) (0.1466) (0.1879)
R-Square 0.0787 0.6013 0.9672 0.6079 0.6213 0.9693
Number of Cases 378 378 297 377 378 378 297 297 377
PANEL C
Threshold-15 0.6551*** 0.1299 -0.4065 0.0150 0.1485 0.1481 -0.2864 -0.2849 0.0360
(0.1417) (0.1380) (0.3552) (0.0491) (0.1332) (0.1328) (0.3510) (0.3467) (0.0512)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4759*** 0.0983** 0.4639*** 0.4498*** 0.1185***
(0.0517) (0.0467) (0.0429) (0.0418) (0.0440)
Population rate (above 65) -12.2343 -14.5408 -18.9292* -18.5989* -11.9071**
(11.8198) (12.0780) (10.4325) (9.8070) (4.9188)
Population rate (under 15) -0.5358 0.3182 1.5682 1.7596 -0.0505
(1.1675) (1.4205) (2.4868) (2.2532) (1.0329)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0576 -0.0414 -0.0867** -0.0801* -0.0477*
(0.0404) (0.0367) (0.0413) (0.0429) (0.0250)
Unemployment Rate 0.0010 0.0141 0.0182* 0.0238** 0.0166
(0.0256) (0.0220) (0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0141)
Log(GDP per capita) 1.9516** 2.5730** 3.7372*** 4.0139*** 2.7388***
(0.8120) (0.9687) (0.8781) (0.9421) (0.8856)
FLFP -0.0708* -0.0364 -0.0574***
(0.0376) (0.0231) (0.0137)
Female education -0.5109 0.3085 -0.4381
(0.4608) (0.4427) (0.4312)
Constant 1.6653*** 1.9279*** 4.0778*** -16.2527* -12.5445 -14.3352
(0.2330) (0.1098) (0.5360) (8.0689) (9.4137) (11.5022)
R-Square 0.0498 0.5484 0.9587 0.5613 0.5792 0.9637
Number of Cases 364 364 286 363 364 364 286 286 363
The pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates are shown in columns 1 of each panel. The fixed effects estimation results are shown in columns 2, 5, 6. Columns 3,7 and 8 use the
GMM of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) which instrument for the 15% female parliamentary representation using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous
correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported in columns (4) and columns (9) which include autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of
serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Following related literature Columns 5 and 7 add additional covariates such as
real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old to take into account general economic development, labor
market situation and demographic development. In addition to these covariates, columns 6, 8 and 9 add also female labor force participation rate and female educational
attainment for 15-44 year old women to take into account social development. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Except the pooled cross-sectional OLS regression,
all estimations include country dummies and country specific time trends. The main independent variable (Threshold-15) is a dummy variable which is the proxy for gender
bargaining power. It takes a value equal to 1 when the share of female seats in national parliaments across OECD exceed 15%. Panel A uses a yearly balanced panel data from
19802008 where the public spending on family allowances as a percentage of GDP is the main regressand. Panel B uses the same annual data from 1995 to 2008 including
other countries for which the necesssary data is not available for the previous years. Panel C uses the same sample in Panel B where the public spending on family allowances
as a percentage of total govenment spending is the main regressand. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. Total Old-Age Benefits
(%GDP) refers to public and mandatory private spending on old-age benefits as a percentage of GDP. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity. FLFP
stands for Female Labor Force Participation Rate.
Table 15: Female Political Representation over the 20% Female Critical Mass
Threshold and Public Spending on Family Allowances
Pooled-OLS FE AB PCSE FE FE AB AB PCSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PANEL A
Threshold-20 0.2059*** 0.0080 -0.0090 -0.0090 -0.0184 -0.0089 -0.0286 -0.0287 -0.0194
(0.0452) (0.0830) (0.0289) (0.0261) (0.0818) (0.0819) (0.0265) (0.0262) (0.0271)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.7173*** 0.3342*** 0.6834*** 0.6778*** 0.3109***
(0.0453) (0.0413) (0.0419) (0.0381) (0.0392)
Population rate (above 65) -3.6457 -5.0801 -3.0448 -3.1020* -3.2563*
(3.9627) (3.2857) (1.8543) (1.7062) (1.8526)
Population rate(under 15) 1.3911 0.6754 -0.4714 -0.5925 0.9583
(2.9175) (3.1717) (1.0719) (1.1276) (1.0038)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0374 -0.0379 -0.0390*** -0.0395*** -0.0339***
(0.0245) (0.0278) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0129)
Unemployment Rate 0.0020 0.0017 -0.0055 -0.0060 0.0002
(0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0041)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.6769 -0.7736 -0.1841 -0.2105 -0.4105**
(0.4313) (0.4602) (0.1843) (0.1719) (0.1714)
FLFP 0.0113 0.0036 0.0088*
(0.0108) (0.0043) (0.0046)
Female education 0.2966 0.1422 0.1872*
(0.2650) (0.1308) (0.1057)
R-Square 0.0380 0.7571 0.9434 0.7802 0.7850 0.9476
Number of Cases 551 551 494 550 551 551 494 494 550
PANEL B
Threshold-20 0.3614*** 0.0431 0.0776 0.0487 0.0384 0.0364 0.0649 0.0785 0.0444
(0.0541) (0.1048) (0.0815) (0.0332) (0.1080) (0.1057) (0.0812) (0.0811) (0.0325)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4330*** 0.1602*** 0.4445*** 0.4148*** 0.1656***
(0.0493) (0.0524) (0.0538) (0.0608) (0.0506)
Population rate (above 65) -4.0635 -4.8568 -8.7556* -8.1076* -4.6521**
(5.6425) (5.2650) (5.2136) (4.6448) (2.2330)
Population rate (under 15) -0.3969 -0.0792 -0.4949 -0.4465 -0.2834
(0.5404) (0.5967) (1.1658) (1.1687) (0.4125)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0180 -0.0120 -0.0238 -0.0163 -0.0145
(0.0179) (0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0185) (0.0094)
Unemployment Rate -0.0033 0.0016 0.0119 0.0154* 0.0028
(0.0128) (0.0112) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0051)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.2122 0.0294 0.9179** 0.9948** 0.2261
(0.2914) (0.3108) (0.4003) (0.3919) (0.3169)
FLFP -0.0263* -0.0181 -0.0205***
(0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0064)
Female education -0.1985 -0.0643 -0.1738
(0.1907) (0.1646) (0.1824)
R-Square 0.1062 0.6026 0.9671 0.6088 0.6220 0.9694
Number of Cases 378 378 297 377 378 378 297 297 377
PANEL C
Threshold-20 0.6801*** 0.1403 0.0236 0.1219 0.1367 0.1339 0.0049 0.0145 0.1261
(0.1359) (0.2768) (0.1874) (0.0855) (0.2886) (0.2832) (0.2108) (0.2193) (0.0779)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4932*** 0.1004** 0.4762*** 0.4579*** 0.1189***
(0.0638) (0.0461) (0.0567) (0.0597) (0.0435)
Population rate (above 65) -11.8924 -13.7466 -21.6274* -20.6897** -12.4718**
(11.7089) (12.0153) (11.0895) (10.3939) (5.0215)
Population rate (under 15) -0.5350 0.2606 1.5782 1.6812 -0.1344
(1.2211) (1.4332) (2.2619) (2.0451) (1.0575)
Total Old-Age Benefits(%GDP) -0.0512 -0.0358 -0.0819** -0.0738* -0.0386
(0.0341) (0.0318) (0.0384) (0.0393) (0.0244)
Unemployment Rate -0.0012 0.0115 0.0189** 0.0250*** 0.0164
(0.0259) (0.0226) (0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0141)
Log(GDP per capita) 1.7563** 2.3281** 3.9378*** 4.2057*** 2.6533***
(0.8474) (0.9804) (0.8604) (0.8952) (0.9023)
FLFP -0.0674* -0.0387* -0.0552***
(0.0349) (0.0205) (0.0137)
Female education -0.6700 0.1922 -0.5259
(0.5806) (0.4534) (0.4177)
R-Square 0.0637 0.5492 0.9587 0.5608 0.5785 0.9633
Number of Cases 364 364 286 363 364 364 286 286 363
The pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates are shown in columns 1 of each panel. The fixed effects estimation results are shown in columns 2, 5, 6. Columns 3,7 and 8 use the
GMM of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) which instrument for the 20% female parliamentary representation using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous
correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported in columns (4) and columns (9) which include autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of
serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Following related literature Columns 5 and 7 add additional covariates such as
real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old to take into account general economic development, labor
market situation and demographic development. In addition to these covariates, columns 6, 8 and 9 add also female labor force participation rate and female educational
attainment for 15-44 year old women to take into account social development. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Except the pooled cross-sectional OLS regression,
all estimations include country dummies and country specific time trends. The main independent variable (Threshold-20) is a dummy variable which is the proxy for gender
bargaining power. It takes a value equal to 1 when the share of female seats in national parliaments across OECD exceed 20%. Panel A uses a yearly balanced panel data from
19802008 where the public spending on family allowances as a percentage of GDP is the main regressand. Panel B uses the same annual data from 1995 to 2008 including
other countries for which the necesssary data is not available for the previous years. Panel C uses the same sample in Panel B where the public spending on family allowances
as a percentage of total govenment spending is the main regressand. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. Total Old-Age Benefits
(%GDP) refers to public and mandatory private spending on old-age benefits as a percentage of GDP. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity. FLFP
stands for Female Labor Force Participation Rate.
Table 16: Female Political Representation over the 25% Female Critical Mass
Threshold and Public Spending on Family Allowances
PooledOLS FE ABI PCSEI FEII FEIII ABII ABIII PCSEII
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PANEL A
Threshold-25 0.1215*** 0.0272 -0.0120 0.0096 0.0475 0.0404 -0.0041 -0.0068 0.0192
(0.0450) (0.0597) (0.0402) (0.0310) (0.0702) (0.0605) (0.0386) (0.0371) (0.0309)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.7237*** 0.3320*** 0.6918*** 0.6861*** 0.3046***
(0.0452) (0.0413) (0.0456) (0.0409) (0.0392)
Population rate (above 65) -3.5512 -5.0277 -3.0293 -3.0995* -3.2719*
(3.9074) (3.2379) (1.8824) (1.7329) (1.8511)
Population rate (under 15) 1.5918 0.8023 -0.3762 -0.5090 1.0725
(2.7439) (2.9700) (1.1251) (1.1798) (1.0094)
Total Old-Age Benefits (%GDP) -0.0375 -0.0388 -0.0353*** -0.0357*** -0.0333***
(0.0265) (0.0290) (0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0125)
Unemployment Rate 0.0039 0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0051 0.0012
(0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0042)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.6100 -0.7262* -0.1414 -0.1709 -0.3766**
(0.3836) (0.4113) (0.1950) (0.1787) (0.1716)
FLFP 0.0115 0.0037 0.0089*
(0.0107) (0.0043) (0.0046)
Female education 0.2848 0.1463 0.1852*
(0.2632) (0.1321) (0.1043)
R-Square 0.0191 0.7573 0.9432 0.7808 0.7856 0.9468
Number of Cases 551 551 494 550 551 551 494 494 550
PANEL B
Threshold-25 0.3142*** 0.0295 0.0179 0.0260 0.0389 0.0256 0.0431 0.0368 0.0270
(0.0555) (0.0235) (0.0635) (0.0561) (0.0261) (0.0267) (0.0560) (0.0523) (0.0557)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.4427*** 0.1559*** 0.4425*** 0.4201*** 0.1598***
(0.0416) (0.0523) (0.0443) (0.0511) (0.0503)
Population rate(above 65) -3.7852 -4.5905 -8.9747* -8.3740* -4.3201*
(5.6069) (5.1966) (4.8826) (4.2985) (2.2210)
Population rate (under 15) -0.3557 -0.0433 -0.2703 -0.2030 -0.2443
(0.5755) (0.6353) (1.1040) (1.0817) (0.4138)
Total Old-Age Benefits (%GDP) -0.0230 -0.0163 -0.0317 -0.0261 -0.0193**
(0.0234) (0.0214) (0.0232) (0.0241) (0.0094)
Unemployment Rate -0.0037 0.0014 0.0101 0.0131* 0.0024
(0.0130) (0.0112) (0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0052)
Log(GDP per capita) -0.1863 0.0523 0.9240** 0.9929*** 0.2414
(0.2801) (0.3149) (0.3895) (0.3683) (0.3098)
FLFP -0.0264* -0.0158 -0.0206***
(0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0065)
Female education -0.1817 -0.0409 -0.1529
(0.1481) (0.1585) (0.1842)
R-Square 0.0766 0.6009 0.9671 0.6079 0.6209 0.9691
Number of Cases 378 378 297 377 378 378 297 297 377
PANEL C
Threshold-25 0.4413*** 0.4413*** 0.4413*** 0.0617 0.1286 0.0964 -0.0693 -0.1001 0.0804
(0.1396) (0.1396) (0.1396) (0.1476) (0.0808) (0.0734) (0.1204) (0.1499) (0.1456)
Lag(Family Allowances) 0.1002** 0.4830*** 0.4676*** 0.1176***
(0.0462) (0.0563) (0.0560) (0.0434)
Population rate(above 65) -10.8623 -12.7640 -21.3013* -20.2773* -11.6396**
(11.8780) (12.0480) (11.2712) (10.7781) (4.8694)
Population rate (under 15) -0.3941 0.3932 1.4774 1.5590 -0.0246
(1.3285) (1.5376) (2.3579) (2.1752) (1.0389)
Total Old-Age Benefits (%GDP) -0.0686 -0.0517 -0.0795** -0.0712* -0.0523**
(0.0506) (0.0458) (0.0352) (0.0366) (0.0233)
Unemployment Rate -0.0023 0.0105 0.0191** 0.0252** 0.0153
(0.0266) (0.0229) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0143)
Log(GDP per capita) 1.8418** 2.4117** 3.8967*** 4.1595*** 2.7086***
(0.7821) (0.9337) (0.8703) (0.9125) (0.8795)
FLFP -0.0678* -0.0392* -0.0556***
(0.0370) (0.0228) (0.0138)
Female education -0.6070 0.2293 -0.4702
(0.4769) (0.4033) (0.4292)
R-Square 0.0263 0.0263 0.0263 0.9593 0.5585 0.5758 0.9637
Number of Cases 364 364 364 363 364 364 286 286 363
The pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates are shown in columns 1 of each panel. The fixed effects estimation results are shown in columns 2, 5, 6. Columns 3,7 and 8 use the
GMM of Manuel Arellano and Stephen R. Bond (1991) which instrument for the 25% female parliamentary representation using a double lag. To control for contemporaneous
correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported in columns (4) and columns (9) which include autoregressive processes of order 1 (AR(1)). It indicates the presence of
serial correlation and allowing Prais-Winsten regression for the correction of serial correlation. Following related literature Columns 5 and 7 add additional covariates such as
real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population rate of the citizens above 65 years old and below 15 years old to take into account general economic development, labor
market situation and demographic development. In addition to these covariates, columns 6, 8 and 9 add also female labor force participation rate and female educational
attainment for 15-44 year old women to take into account social development. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Except the pooled cross-sectional OLS regression,
all estimations include country dummies and country specific time trends. The main independent variable (Threshold-25) is a dummy variable which is the proxy for gender
bargaining power. It takes a value equal to 1 when the share of female seats in national parliaments across OECD exceed 25%. Panel A uses a yearly balanced panel data from
19802008 where the public spending on family allowances as a percentage of GDP is the main regressand. Panel B uses the same annual data from 1995 to 2008 including
other countries for which the necesssary data is not available for the previous years. Panel C uses the same sample in Panel B where the public spending on family allowances
as a percentage of total govenment spending is the main regressand. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. Total Old-Age Benefits
(%GDP) refers to public and mandatory private spending on old-age benefits as a percentage of GDP. All standard errors are robust for the arbitrary heteroscedasticity. FLFP
stands for Female Labor Force Participation Rate.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Parliament is the place where a country’s policy direction is set. The fail-
ure to involve different voices in policy-making may prove the existence
of an unequality in political decisions in public policy making. The in-
volvement of citizens in policy-making process comes generally in two
forms: a) Direct participation of citizens in government affairs b) Indirect
participation through representatives which are elected in elections.
In line with the global trend to democratization, representative
democracy and direct participation in policy-making has gained increas-
ing significance in the political arena. It has also highly emphasized that
such representation must cover diverse groups irrespective of race, class,
and gender. Among these categories, in recent decades, the question of
female political representation has emerged as a global issue all over the
world. The under-representation of women in politics still persist even in
the most advanced countries. Women have constituted just 26.8% percent
of the members of parliaments across the OECD in 2012, up from 19.9%
in 2009.
The existing literature has often emphasized both the role of female
representation in a representative body (indirect participation) and the
individual preferences of female politicians (direct participation) in pol-
icy outcomes which reflect women’s interests and preferences. On the
other hand, there is sufficient amount of evidence that women and men
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have different policy preferences. Their common argument is that women
are more likely than man invest in children and favour redistribution and
they give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as care
givers in the family(Tho90; BC00; Duf03; CD98; EP02; CD04; ALF05). For
instance, the survey conducted between 2006 and 2008 by the Inter Parlia-
mentary Union (IPU) indicates that most female policymakers share cer-
tain general interests and concerns (e.g family specific policies related to
child health, maternal health), and feel that they have a responsibility to
represent women. This does not necessarily imply, however, that female
political representation has an impact on policy decisions which reflect
women’s interests. According to Median Voter Model (Downs (1957)), if
the candidates only care about winning the elections and commit to im-
plementing specific policies once elected, political decisions only reflect
the preferences of the median voters. That means the preferences of a
politician would not matter for policy outcomes.
This thesis has been consisted of three self-contained essays that ad-
dress topics regarding the link between female political representation,
family-specific social policies and child health outcomes. The first one
of the three essays has focused on role of the parental leave policies on
the child health. OECD countries use parental leave policies to support
families (especially mothers who are pregnant or recently given birth)
for their efforts to care for newborns. Parental leave policies has two di-
mensions as follows: a) job protected leave as the number of weeks after
or before the child birth b) financial support as cash benefits during the
parental leave period. Although the preliminary role of parental leave
entitlements is to provide a care for children, it may take a place among
women’s preffered policies due to its role on female labor market out-
comes as well. Although one of the aims of these policies to provide a
care to meet the objectives of child well-being, the preliminary result of
the first essay shows no evidence for a significant relationship between
the public spending on parental leave benefits and child health outcomes
over the forty years across OECD countries. In cases where public spend-
ing is found to have low or negligible effect on development outcomes,
two explanations are given in the previous literature. First, it is argued
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that the link between public spending and development outcomes could
be severed because an increase in public provision could lead to a crowd-
ing out of private sector provision. The second set of possible reasons for
the ineffectiveness of public spending includes poor targeting and/or in-
stitutional inefficiencies. Considering the fact that spending on parental
leave benefits are solely provided by the public sector, the former case of
the private crowing out effect does not explain the lack of a relationship
between parental leave benefits and child health outcomes. The existing
studies on the relationship between the inefficiency of institutions in re-
source allocation and the develoment outcomes has mainly focused on
the bribes that corrupt politicians might levy. However welfare transfers
such as parental leave benefits, old-age benefits are such policies where
corrupt politicians may find almost no room(Mau98).
The reason for the lack of a relationship between public spending allo-
cations and child health outcomes might be both a “crowding out effect”
or institutional efficacy, however in different forms. The OECD Social
Expenditure Database groups benefits or expenditures with a social pur-
pose in nine policy areas (e.g old-age benefits, housing benefits, unem-
ployment benefits, family-specific benefits, health etc.). A crowding-out
effect within social expenditure areas may occur. In short, high spend-
ing on traditional programmes impedes the development of new ones.
For instance, due to the population structure of most of the OECD coun-
tries, old-age benefits may de facto crowd out spending on other pro-
grammes which may not be in strong competition. The population struc-
ture is a key driver of social spending across OECD countries and most
social spending goes to the elderly population. Although after the recent
economic crisis (2007/08), the share of family-specific spending, which
includes parental leave benefits, is increased with the idea of social sup-
port for future generations, social spending on the elderly amounted to
11% of GDP in overall total social welfare spending that 22% of GDP in
2009. Less than 5% of total social welfare spending is shared among un-
employment, housing, spending on active labor market programmes and
family-specific spending. The share of the parental leave benefits was
only 0.3% of GDP, up from 0.14% in 1980(OEC13f).
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In the consideration of above-mentioned studies which emphasize
that women as either being the direct or the indirect participants of poli-
tics give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as care
givers in families, it is possible to think whether the persistent under-
representation of women in politics would be a reason for this dispropor-
tional resource allocation among social welfare areas. The second essay of
the thesis, therefore, seeks to assess the link between parental leave bene-
fits, female political participation and child health outcomes. More specif-
ically, it is examined that whether the persistent under-representation of
women in parliaments has played a role for the inefficacy of parental
leave benefits on child health outcomes over the forty years across OECD
countries. Overall empirical results support the notion that the interac-
tion of the percentage share of the female parliamentarians and public
spending on parental benefits has not been relevant on the child mortal-
ity rates. However, as Median Voter Theorem indicates that if candidates
are office-seeking with electoral motives, public policy decisions will re-
flect the median voter’ preferences which is selected by a majority rule
voting system. Namely, even if there exist high percentage of female po-
litical representation, the preferences of the female politicians may not be
relevant on policy decisions which reflect women’s interests. On the one
hand, the reason of the insufficient allocation towards parental leave ben-
efits would be the political under-representation of women in policy de-
cision making. On the other hand, the disparity in the resource allocation
within social welfare areas might be a rational response by vote-seeking
politicians due the population of many OECD countries is getting older
and those are with the greatest propensity to vote. Moreover, electoral
participation is falling fastest among the young across the OECD coun-
tries, which gives to older voters greater influence in the political process.
For instance, in 2010 British general election, just 44% of young people
aged at 18-24 voted compared to 76% of those aged over 65. In general,
older people are much more likely to vote than younger people across
OECD countries. Among OECD-34, Italy, Belgium and Australia are the
only countries with a small tendency for the young people to vote more
than the old people. The higher participation of elderly people in national
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elections, as well as the growing share of the elderly population may also
influence the political process, as introducing budget cuts in social wel-
fare spending that unequally benefit the old. By 2011, the average per-
centage point difference in voting rates between those aged over 55 years
old and those aged between 16-35 years old in OECDwas 12.1%(OEC11).
Considering the last forty years trend of social welfare expenditures
across OECD countries, the highest share of the old-age benefits com-
pared to family-focused policies such as parental leave benefits is not
suprising since majority of the population across OECD countries are el-
derly. The benchmark democracymodel of Down(1957) supports this fact
for which majority of rule voting systemwill select the most prefered out-
come of the policies. However democracy does not always correspond
to some ideal of political equality (Ace06) and since electorally account-
able governments often fail to reflect the interests of different groups,
representative democracy should apply for the equal representation of
citizens in policy-making on public spending allocation(Pan03). Directly
after the “Representative Democracy Model (Citizen Candidate Model)”
of (Besley and Coate,1997), there is sufficient amount of research has em-
phasized on the female identity of politicians on family-focused policy
outcomes which directly target women and children. Considering the
persistence trend of female under-representation in OECD parliaments
(at the end of the 2000s, the percentage share of female seats has been
only 19.9%) over forty years, the role of female under-representation in
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politics has been analyzed to see whether it is one of the determinants for
the insignificant relationship between parental leavel benefits and child
health outcomes. The second essay of the thesis has focused on answering
this question. The empirical results presented in the second chapter sup-
ports the notion that the interaction of female political representation and
public parental benefits over forty years across OECD countries, has not
been relevant in reducing the child mortality rates. One the one hand, the
reason would be the political under-representation of women in policy
decision making but on the other hand the gender of the politician might
not matter in the resource allocation decisions of social welfare spending
across the OECD area. It is simply what Down(1957)’s Median Voter’s
Theorem suggest where politicians’ preferences and personal character-
istics do not matter in public policy choices.
Chapter 4, therefore, has focused on the role of female politicians on
policy-making which reflects women’s interests. Does gender really mat-
ter in policy making on the resource allocation among social welfare ar-
eas in the OECD? To see the relationship between female political repre-
sentation and family-specific policies including also countries which are
recently joined OECD this study takes into account public spending on
family allowances as the main field of the interest. The overall results
support two basic hyphothesis; a) there has been no evidence for a posi-
tive significant relationship between the fraction of female parliamentar-
ians and public spending on family allowances over the 30 years across
OECD countries b) Policy changes in terms of public spending choices on
family allowances can be driven by the female politicians only when the
percentages of women in the parliaments exceed a remarkable value. It is
important to emphasize that overall analyses in this thesis do not address
the causation but entire results are robust to using different samples, to
using different econometric frameworks such as Arellano Bond (GMM)
or Prais-Winsten (AR(1)) and to including additional covariates.
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Appendix A
Parental, Maternity and
Child Care Policies in
OECD Countries
A.1 The Definition of Parental, Maternity and
Child Care Policies
Almost all OECD Countries support families for their efforts to care for
newborn infants or young children. The support of the governments in
Maternity, Parental or Childcare Leave Systems could come in the form
of a) job protected leave as the number of weeks after or before the child
birth and b) financial support as cash benefits during this leave period.
These leaves are granted for various periods of time and paid at different
rates among the OECD countries.
Maternity leave refers to the period of rest reserved for women, dur-
ing pregnancy or immediately after the confinement or adoption. It is one
of the elements of maternity protection covered by the ILO Convention
No. 183 and Recommendation No. 191 (2000). This convention recom-
mends that a woman should be entitled to a time of maternity leave of
at least 14 weeks. Almost all OECD countries have ratified the minimum
duration of 14 weeks of paid leave as recommended by the International
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Labour Organisation (ILO), andmany countries grant maternity leave en-
titlements that exceed the 14-week minimum (ILO, 2010). Most countries
allow beneficiaries to combine pre and post-birth leave, while some man-
date a short period of pre-birth leave and six to ten weeks after childbirth.
Almost all OECD countries provide specific public income support pay-
ments that are tied to the length of maternity leave1.
Parental leave refers to longer periods of leave which is obtained after
maternity and paternity2 leave. If the eligibility for public income support
is not family-based (which is the case often), the entitlement of parental
leave is individual, so that only one parent can claim the support. Al-
though the OECD categorizes leave schemes under three main fields as;
Maternity, Paternity and Parental Leaves, in some countries parental and
childcare leaves have been distinct from eachother. Childcare leave is
generally provided for 26 weeks and might be extended by an additional
26 weeks under some circumstances. Parents have often the right to use
it until the child is nine years of age.
A.2 Maternity, Parental and Child Leave
Schemes in OECD Countries
Australia: In 1973 Commonwealth employees were entitled to a 12-week
of paid maternity leave, but this did not apply to the private sector. The
introduction of the first national scheme was in 2011 for the parental
leave. Currently, there is no statutory entitlement to maternity leave but
women may take up to six weeks (prior to the expected birth) under the
parental leave scheme. Moreover parental leave entitlement provides for
up to 12 months leave for only one parent who takes the responsibility of
childcare. The eligible mothers or fathers may receive payment for up to
18 weeks of this leave under the parental leave scheme(AWD12; GB11).
1United States is the only OECD country that has no nationwide legislation on paid ma-
ternity leave. Some states provide income support through either sick-leave insurance or
maternity-leave programmes.
2Paternity leave refers the paid leave often at full wage payment for the absence of em-
ployed fathers at the time of confinement.
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Austria: Austria introduced the first paid maternity leave in 1911
which contained 4 weeks of leave and was paid as 60% of earnings. In
1958, the number of paid weeks was increased to 6 weeks which covered
before and after the childbirth at 100% of earnings(GB11). By 2012, sixteen
weeks (eight weeks before the birth and eight weeks after the birth) of
maternity leave is obligatory to use and the benefits are the one hundred
per cent of average income for employees(RP12). In addition to mater-
nity leave entitlement, Austria launched a childcare leave scheme in 1956
for a 6 months period. In 1960, there was an extension from 6 months to
12 months of paid leave. In 1974, the benefit scheme was converted to a
flat amount which was 2000 ATS. In 1995, the duration of leave was de-
creased for one parent to 18 months which was previously increased to 24
months in 19903. In 1997 parents received a parental leave benefit at a flat
rate amount of 14 Euros. In 2002, the parental leave benefit scheme was
converted to child care leave at a flat rate amount of 14.53 Euros which
was paid for the youngest child under the age of three(GB11). By 2012,
parents may choose from five different alternatives of childcare benefits.
One option is the income-based, the rest has provide a monthly lump
sum(RP12).
Belgium: Belgium introduced a paid maternity leave scheme earlier
than Austria in 1894 for the 6 weeks of paid leave. The benefits of ma-
ternity leave were equal to 60% of earnings in 1958 for the 12 weeks of
maternity leave period. From 1975 to 2010, the rates of benefits ranged
from 76.4% to 79.5% (GB11). Currently, the maternity leave entitlement is
fifteen weeks for employees. Although woman can start to take her leave
six weeks before her baby is due, one week before and nine weeks after
the delivery are obligatory leave periods. Employees in the private sec-
tor are paid at 82 per cent of earnings in the first month and 75 per cent
for the remaining weeks with a ceiling of 94.87 per day. Statutory civil
servants receive full salary(FL12). Beside an entitlement for the mater-
nity leave, Belgium did not have any national legislation for the parental
leave until January 1998. Previously, there was the Career Break (Time
Credit) Scheme which was launched in 1986. The Career Break (Time
3The remaining 6 months were used by the other parent.
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Credit) Scheme allowed to workers a 3 to 12 months paid parental leave
from 1986 to 1998. Later on, Belgium introduced a national legislation
for the parental leave in January 1998 which allowed parents for a full
time paid leave up to 3 months and for a part time paid leave up to 6
months(BP99; D+04; GB11). By 2012, parental leave is four months per
child. Leave is an individual entitlement and paid as 679.59 Euros (after
taxes) per month(FL12).
Canada: Although job-protected maternity leave was introduced in
Canada more than 90 years ago, only 55% of employees were entitled
to maternity leave in 1967. The first paid federal maternity leave was
launched in 1971 within the Unemployment Insurance (UI) Act which
included 15 weeks of leave paid at 66% of earnings. From 1979 to 2010,
the rates of benefits ranged from 55% to 60% (PvdG04; GB11). At the
moment, women are entitled to 15 to 18 weeks of maternity leave and
it may not start earlier than 11 to 17 weeks before the expected date of
birth. It is important to not that some provinces the leave is longer of a
total of 17 or 18 weeks, however, only 15 weeks are paid at 55 per cent
of earnings(ASG12). In addition to maternity leave entitlement, Canada
launched a 10weeks of parental leave, whichwas paid as 66% of earnings,
in 1990. It was extended to 35 weeks in 2001(GB11). By 2012, 35 to 37
weeks of parental leave is entitled in case when there is single parent or
when the leave is shared between two parents. If it is a family entitlement
the leave period may not be more than 35 weeks. Parental leave benefits
are at the same rate as maternity leave (55 per cent of earnings) up to 35
weeks per family(ASG12).
Denmark: In 1915 Denmark started out with the first paid maternity
leave which captured 2 weeks of paid leave. It was extended to 14 weeks
in 1960 and to 18.6 weeks in 2008. Women currently are entitled to 18
weeks of paid maternity leave which paid as 106 euros per working day
or 530 euros per week. The first 2 weeks of the maternity leave are com-
pulsory after the child birth(Tin12). Moreover, in 1985, the first parental
leave was launched. Following the 14 weeks of maternity leave, a further
12 weeks were available for one parent in 1999 and it was extended to 32
weeks in 2002. In 2008, the total weeks of parental leave were 52 weeks
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(20 weeks were paid at the full wage replacement rate and 32 weeks were
unpaid)(GB11). By 2012, each parent is entitled to 32 weeks until the child
is 48 weeks but the total leave period cannot exceed more than 32 weeks
per family. Payment for parental leave is as for maternity leave(Tin12).
In addition to maternity and parental leaves, Denmark commenced with
the child care leaves in 1992. In 2000, the right was based on the age of
the child who has to be under 8 years old. Although the child care leave
was 13 weeks for the each parent, parents were allowed to take a 26-week
of leave when the child is under one year or recently adopted. In 2002 the
child care leave scheme was abolished in Denmark(RCW99).
Finland: The first paid maternity leave in Finland was introduced in
1964 as 9 weeks of leave and benefits were equal to 0.15% of annual in-
come per day(GB11). This period was extended to 12 weeks in 1972 and
to 29 weeks in 1974. In 1981, the Finnish maternal leave was as long as 43
weeks (including 5-8 weeks before the child birth)(GSV06). Currentlyma-
ternity leave can be taken for one hundred and five working days. Dur-
ing the first 56 days of leave, the payment is equal to 90 per cent of annual
earnings and after this initial period of leave, benefit is paid at 70 per cent
of earnings. It is obligatory to take maternity leave two weeks before and
two weeks after the birth(SLT12). In addition to maternity leave, Finland
launched a parental leave scheme in 1985. The first 14 weeks after the
birth were reserved for the mother. In 2005, the parental leave period was
54 weeks which reserve the first 20 weeks for the mother and the remain-
ing 32 weeks were for the family with a father quota of 2 weeks(GSV06).
By 2012, each family is allowed to take a parental leave for one hundred
and fifty-eight working days. During the first one month of the leave,
the payment is equal to 75 per cent of annual earnings. After this initial
period of leave, the payment is 70 per cent of earnings(SLT12).
France: The first maternity leave legislation was launched in 1909
while the maternity benefits was commenced in 1913. In 1958, mater-
nity leave benefits were equal to 50% of earnings(GB11). Since 2012,
new mothers have right to get 16 weeks of paid leave. Taking at least
three weeks of the leave before the birth is obligatory, but the remaining
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weeks can be taken before or after the child birth4(JD12). Beside mater-
nity leave scheme, the first parental leave legislation was accepted in 1977
as 24 months. In 1987, the duration of the parental leave was increased
to 3 years after the childbirth. France is one of the ten countries where
parental leave is a family entitlement5. As before, parental leaves are still
unpaid but National Family Allowance Fund provides a monthly child-
care benefit 566.01 per month. For the first child parents are entitled to
get this benefit for six months but the benefit is paid for three years to
parents with multiple children(Bak06; GB11; JD12).
Germany: The introduction of the first paid maternity leave was in
1883. Women were entitled for 6 weeks of leave with benefits equal to
50% of earnings. In 1958, the number of weeks were increased to 10-12
weeks (4-6 weeks before and 6 weeks after confinement) with benefits
equal to 75-100% of earnings(GB11). Currently, mothers are entitled to
14 weeks of maternity leave which is taken as six weeks before and eight
weeks after the birth. The maternity leave benefits are paid as 100% of
earnings(BE12b). The first parental leave scheme for a 10 months leave
duration was implemented in 1986. The number of months were in-
creased to 12, 15, 18 and finally to 36 in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992 respectively.
a paid parental leave of 10 months was introduced. It was extended to 12
months in 1988, 15 months in 1989, 18 months in 1990, and finally to 36 in
1992 it was extended until the childs third birthday(GB11). By 2012, fam-
ilies are entitled to 36 months of leave and it has been paid for a period of
14 months as 67 per cent of earnings(BE12b).
Greece: The introduction of the first paid maternity leave was in
1934. Mothers were entitled to 12 weeks of paid leave with benefits equal
to 33% earnings. In 1958, the payment was increased to 50% of earn-
ings with an additional benefit which equals to 10% of earnings for each
dependent(GB11). Since 2012, maternity leave has taken for 17 weeks as
8 weeks before and 9 weeks after the parturition with a benefit equals
to 100% of earnings(HK12). In addition to maternity leave scheme, an
4For three or more children, women are entitled to 24 weeks of maternity leave
5The other countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hun-
gary, Poland and Spain.
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unpaid parental leave scheme was launched in 1984. Both parents were
entitled to a 3 months of unpaid leave which might be received until the
child is three and a half(GB11). Since 2012, each parent may take a 4
months of unpaid leave until the child is 6 years of age(HK12).
Ireland: The first maternity leave for 4 weeks was initiated in 1913
with a lump-sum benefit. In 1958, the number of weeks were increased
to 12 weeks (as 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after the birth)(GB11).
Since 2012, the period of maternity leave has been 42 weeks (26 weeks
are paid as 80% of earnings and the remaining 16 weeks have been
unpaid)(Dre12). Parental leave is currently unpaid and can be received
for 14 weeks. Under the Parental Leave Act of 1988, the leave could
then be taken until the childs fifth birthday. Later on, this was ex-
panded to the childs first eight years, under the Parental Leave Act of
20066(Dre12; GB11).
Italy: The first paid maternity leave is implemented in 1919. It in-
cluded 4 weeks of leave which was paid as a lump-sum payment. In 1958,
there was differentiation for the amount of leave among sectors, such as
13 weeks for the workers in the industries, 8 weeks for agricultural work-
ers, and 6 weeks for workers in the commerce sector. Working women in
all these sectors were entitled to a leave which was paid at a rate of 80% of
earnings. In 1961, a new regulation brought uniformity across all working
groups, benefits again were equal to 80% of earnings, and were payable
for 21 weeks(GB11). Since 2012, the length of thematernity leave has been
5 months, paid as 80% of earnings. Moreover, the Tribunal of Florance
extended the conditions of this entitlement in the case of if the mother is
housewife, ill or self-employed without a social security membership, the
father can receive the full amount of the maternity leave(AG12). In addi-
tion to maternity leave, a parental leave scheme was launched in 1973 for
six months at the same rate of maternity leave payment. In 1999, entitle-
ment was renewed as an individual right for both parents, which can be
received until the child’s nine years age(GB11). Since 2012, each parent
are entitled to 6 months paid parental leave. It is again individual entitle-
ment but the length of the leave cannot exceed 10 months if it is received
6The maximum age has been determined as 16 years in case of children with handicaps.
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by both parents. Parental benefits are paid as 30% of the earnings if the
child is under 3 years old. In the case of the child being between 3 and 8
years of age, leave is unpaid(AG12).
Japan: The first maternity leave was launched in 1922. Mothers were
entitled to 10 weeks of leave which was paid as 60% of earnings. In 1958,
the number of weeks were increased to 12 weeks but the wage replace-
ment rate remained as 60%(GB11). Since 2012, mothers are allowed to
receive 14 weeks (6 weeks are obligatory period of time which has to be
taken before the child birth.) of leave which is paid as 66.7% of earnings.
In addition to maternity leave, parents are individually entitled to a 12
months parental leave which is paid as 50% of earnings. If both parents
share the leave, there is an extension from 12 months to 14 months(HJ12).
Luxembourg: In 1925, Luxembourg introduced the first maternity
leave scheme which allowed mothers to take 8 weeks of leave. The ma-
ternity leave payments were equal to 50% of earnings. In 1958, Lux-
embourg increased both the number of weeks and benefits which were
12 weeks and 50-75% of earnings respectivelygauthier2011. Since 2012,
there has been 16-weeks compulsory leave scheme which is applied as 8
weeks before and 6 weeks after the confinement. The current maternity
leave payment is equal to 100% of earnings. The length of the paternal
leave is 6 months per parent which is paid at a flat rate as 1,778 euros per
month(ZL12).
Netherlands: The first maternity leave scheme was launched in 1913.
Women were entitled to 12 weeks of leave paid at 100% of earnings
in 1913(GB11). Since 2012, the total length of the maternal leave is 16
weeks which are received as 6 weeks before and 10 weeks after the child
birth. Maternity payments are equal to 100% of earnings(GK12). The first
parental leave was introduced in 1990 which allowed parents to take 6
months. However, leave was unpaid at that time. 2009 is the first year
when a paid leave scheme was introduced. It was a tax relief(GB11). Cur-
rently, the leave is still received as a tax reduction of 723 euros per month
and can be taken until the childs 8th birthday(GK12).
New Zealand: Introduction of the first paid maternity leave was
in 1926. It included 4 weeks of leave which was paid as a lump-sum
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benefit(GB11). The current implementation is fourteen weeks which
women can start to take the leave from six weeks before the child birth
and the leave payment is equal to 100% of earnings, up to a ceiling of 281
euros per week. In addition to maternity leave, an unpaid parental leave
may be taken in the 12 months after birth, up to 52 weeks(Hea12).
Norway: In 1915, the first paid maternity leave scheme was launched
which allowedwomen to take 8 weeks of leave. Womenwere entitled to a
payable leave at a flat-rate for 12 weeks (6 weeks before and 6 weeks after
the childbirth) in 1958. Since 1977, there is no separatematernity leave but
women are allowed to take a leave under parental leave scheme(GB11).
By 2012, under the parental leave scheme, mothers and fathers are en-
titled to 9 and 12 weeks of respectively. Total number of weeks range
between 47 and 57 weeks depending on the payments which change be-
tween 80% and 100% of earnings respectively. If payments are received
equal to 100% of earnings, a 10-weeks reduction applies on the length of
leave. Either father or mother takes remaining 26 or 36 weeks of leave
which is called as family entitlement(BE12a).
Portugal: The firstmaternity leavewas introduced in Portugal in 1922.
The length of the leave was 10 weeks with benefits which are equal to
100% of earnings(GB11). Since 2009, maternity leave scheme has been
replaced with a parental leave which is called Licena parental inicial (Ini-
tial Prental Leave). Depending on the payment level, which is equal
to either 100% or 80% of earnings, the length of the leave could be ei-
ther 120 or 150 calendar days. Initial Prental Leave scheme stipulate 45
days (after the birth) obligatory leave period for mothers and the remain-
ing days could be shared between parents(KM12). Before the maternity
and parental leave schemes were sperated, parental leave was an unpaid
leave of 26 weeks in 1984 which might be extended to 2 years in spe-
cial circumstances. In 2000, the leave was again unpaid for 3 months
per parent(GB11). Currently there are two more supplementary parental
leaves in addition to Initial Parental Leave scheme ; a)Parental leave for
only fathers: Fathers are entitled to twenty days of leave which is paid as
one hundred per cent of earnings. During the first month after birth, 10
days are obligatory to use. b) Additional Parental leave: It is an individ-
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ual entitlement which parents can take for three months. It is paid as 25%
of the earnings. Payment can only be done to one parent at a time. If the
three months are taken as unpaid parental leave both parent can receive
it at the same time(KM12).
Spain: Spain launched the first maternity leave in 1929. Mothers were
entitled to 10 weeks of leave which was paid at a flat rate. In 1958, the
number of weeks were increased to 12 weeks with a payment which was
equal to 60% of earnings(GB11). Currently, the length of the maternity
leave is 16 weeks and it is compulsory to receive the 6-weeks of leave be-
fore the confinement. The remaining 10 weeks could be used both before
or after the child birth. Mothers are entitled to maternity payments as
100% of their earnings. In addition to maternity leave, parents are indi-
vidually entitled for an unpaid paternal leave which could be received
until the third year of childs birthday(Ann12).
Sweden: The first maternity leave scheme of Sweden was introduced
in 1931 which included 8 weeks of paid leave with a lump-sum benefit. In
1974, maternity leave was replaced by parental leave(GB11) but currently,
parental leaves are implemented alongside maternity leave. It is compul-
sory for women to receive at least two-weeks maternity leave before or
after the confinement. There is another type of leave called Temporary
Leave which has ten days length used during the first 60 days after the
confinement. It is paid leave at the 80% of earnings per year. Thirdly, par-
ents were entitled to a paid parental leave for 480 days. The first 390 days
are paid as 80% of earnings. For the remaining 90 days, a flat rate benefit
applies. Each parent individually receives 60 days of leave and they are
not transferable between mothers and fathers. The remaining days are
divided equally among parents and transferable to each other(HDC12).
Switzerland: Switzerland introduced the first maternity leave in 1911
which included 6 weeks of paid leave(GB11). Since 2005, 14 weeks of
maternity leave has been implemented and 8 weeks of the leave must
be received following to childbirth. It is a paid leave equal to 80% of
earnings per month. There is curently no entitlement for parental leave
in Switzerland(Val12).
The United Kingdom: The first maternity leave was launched in 1911
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which included 4 weeks of paid leave. In 1958, the number of weeks
were increased to 18 weeks which were paid at a flat rate. In 2007, the
length of the paid maternity leave was 39 weeks(GB11). Currently, moth-
ers are entitled to 52 weeks of maternity leave which starts as 11 weeks
before the confinement. Out of 52 weeks, 13 weeks are unpaid. Payments
are received as 90% of earnings for the first 6 weeks and the remaining
33 weeks, a flat rate payment which equals to 135 euros applies. Fa-
thers are entitled to two-weeks of paternity leave which is paid as 90%
of gross weekly earnings. Parental leave has been individually received
as 13 weeks per parent. It is an unpaid entitlement. Leave could be re-
ceived until the childs 5th birthday(OM12).
The United States: There is no statutory right to any of the types of
paid leave at national level7. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) provides a sort of leave for a variety of reasons (e.g childbirth or
the care of a newborn child up to 12 months, for the placement and care
of an adopted child, for the care of a seriously ill child, spouse or parent
etc.). Leave can be used up to 12 weeks in a 12 month period before and
after the child birth(KW12).
7Five states (California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island) and Puerto Rico
have Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programmes which can apply before or after the
child birth as well.
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Appendix B
Data Sources and
Definitions for Chapter 1
and Chapter 2
B.1 Independent Variables
1.GDP Per Capita Definition: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain
Series), at 2005 constant prices.
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table Version 7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production,
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, July 2012.
2.Total Health Expenditures as a percent of GDP
Definition: The sum of expenditure on activities that through application
of medical, paramedical, and nursing knowledge and technology. Total
health expenditures used as an independent variable in this paper is de-
fined by OECD as the sum of following items; Services of curative care,
Services of rehabilitative care, Services of long-term nursing care, Ancil-
lary services to health care, Medical goods dispensed to out-patients, Ser-
vices of prevention and public health, Health administration and health
insurance, Expenditure on services not allocated by function, Investment
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(gross capital formation) in health.
Source: OECD (2013), ”OECD Health Data: Health expenditure and fi-
nancing”, OECD Health Statistics (database).
3.The female employment/population ratio
Definition: Propotion of an economy’s female population aged 15-64 that
is employed.
Source: OECD (2010), ”Labour Market Statistics: Labour force statistics
by sex and proportion of age group”.
4.The female education aged between 15-44
Definition: Mean years of education of women aged between 15-44.
Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Educational At-
tainment and Child Mortality Estimates by Country 1970-2009. Seattle,
United States: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2010.
5. The fertility rate (children per women aged 15 to 49 years old)
Definition: Fertility rates express the average number of children a
woman would have if she lived to the end of her childbearing years
(conventionally considered to be 15-44 but sometimes 15-49) and bore
children at the prevailing rate for each age during that period.
Source: OECD (2013), ”OECD Health Data: Demographic references”,
OECD Health Statistics (database).
6.The share of population with health insurance coverage
Definition: It is defined in OECD Health at a Glance (Europe 2013) as fol-
lowing; ”Coverage for health care is the share of the population receiving
a defined set of health care goods and services under public programmes
and through private health insurance. It includes those covered in
their own name and their dependents. Public cover- age refers both
to government programmes, generally financed by taxation, and social
health insurance, generally financed by payroll taxes. Take-up of private
health insurance is often voluntary, although it may be mandatory by
law or compulsory for employees as part of their working conditions.
Premiums are generally non-income-related, although the purchase of
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private cover can be subsidised by the government”.
Source: Priliminary source is OECD Health Data: Social protection
(2013). The missing values for the countries included also Ruhm(2000)’s
analysis are filled by using his database.
7. Public Spending on Parental leave benefits
Definition: Cash benefits paid during total leave period as a percent of
female wages in manufacturing.
Source: Gauthier and Bortniks Comparative Maternity, Parental, and
Childcare Leave and Benefits Database (1960-2010)
8. Public Spending on Maternity leave benefits
Definition: Cash benefits paid during the maternity leave as a percent of
female wages in manufacturing.
Source: Gauthier and Bortniks Comparative Maternity, Parental, and
Childcare Leave and Benefits Database (1960-2010)
B.2 Dependent Variables
1.The natural log of under-5 mortality rate
Definition: Total number of child deaths under five years of age per 1,000
live births
Source: IHME(2010), Infant and Child Mortality Estimates by Country
(1970-2010)
2. The natural log of neonatal mortality rate
Definition: Total number of infant deaths under twenty eight days of age
per 1,000 live births
Source: IHME(2010), Infant and Child Mortality Estimates by Country
(1970-2010)
3.The natural log of postneonatal mortality rate
Definition: Total number of infant deaths between twenty eight days and
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one year of age per 1,000 live births
Source: IHME(2010), Infant and Child Mortality Estimates by Country
(1970-2010)
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Appendix C
Public Spending on
Maternity Leave Benefits
and Child Health Outcomes
across OECD Countries
C.1 Public Spending on Maternity Leave Ben-
efits and Child Health Outcomes across
OECD Countries
As it is explained in the section (2.2), “parental leave benefits” is a generic
term which captures the total amount of payments that are provided
to parents under all types of leave entitlements. These are maternity
leave entitlements, parental leave entitlements and child care leave en-
titlements. Among those entitlements, the most traditional one is the ma-
ternity leave entitlements which provide benefits especially in the very
early period of newborn. To examine whether maternity leave benefits
alone are relevant for the child health outcomes, I have analyzed the re-
lationship between maternity leave benefits and child mortality rates as
well. Overall analyses where the main independent variable is maternity
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leave benefits use a dataset which covers 22 OECD countries from 1970
to 2010. The summary statistics for this dataset is shown at Panel (A1)
in Table-20. Panel (A2) in Table-20 represent the summary statistics of
another sample which is used for the estimations that controls for addi-
tional covariates. Table 21-23 show the relevant estimation results where
the main dependent variables are neonatal, postneonatal and under-five
mortality rates respectively. Similar to the lack of a relationship between
public spending on parental benefits and child health outcomes, mater-
nity leave benefits show also no relevance on the child health outcomes.
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Appendix D
Overview of Family
Allowances and Other
Social Welfare Policies in
OECD Countries
Social expenditures are the policies implemented by public and private
institutions targeted at households and individuals in order to support
them during circumstances which have adversely affected their welfare.
Social expenditures aim to safeguard theworking and living environment
of the population, and ensure good standards of health and work abil-
ity, sufficient income, services, social security at different stages of life.
Practically every household at some point receives some form of income
transfer or uses social and health services. All of the countries in the high
spending category have chosen to devote a relatively large share of their
national income to public purposes. This reflects a desire for a larger gov-
ernment role in society and the economy. Countries in the low spending
category namely South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Canadatend
more toward leaving the private sector to itself with less government in-
tervention.
Australia: The most recent data on social spending in OECD coun-
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tries shows that in 2009 Australia spent 21 per cent of GDP on social areas
(including old-age pensions, unemployment payments, health, housing,
family, active labor programmes, incapacity and survivor benefits) which
is less than OECD average(%24). Australia actually spent a little less
than most of the other OECD countries and the only countries that spent
substantially less than Australia(21 percent of GDP) were developing
countries like Estonia(20%), Israel(16.6%), Mexico(8.5%), Chile(14.3%),
Turkey(12.8%), the Slovak Republic(19.7%) and Korea(12%)(OEC13f).
The low level spending mostly depends on the tax income collected
which is lower than other OECD countries as well. Australia is the sixth
lowest-taxing country in the OECD. On the other hand, apart from New
Zeland, provision of social expenditures in Australia differ from most of
the developed countries of the OECD area. Benefits are flat-rate, income
(asset) tested and paid from general government revenue. There are no
contributions by earnings in the government benefit system. For instance
social security is financed by contributions from employers and employ-
ees in Europe, the US or Japan, this means that higher-income workers
receive more benefits if they become unemployed or are disabled. By
contrast, in Australia benefits are income-tested or asset-tested, so pay-
ments reduce as other resources increase which refers an efficient poverty
reduction by helping to those people in need. Australia heavily depends
on income-testing and allocates a higher share of benefits to lower-income
groups than any other country in the OECD. The poorest 20% of the pop-
ulation receives nearly 42% of all themoney spent on social security while
the richest 20 percent receives only around 3% of all the money(WA02).
The major spending items are old age benefits (7.3% of GDP) and spend-
ing on healthcare (6.9% of GDP) in 2009. Family spending consists of
only 2.8% of GDP (1.8% of GDP is spent for family allowances). Aus-
tralia spent only 4.0% of its GDP on other social policy areas such as un-
employment (0.5% of GDP), housing(0.3% of GDP), active labor market
programmes(0.3% of GDP),incapacity related benefits(2.3% of GDP), sur-
vivor benefits (0.2% of GDP) and others(0.4% of GDP)(OEC13f).
Austria: Austria is one of the countries which spends above the OECD
average in social areas. In 2009, It was ranked as the fifth country out of
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34 countries who spend more than one third of its GDP to social pol-
icy areas. Austria spent 31.2% of its GDP on social benefits followed
by France(35.2%), Denmark(33.1%), Sweden(33%) and Belgium(32%) in
2009. Since older age groups has had a growing trend, a large propor-
tion of social expenditure in Austria has been done in respect of the old
age function similar with many OECD countries which have dominant
old-age profile with respect to the whole population. In 2009, the money
spent on old age benefits was equating to 12.7% of GDP while the OECD
average was 8.3%. The only two countries which spent much more on
old-age benefits were Japan(14% of GDP) and Italy in 2009. Expenditure
on health care was in second place with 7.8% as a percentage of GDP.
More than two-thirds of social expenditure was thus in respect of old age
and health benefits. Significantly lower proportions of expenditure were
accounted for by the following functions 1.1% of GDP unemployment,
0.1% of GDP housing, 3.1% of GDP family, 0.8% active labor policies,
3.4% incapacity benefits and 2.0% survivors. The third biggest share from
all social spending belonged to incapicity benefits which serves for the
cases of permanently total(or reduced) incapacity to work for providing
the reintegration into the labour market, as well as special protection for
specific groups of people under employment law. Family benefits consti-
tuted the fourth major expenditure itemwith a propotion as 3.1% of GDP.
Family allowances consist of only 2.2% of GDP in 2009(OEC13f).
Belgium: Belgium has showed an increasing trend in social expen-
diture since the begining of the1980s. The share of social expenditure
as a propotion of GDP grew 30.6% from 1980 to 2009. According to
recent OECD social expenditures dataset (2009), Belgium is the fourth
biggest country out of 34 OECD countries with respect to its social spend-
ing as a propotion of GDP, however spending on social areas has grown
slower compared tomost of the OECD countries since 1980s. In Denmark,
France, as well as Sweden, the reason for this slow growth is having a de-
veloped and effective social protection systems and has been already hav-
ing higher social spending shares into budgets since the early 1980s. In
countries such as Japan, Portugal and especially Greece, the current rela-
tive share of social expenditure is smaller than Belgium. However, from
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1980 to 2009, the social spending in those countries grew significantly
more than the social spending of Belgium. The largest social spending
item, 9.4% of GDP in 2009, is old-age benefits and the second largest is
health care spending with the propotion as 8.6% of GDP in 2009. Belgium
spent only 4.7% of its GDP on other social policy areas such as unem-
ployment (0.9% of GDP), housing(0.0% of GDP), family(0.7% of GDP),
active labor market programmes(0.2% of GDP),incapacity related bene-
fits(2.1% of GDP) and survivor benefits (0.8% of GDP). Family allowances
has a great decreasing trend from 1980 (2.8% of GDP) to 2009 (1.6% of
GDP)(OEC13f).
Canada: According to the OECD, total social spending accounted for
24.3 percent of Canada’s GDP in 2009 compared with an average of 24.0
per cent across OECD countries. Considering general situation, Canada
is not one of the leading countries which allocates higher ratios of their
budgets to general social spending but Canada had the fourth biggest
health spending share (9.4% of GDP) after France(10.6% of GDP), Ger-
many(9.7% of GDP) and United States(14.4% of GDP) compared with an
average of 6.6 per cent across OECD countries. Canada’s spending on
healthcare was 4,363 US dollars per person in 2009 (adjusted for pur-
chasing power parity) and was also higher than the OECD average of
3,223 US dollars. Per capita health spending from 1980 to 2009 grew by
77.4 per cent, higher than the OECD average of 46.7 per cent. Following
health expenditures, the second main spending item is old-age benefits
accounted for 7.8% of Canada’s GDP in 2009(OEC13f). The basic old-
age pension scheme in Canada was not originally means-tested, but since
1989, it has been means-tested when the wealthy elderly were required
to pay-back entitlements. Canada also have a sort of provision which
excludes a limited number of low or no-earnings periods (due to inter-
ruptions to contributions for illness, unemployment and education) from
the pension final benefit calculation. Besides old-age benefits, there are
other income-tested supplementary benefits for pensioners (Guaranteed
Income Supplement) which are not taxable(Osb01). Considering other
items categorized under social policy areas, Canada spent only 5.0% of
its GDP on other social policy areas such as unemployment (0.1% of
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GDP), housing(1.0% of GDP), family(1.5% of GDP), active labor market
programmes(0.2% of GDP),incapacity related benefits(1.1% of GDP) and
benefits on survivors(1.1% of GDP). Family allowances consist really a
small propotion of GDP which is 0.6% in 2009(OEC13f).
Denmark: Social Spending in Denmark is the second highest at over
33.1% of GDP across the OECD countries in 2009 after France’s social
spending amounted at 35.2% of GDP. Spending on social areas as a per-
centage of GDP has grown on 26% from 1980 to 2009 but is slightly less
than average growth rate (accounted for 62.8%) across OECD countries.
As in most of the OECD countries, the highest propotion of the total so-
cial expenditures is belonged to old age benefits, which in this case ac-
counted for 10.7% of GDP . The flat-rate basic pension scheme is funded
by general taxation but separate from general social assistance schemes.
The second highest share of the total social expenditures is belonged to
health spending which was accounted for 7.9% of GDP in 2009. Spend-
ing on family benefits and incapacity benefits, compared to other OECD
countries, have higher budget shares of 3.9 percent and 5.2 percent of
GDP respectively. It is the third biggest country out of 34 countries in re-
spect to expenditures on incapacity benefits after Sweden(5.7% of GDP)
and Norway(6.4% in GDP) and the second highest country in spending
on family benefits following by Ireland with 4.1% of GDP. However the
propotion of family allowances to GDP is only 1% and it increased only
0.2% since 1980(OEC13f).
Finland: The Finnish welfare system fit into the Nordic conception
of social welfare where social spending has higher shares of budgets.
Finnish social expenditures constituted of about 7 percent of the coun-
try’s gross domestic product in 1950, roughly equal to what Sweden,
Denmark, and Norway were spending. By 1980, Finland’s social expen-
ditures had risen to about 19 percent of GDP and Finland became the
sixth biggest country out of 34 OECD countries in respect of social spend-
ing accounted for 30.6% of GDP in 2009. As it has been in all European
countries, the main social spending item is old age benefits (5.1% of GDP
in 1980 10.4% of GDP in 2009). Similar with the majority of the member
countries (e.g Canada, Sweden), Finland has determined the pensionable
143
age at 65 years old. The second main social spending item was health
care expenditures (5.1% of GDP in 1980 and 7.0% of GDP in 2009) and
after health care, the next three welfare state items, are incapacity related
benefits(4.8% GDP) expenditures on families (3.3% of GDP) and unem-
ployment benefits(2.0%). Nordic Countries including Finland are leading
countries in social expenditures on families. However, compared to other
social spending categories such as old-age benefits and health expendi-
tures, spending on family allowances is lower and increased only 0.1% as
a percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2009(OEC13f).
France: According to the latest statistics of OECD Social Expenditures
Database (2009), France has the highest spending amount on social wel-
fare areas (35.2% of GDP) compared to an average of 24.0 per cent of
OECD countries. The gap between the level of France’s social expen-
ditures and the lowest spending level (Mexico : 8.5% of GDP) is 29.7 as
a percentage of GDP. France is the second leading country (after United
states) in terms of spending on health care. The other main driver of the
increasing trend in social expenditures has been the rapid growth in old-
age benefits due to structural factors such as population ageing. France is
the forth biggest country in respect of spending on old-age benefits (ac-
counted for 12.4% of GDP) after Italy (14.4% of GDP), Austria(12.7% of
GDP) and Sweden(12.6% of GDP)(OEC13f). France has a two level flat
rate schemes. The first one is for the older people who are not eligible for
contributory scheme, and a supplementary benefit which covers all the el-
derly to increase their income level to the basic minimum(Cla97). Follow-
ing old-age benefits and spending on healthcare, the third main expendi-
ture item in France is family benefits accounted for 3.2% of GDP (family
allowances consists only 1.1% of GDP) compared with an average of 2.3
percent across OECD countries. Ireland(4.1% of GDP), Denmark(3.9%
of GDP), Sweden(3.7% of GDP), United Kingdom(3.8% of GDP), Hun-
gary(3.6% of GDP), Finland(3.3% of GDP), New Zeland(3.5% of GDP) are
the countries spent on family benefits slightly more than France. Consid-
ering other items categorized under social policy areas, France spent only
7.8% of its GDP on other social policy areas such as unemployment(1.5%
of GDP), housing(0.8% of GDP), active labor market programmes(1.0% of
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GDP), incapacity related benefits (2.6% of GDP) and benefits on survivors
(1.9% of GDP)(OEC13f).
Greece: According to the latest statistics of OECD Social Expendi-
tures Database (2009), total social spending and public social spending
accounted for 25.7 and 23.9 percent of Greece’s GDP in 2009 compared
with averages of 24.0 and 22.2 per cent respectively across OECD coun-
tries. Economic crisis generally led to an increase in social spending (With
the increasing trend in joblessness expenditures on unemployment ben-
efits have increased from an average of 0.7% of GDP in 2007 to 1.1% in
2009, average public spending on Active Labour Market Programmes has
had slightly smaller increase from 0.5% in 2007 to 0.6% of GDP in 2009,
to obstruct the negative effect of the crisis for poorer families countries
where family support is largely income-tested, public spending on fam-
ily benefits (e.g. child benefit, working tax credit and child tax credit) has
also increased across the OECD starting with either 2007 or 2008. How-
ever, in contrast, Greece had the largest decrease in social spending after
the crisis in 2009 and after. Similar to Greece, some of the other coun-
tries such as Estonia, Iceland have cut the cash benefits as well. By 2009,
compared to other countries, old-age benefits (11.7% of GDP) and expen-
ditures on health care are (6.7% of GDP) the main social spending items
for Greece. Although the economic crises had a decreasing effect on so-
cial expenditures, old age benefits with 11.2% of GDPwas over the OECD
average (8.3% of GDP) in 2009. However, spending on health care (6.7%
of GDP) was lower than the OECD average (7.0% of GDP). Considering
the other items categorized under social policy areas, Greece spent only
5.0% of its GDP on other social policy areas such as unemployment (0.7%
of GDP), housing(0.5% of GDP), family(1.4% of GDP), active labor mar-
ket programmes(0.2% of GDP),incapacity related benefits(1.5% of GDP)
and survivor benefits (2.2% of GDP). The propotion of family allowances
has increased only 0.1% from 2008 to 2009 which accounted for 0.5% of
GDP(OEC12; OEC13f).
Ireland: Compared to other European countries, Ireland has a low
rate of social expenditure for a variety of historical reasons which in-
clude the influence of the British welfare model. Although the recent
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economic crisis led to an increase in Ireland’s social spending after 2007,
Ireland had the third lowest total social expenditure (25.8% of GDP) after
Greece (25.7% of GDP) and Luxembourg(25.3% of GDP) among EU-15
in 2009. Considering EU-19 countries, Ireland had higher social expen-
diture levels compared to three more countries (Slovak republic(19.7%
of GDP), Hungary(24.1% of GDP) and Czech Republic(21.5% of GDP)).
However the level was still lower than the OECD average which was
28.1 percent of GDP. Moreover, despite of the higher expenditure levels
of other advanced economies, spending on old-age benefits was accouted
for 5.6% of GDP in Ireland which was lower than the averages of EU-
15(10.4% of GDP), EU-19(10.0% of GDP) and OECD-34(8.3% of GDP) in
2009(OEC13f). There are, however, exceptions to this general character-
isation. For instance, the total spending on health care, despite the de-
creasing trend from 1980s1 eighth highest among OECD-34 countries as a
propotion of GDP in 2009. Furthermore, the next biggestmain items of so-
cial expenditure in Ireland as family benefits and unemployment related
social protection. By 2009, out of 34 OECD countries, Ireland had the first
and third highest expenditure level on family and unemployment bene-
fits 4.1 percent and 2.6 percent as propositions of GDP respectively. The
Irish social transfers (rather than pensions) are heavily concentrated on
low-income individuals and households. There is an obvious advantage
in this approach which more directly targets those who need most. Due
to this approach, compared to other OECD countries, Ireland has been
one of the exceptions to have had large amount of increases in family
allowances from 1980 to 2009(Tim03; OEC13f).
Italy: Similar with other European countries, Italy had a high ratio
of total social expenditures to GDP in 2009 (30.1%). Almost half of this
amount is allocated to old age benefits (pensions). The age dependency
ratio of old people to working-age population was 21% in 1980 while
Italy had 8 per cent share of old benefits to GDP which was increased
to 14.4% of GDP in 2009 while the elderly ratio in the population was 30
percent, almost one third of the working population. The second main
1Irelandwas the third country with respect to spending on healthcare after Germany and
Sweden in 2009.
146
category of the Italian welfare state spending is health care with 7.5 per
cent of GDP after old-age benefits. On the other hand, spending on fam-
ilies were lower than the OECD average. As a result, families are re-
sponsible for providing or purchasing most care for their children. In
2009, spending on cash benefits and services for families(1.6% of GDP)
was lower in Italy than anywhere else in Europe besides Greece, Poland,
Spain and Portugal. The counterpart of an income transfer systemmainly
based on pensions which means the less involvement of the government
in other social areas such as unemployment, family, incapacity benefits.
In Italy, the 80 per cent of transfer beneficiars are pensioners, which is
higher than the European average. Spending in certain areas such as debt
service (12.2% of GDP in 2011) and pensions is high, but in areas such
as education, research, family and unemployment benefits is relatively
low. Therefore, unemployment assistance, child and family care do need
to be reinforced. Family allowances consisted of only 0.5% of GDP in
2009(OEC02; OEC13f).
Japan: In Japan’s social expenditure history, major steps were the in-
troduction of public pension and health insurance systems in 1961. Fol-
lowing those launchements, family and child allowances were introduced
in 1972. In the following year, unemployment insurance which was intro-
duced on a limited scale in 1947, was expanded into the Employment
Insurance System. Social welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP
was 26.4% in 2009 which is higher than the OECD-34 average. However,
the shares of areas such as family, active labor market policies and un-
employment benefits into total social spending are lower in Japan than
in European countries. Social spending as a share of GDP has been ex-
panding in the context of population ageing, although it remains belower
than many countries across OECD. The proportion received by the low-
income households is small. Consequently, the impact of social spending
on inequality and poverty is weak in Japan compared to other advanced
economies. The proportion of the population in relative poverty, defined
as less than one-half of the disposable median income was 14.9% and
15.7% in mid-2000s and late 2000s respectively in Japan. Japan is the sixth
highest in the OECD area with respect to number of people in relative
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poverty after Mexico, Israel, Chile, the United States and Turkey. Income
inequality and poverty among the working-age population in Japan have
risen to levels above the OECD average since 1980s. This trend firstly de-
pends on the ageing of the workforce because the elderly have generally
accumulated significant wealth with respect to financing their retirement.
Japan was the second highest country over 34 countries in OECD with
respect to expenditures on pensions and old age benefits (14% of GDP)
after Italy(14.4% of GDP) in 2009. Following pensions and old age bene-
fits, the second and the third main items in social spending as a share of
GDP were healthcare (7.3% of GDP) and survivor benefits(1.4% of GDP).
Expenditures on other social policy areas except survivor benefits were
all under OECD averages such as unemployment (0.7% of GDP), fam-
ily(1.0% of GDP), active labor market programmes (0.4% of GDP), in-
capacity related benefits(1.1% of GDP). Japan is one of the countries to
spend really less to family allowances (0.3% of GDP) compared to other
countries(Jon07; OEC13f).
Luxembourg: Luxembourg has the most generous welfare system
among OECD countries. Social expenditures in per capita terms (16,858
dollar at 2000 constant prices) rank highest among OECD countries aver-
aged at 7,407 dollar per head at 2000 constant prices. Luxembourgs gen-
erous benefit system is the result of its economic success. The economic
boom of the golden 1980s and 1990s caused a sharp increase in the per
capita public social spending starting in 1983 and continued formore than
two decades. The only exception of the increasing trend of welfare system
was the international financial crisis starting in 2007. The per capita so-
cial expenditures decreased about 2.2 per cent in 2007 compared to 2006.
The share of the total public social spending in GDP decreased from 22.1
per cent to 20.6 per cent. However, it again slightly increased in 2008 and
peaked at 24.4% of GDP in 2009. Luxembourg has achieved rapid and
sustained growth over the past 25 years and living standards are the high-
est in the OECD. This substantial economic growth also increased em-
ployment in Luxembourg, which has largely been met with crossborder
workers. Unemployment has remained low compared to other European
countries. These significant improvements occured without substantially
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widening the income disparities, itself caused by the generous welfare
system. For instance, although the main elements of Luxembourgs social
welfare system are health care, old-age pension benefits are at similar lev-
els to other OECD countries, family benefits also have important shares
in GDP. Luxembourg has the highest spending level on family allowances
(2.5% GDP) across OECD countries(OEC10b; OEC13f).
Netherlands: The Netherlands’ first social entitlement was launched
in 1897. The first social legislation of the Netherlands was covering some
rules only for employing children under 12 years of age, but it was one
of the first social legislations in the world. In 1901, the first social in-
surance scheme as work-injury benefits was launched. Following the
work-injury benefits scheme, incapacity and sickness for wage workers
were introduced until the Second World War as well. In 1945, the so-
cial protection system was extended from just wage workers to the all
citizens. The general social protection system was launched as covering
old-age,disability, survivor and unemployment benefits. These new leg-
islations mostly took effect in 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, other type
of schemes on benefits such as national health insurance for people who
have low incomes, national school and study allowances and housing
benefits were introduced as well. However the expansion period of the
social welfare system came to an end with the 1970s oil crisis. The aim of
social policies was shifted from welfare to work, namely, income benefits
were reduced and labor market arrangements were extended. Since 1980
to mid-1990s, The Netherlands was ranked at most 5th country which has
higher social spending level over 34 OECD Countries. However since
mid-1990s it took place in the first 11 to 15 countries and finally it was
the 16th country in social spending ranking across OECD countries with
a share as 25.3 percent of the gross domestic product in 2009. Especially
big increases were found in Portugal, Japan and Turkey but social spend-
ing in the Netherlands fell as a percentage of GDP for several reasons,
including low GDP growth. By 2009, the expenditures on old age bene-
fits and health care spending were 9.9% and 7.9% as a percentage of GDP
respectively. They are also one of the few social expenditure categories
that were not decreased since the beginning of 1980s. Except some small
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increases of housing benefits and active labor market programmes, all
other main social expenditure items had lower values compared to their
amounts in 1980. Expenditures on housing and active labor market poli-
cies were increased only 0.1 and 0.7 percentage points from 1980 to 2009
but survivor benefits, unemployment, family, incapacity related benefits
were decreased 0.6, 0.2, 0.8 and 3.4 percentage points respectively. Family
allowances has started to increase after 2000 but could not reach its level
in 1980(VO06; OEC13f).
New Zealand: Before the 1900s the main items of social welfare sys-
tem (e.g health and education) were generally delivered at provincial
levels, and often through the private sector such as religious organisa-
tions and non-governmental organizations. From 1900s to 1940s, the
central governments roles in those sectors grew with the idea of “pub-
lic health and education to all citizens”. Moreover, an unemployment
benefit scheme was introduced for the people who are available for work
in this period. During mid-1930s, a wide range of new income support
programmes were launched. The income tested old-age benefit (for the
people at the age 60 and over) and a benefit for those who had difficul-
ties in working were the two important schemes of these income support
programmes. From 1950s to the 1970s, the post Second World War baby
boom led to growth in housing and education spending. Frommid-1980s,
with the UK’s entry into EU, New Zealand faced some changes with re-
spect to policies. Compared to other European countries, New Zealand
had a low rate of social expenditure due to the influence of the British
welfare model. In 2009, the ratio of overall social expenditures (public
and mandatory private) to gross domestic product was 21.7% which was
less than the average of 24.0 per cent across OECD countries. Although
the general social spending was lower than the OECD average in 2009,
spending on family benefits had a higher GDP share compared to other
OECD countries. According to the latest statistics of OECD Social Ex-
penditures Database (2009), Family spending (3.5% of GDP) is the third
highest category after health spending (8.8% of GDP) and old-age benefits
(4.5% of GDP). New Zealand spent 4.9% of its GDP on other social pol-
icy areas such as unemployment (0.5% of GDP), housing(0.9% of GDP),
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active labor market programmes(0.3% of GDP),incapacity related bene-
fits(2.8% of GDP), benefits on survivors(0.2% of GDP) and others(0.2% of
GDP) in 2009(Eas80; OEC13f).
Norway: In Norway, the first welfare reforms came into being when
the risk of industrial labour was questioned for the first time. These laws
were particularly on insurance and social security benefits to cover loss
of income due to work injuries. Social areas such as health and education
were not so much concerned at that time but until 1920, many of the re-
gional local councils launched health and eduction programmes as well.
After 1920, some councils started to have economic problems and this
caused social inequality between regions. The inequality was attempted
to be solved with national schemes of governments. First, the child ben-
efit became national in 1946 as flat-rate benefits allocated to families with
more than one child. Afterwards, national old-age pension scheme was
launched in 1957 with flat rate benefits and the year after the sickness
insurance became universal as well. Remarkably, In 1966, the National
Insurance Scheme was passed and therefore all the new social security
programmes universally applied. The 1970s were also witnesses of some
positive modifications in social welfare system. Several large reforms
were carried through in the late 1970s, such as the work environment
act and sick-pay programme. These positive modifications were done by
thinking the economic backlash due to the oil crisis was considered as a
temporary issue. However, the oil crisis in 1973 turned out to be a warn-
ing and create a decreasing trend in social welfare expenditures. This
decreasing trend was continued until the recent financial crisis of 2007
and the latest data on 2009 showed an increase in both social expenditure
areas. Public Family allowances decreased 0.3 point as a percentage of
GDP from 1980 to 2009(Bjø01; OEC13f).
Portugal: Portugal had experienced an unsuccessful democracy be-
fore the Carnation Revolution of 1974. The first republic was established
in 1910 and it lasted in 16 years. Under the republic, there were poorly
functioned political institutions and the corruption were widespread.
Therefore military coup d’tat ended the First Republic in 1926. In 1928,
Portugals military government appointed economist Dr. Antonio Salazar
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as Minister of Finance. Economic conditions improved slightly in the
1950s and living standards began to rise. However, the 1960s were cri-
sis years for Portugal starting with the colonial war. In 1968 Salazar be-
came incapacitated in an accident and the Council of State chose Mar-
cello Caetano (from 1968 to 1974) to succeed him. However, Caetano’s
promises of some reforms fell into indecision. Social tensions were in-
creased due to the absence of opportunities for advancement. In 1974,
a group of younger officers abolished the Caetano period. The transi-
tion from autocracy to democracy have changed the size and scope of
the government. Social welfare spending started to increase after 1974.
Considering social protection and access to health care, Portugal is still
one of the leading welfare states even though the majority of the growth
in social welfare spending has occured after 1974. The share of public
social spending is currently higher than the OECD average. It is the sec-
ond highest country after Japan with 7.5% increases in spending on old-
age benefits as a percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2009. Furthermore, the
spending on health care was only 0.2% and 3.3% of GDP in 1972 and 1980
respectively. By 2009, it reached a ratio of 7.7% of GDP, where the OECD
average accounted for 7.0% of GDP. The increased amount of spending on
pensions and health care are much more higher than the other social pol-
icy areas Portugal massively expanded the size and the scope of the other
expenditure types as well. By 2009, unemployment benefits were four
times higher than its level in 1980. Moreover expenditures on family and
survivor benefits had tripled compared to their 1980’s levels. Although
a small rise is occured, family allowances also increased from (1980 to
2009 (0.5% of to 2009 (0.6% of GDP). Democracy has brought an immense
change in the state and transformed it into a welfare state from a warfare
state(Cas95; OEC13f).
Spain: The transition to democracy in Spain was occured almost at
the same period as Portugal. Transition started in the era when the dic-
tatorship was ended and concluded with the completion of the Spanish
Constitution of 1978 after the establishment of Constituent Cortes (The
Spanish Parliament). Following the new constitution in 1978, massive
transformations were made up in social policy areas. The Constitution
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acknowledged social protection for all sectors and especially for the most
vulnerable (Art. 39: family and children, Art.48: young people, Art.49: the
handicapped, Art. 59: the elderly). All social security benefits came un-
der the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In ad-
dition, public health and relevant health programs were initiated to be
managed by the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs. From 1980
to 1993 there was a rapid, permanent increasing trend in total social ex-
penditures. However social expenditures started to fall down after the
begining of 1990s due to the global economic crisis. In 1993, the ratio of
the total government and mandatory private social expenditures to gross
domestic product was 23.1 per cent but it was one of the EU countries
that spent a lower proportion of its GDP on social welfare in 1994. A con-
siderable fall permanently continued for many years and could not reach
the level of 1993. Another massive fall in total social welfare spending oc-
cured in 2001 (19.8% of the GDP) which was explained by the strong GDP
growth rate and increasing trend in employment over the last five years.
The increase in employment rate reduced the amount of unemployment
benefits. Moreover, the reduction in the school-age population in this
period kept the education spending at lower level. Similarly, healthcare
spending also followed an downturning trend until 2000s after its highest
level in 1993. Public spending on family allowances followed a decreas-
ing trend as well. In 2009, Spain was the last country in terms of spending
on family allowances among OECD countries. It fell down 0.2% of GDP
points from 1980 to 2009(Kaz10; OEC13f).
Sweden: Sweden did not participate to the first world war but the
economic crisis of 1921-22 and the American crisis in 1929 caused a re-
cession period in the Swedish economy and it took many years before
the economy recover itself. In 1932, therefore, Swedish government de-
cided to apply some economic regulations which control unemployment
as the first priority. To control unemployment during the recession peri-
ods was the beginning of the policies which afterwards continue with the
Swedish Welfare System. The Swedish Welfare Model (1950-1980) aimed
at providing higher welfare status to citizens with a social responsibility
and it was a typical example which many countries pay attention due to
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its specific feature of being a unique combination of a capitalist structure
and a social market. As Esping-Andersen describes that it was a social
democratic model under capitalism. The system worked well and Swe-
den was one of the most successful western nations which had high level
economic growth from early 1950s to the late 1960s. Between 1960s and
1970s, the economy reached its peak. Despite the golden decades from
1950 to 1970, Sweden started to have problems in the mid 1970s with the
global oil crisis. Consequently, a cost crisis occured and Sweden lost its
international competitiveness. The cost crisis and the decreasing compet-
itiveness led to several devaluations of the swedish krona in 1980s. The
devaluation in 1982 was the reason for sharp increases in Swedish exports
and profits. Since 1980, Sweden has started to follow neoliberal welfare
policies which were only temporarily useful to keep the economy under
control. After the global crisis of the 1990s, the government attacked the
welfare state more and more. Total public and mandatory private social
spending (as a % of GDP) fell 30.6 percent from 1993 to 2007. Sweden had
the highest expenditure level on healthcare as a share of GDP in 1991 but
it was the 13th country in healthcare spending in 2007 among OECD-34
countries. Similarly, old-age pensions had a decreasing trend since 1993.
Survivor, unemployment benefits and family allowances also follow the
similar path(Ber11; OEC13f).
Switzerland: Themodern Swiss social welfare system is younger than
comparable countries. It was started with the initiation of the old age in-
surance in 1948. Similar to the United States, the Swiss social welfare
system is mainly federal. The federal government is responsible for the
major social insurance programs such as old-age pensions and maternity
benefits and they are ruled by federal law. The prevention of the poverty
and family allowances (payments to families with children) are the re-
sponsibility of the cantons rather than federal government. Therefore,
cantons and trade unions are also responsible for the social welfare deliv-
ery and they share the overall cost together with the federal government.
In 2009, the portion of total public and mandatory private social welfare
expenditures was 25.4% in gross domestic product. Between 1980 to 1995,
the proportion devoted to social welfare services was lower than the other
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comparable states and Switzerland was the 15th country in total public
andmandatory private social expenditures (as a % of GDP) amongOECD
countries. In the meantime, however, the level exceeded the OECD aver-
age. In 2009, it was the 8th highest country with respect to total public
and mandatory private social spending among OECD-34 countries. This
increasing trend after mid-1990s mainly relied on the social change with
the modernization of the state like changed role of the woman. After
the mid-1990s, social welfare services was extended (especially health-
care services) regarding of the important role of women in the society.
On the other hand, although until the end of the 1980s Switzerland had
virtually zero unemployment, the number of people out of the labor mar-
ket increased during the seven-year recession period in 1990s. It was an-
other reason of the increasing trend in total social spending, especially
in incapacity and unemployment benefits during 1990s, with the idea of
supporting people who were out of the labor market. Namely, the long
recession during the period of 1991-1996 concluded with the increases in
social services in contrast to situation in other OECD countries. Public
spending on family allowances has not followed an increasing trend but
has not decreased as well. It was following a stable trend from 1980 to
2009(Kaz10; OEC13f).
United States: The United States spends much less on social wel-
fare than most of the other OECD countries when we consider the dif-
ferences in the amount of social expenditures. In 2009, the United States
ranked 26th out of 34 countries in the OECD regarding to public social
expenditures. The percentage share of the public social spending in GDP
was 19.2 in 2009. Beside the public social welfare expenditures, US is
the country with highest gross private social spending among all the
other OECD countries (10.5% of GDP in 2009). Especially the increas-
ing number of old-age population and its positive effect on pension pro-
grammes largely accounts for an upward trend in private social expen-
diture which increased 16.7 per cent from 1980 to 2009. Private social
health spending and old-age pensions are the main spending items in the
US. Among all the other social expenditure categories, total (public and
private) health spending is at the top of the list with 14.4 percent of GDP.
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Total social expenditures on the old-age benefits has the second great-
est range with 11.0% of GDP. In 2009, United States spent only 4.7% of
its GDP on the other social policy areas such as unemployment (0.9% of
GDP), housing(0.0% of GDP), family(0.7% of GDP), active labor market
programmes(0.2% of GDP), incapacity related benefits(2.1% of GDP) and
survivor benefits (0.8% of GDP). Public spending on families is really be-
low the OECD average ( 0.7% of GDP in 2009). One of the reasons for the
low level public family spending is the inexistence of a paid maternity
leave policy. Amongst OECD-34 countries, US is the only country which
has not launched a paid maternity or parental leave. The second impor-
tant item of the public family spending is the expenditures on family al-
lowances, which was designed to support families with the cost of raising
children, was only 0.1% of GDP in 2009 and 0.5% of GDP in 1980(OEC13f).
United Kingdom: In the UK, total social expenditure is above the
OECD average (24%), accounting for 30.3 percent of GDP in 2009. The
biggest shares are old-age benefits and expenditures on health as is the
case with every country in the OECD. The UK is one of the OECD coun-
tries paying greater attendance to the private pension system to pro-
vide retirement benefits like Australia, Denmark, Mexico, Japan, Korea,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Germany, and the United States.The third
main spending item is expenditure on families with a propotion as 3.8
percent of GDP. Since 1997 the UK has increased public spending on fam-
ilies very rapidly. However family allowances has followed a decreas-
ing trend after 1985 and after 1990 remain at the same level around 0.8-
0.9% of GDP. The forth main social expenditure item is incapacity ben-
efits for people describing themselves as disabled due to a health con-
dition which makes them unable to work. Disability benefits are cost-
ing the United Kingdom more than many other countries in OECD. The
average social expenditures on incapacity benefits among the 34 OECD
members is 2.6 percent of GDP in 2009. The countries which spent more
than UK are Sweden(5.7%), Norway(6.4%), the Netherlands(4.2%), Lux-
embourg(3.6%), Germany(3.5%), Finland(4.8%) and Denmark(5.2%) out
of 34 countries. The United Kingdom spent only 6.0% of its GDP to other
social policy areas as unemployment (0.7% of GDP), housing(1.5% of
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GDP), active labor market programmes(0.3% of GDP),incapacity related
benefits(3.4% of GDP) and benefits on survivors(0.1% of GDP)(OEC13f).
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